HORIZONS
2015

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After the Storm: *Democracy and Development in a New Middle East*

Freedom of Expression and Transparency in Arab Media

Culture or Civilisation.
The Return of Political Extremism in the 21st Century

An Arab Marshall Plan:
A Partnership and Cooperation for the Future of the Middle East

Le Liban et la Suisse:
Regard croisé sur deux destins

Shared Living:
A Threatened Lebanese Ideal

National Security in Lebanon:
Towards a Comprehensive Approach

Innovative Ways to Deal with Violent Extremism

MAISON DU FUTUR

Horizons 2015

HORIZON'S
2015

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SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF MAISON DU FUTUR

AMINE GEMAYEL
Chairman of Maison du Futur

MAISON DU FUTUR has returned to the historic Saray in Bickfaya. Maison du Futur has returned after a compulsory absence, imposed by an eclipse of civilization at one point during the Lebanese War. Maison du Futur dates back to the mid-1970s. It was the leading studies and research center in Lebanon and the wider Middle East, and also a haven for the elite and people of dialogue where they found a space to overcome all boundaries. All parties met, away from violence and weapons for

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the sake of Lebanese accord, which I fought to achieve during, before and after my term as president.

At that time, Maison du Futur shone as a beacon of light in a community accustomed to practicing politics with no consideration whatsoever for the future. Alas, the past, the present and the future took their revenge. However, so that we do not remain victims, Maison du Futur opens its doors again and welcomes all the Lebanese people, as well as Arabs and people from all over the world, to take part in the development of man through education, growth and values, in other words, through dialogue.

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Maison du Futur regains its role amidst tragic Lebanese and Arab circumstances.In Lebanon, there is an open, national crisis, and in the Arab world, there are revolutions with no horizons, wars with no restrictions and regimes with no future. Our peoples seem to disagree over all matters, after they thought that they see eye to eye on everything. They disagree over God and Man, over regimes and entities, over identity and lifestyles. In the name of History, we abolish modernity. In the name of change, we destroy our fellow men and by returning to our roots we wipe them out. We are given an opportunity to have a say in our fate, but we turn it into a chance to annihilate our fate.

Today we are invited to put an end to the deterioration of

Lebanon and the collapse of the Arab world. We are invited to regain our fate and destiny, and to put aside all trivial considerations during this era of sweeping conflicts. If it is challenging to come up with solutions to the Arab wars, marked by blood, terrorism and fighting, then why fall into that trap? What is stopping us from creating a decent future for us and for the new generations? What is stopping the Lebanese people from solving their national crisis by resorting to their Constitution and electing a president?

The ongoing presidential vacancy threatens the Republic, and not the presidency alone. Disrupting the constitutional process is a coup against the regime, and overthrowing the regime negates the Lebanese entity humanly and as a

geographic territory. We turn to our national partners and call upon them to reveal our true intentions. Enough with the scheming! Loyalty to Lebanon commands us to elect a president. Failure to elect a president only discredits loyalty of those disrupting the election.

Until recently, I used to think that the salvation of Lebanon and the Middle East requires that citizens change from sectarian citizens to state citizens, only to find out that, in light of the raging wars, this transformation is not enough. What we need is for citizens to change to human citizens. We were created in the image of God, but we act in the image of Satan. How else would you describe what happened and what is happening in Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Iran,

Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Libya and Afghanistan? (And more is yet to come).

The attempt to bring about change in the Middle East started with a political opposition, followed by a popular opposition, which turned into a fundamentalist then military opposition. Today, it has entered the realms of *takfiri* terrorism. For longtime, we were left between the choice of military regimes or revolutions, then between military regimes or terrorism. However, some are calling us today, in unprecedented insolence, to choose among an array of fundamentalist terrorist organizations: al-Nusra, Daesh, the Houthis and al-Qaeda.

Despite the volatile conflict between the East and the West, it seems sometimes that they agree

on breeding some kind of extremism. The East grows more radical in the name of religion, while the West grows radical in the name of freedom to the point of moral degradation. In the name of religion, Eastern people are drawn away from spirituality, and in the name of freedom, Western people are drawn away from values in their historical sense. In our region, religion has turned into apostasy and there secularism has turned into atheism. While religion and freedom are as far as can be from extremism, ironically the East and the West are using as motto for war the defense of values, God and people. It is a deadly intentional ambiguity.

Based on this reality that threatens our Lebanese and Arab existence, let us look together for real solutions instead of getting sucked up into crises and wars. The earnestness of these efforts requires that the rulers and leaders of Eastern countries involve academic and thought leaders to lay down a strategy for solutions, because the problematic strategies which some of us blame the West for are not laid down by Western governments exclusively, but by research and analysis centers and are later adopted by governments.

Peoples do not live by national and philosophical theories that hinder their progress, but on programs that carry societies from inaction to modernity and innovation, and from the trinity of illiteracy, ignorance and violence to the trinity of education, development and values. Every actor in national affairs, whether king, president, leader or party, needs an ideological backbone for protection against improvisation and arbitrariness.

Maison du Futur aims to be an intellectual reference for social movement, in partnership with similar institutions in the Middle East and the world. Maison du Futur can, in utmost intellectual and academic independence, support those active in the public field with projects, studies and scientific and objective data to be able to carry out their national and external roles. After a forced, temporary absence, Maison du Futur, in partnership with the German Marshall Fund of the United States, held a conference in Washington, entitled *"After the Storm, Democracy and Development in the Middle East."* It also organized a conference in Beirut in cooperation with Conrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, under the title *"Media and Freedom of Expression"*, and another in Bikfayya, at these new headquarters, in partnership with Dutch NEXSUS, entitled *"Is the European Extremist Ideology on the Rise Again?"*

As part of these efforts, Maison du Futur plans to gradually introduce many initiatives, at the Lebanese and Arab levels, chiefly:

– *First:* By the end of this month, on May 30th, and at these headquarters, it will hold a conference on a civilized, developmental Marshall Project for the Arab World, while keeping up with the ongoing negotiations to put an end to wars, reconcile peoples and re-

build destroyed countries. You are all invited to take part along Arab and international experts. People in Lebanon and the Middle East feel the need to work together, in partnership, to build instead of wreak havoc, war and destruction.

– *Second:* Mobilize the Lebanese and Arab elite to promote the spirit of partnership, moderation and tolerance, instead of terrorism and different types of fundamentalism, and also promote human rights and empower women. I had previously launched in this context the Charter-Framework for Arab revolutions and alternative regimes.

– *Third:* In cooperation with Lebanese, Arab and international institutions, we plan on organizing training sessions to prepare new elite groups to practice transparent governance in managing the affairs of the state and the people.

The Maison du Futur workshop is ambitious, requiring perseverance, attention and time. I intend to dedicate my time, energy and expertise to launch and follow this initiative.

AFTER THE STORM: DEMOCRACY and DEVELOPMENT IN A NEW MIDDLE EAST

WASHINGTON, DC
[DECEMBER 10, 2013]

On Tuesday, December 10th the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) partnered with the Beirut, Lebanon – based Maison du Futur to host the all-day conference, "After the Storm: Democracy and Development in a New Middle East".

The event brought together representatives of the United States Government, expert observers, and academics to discuss the causative variables and plausible outcomes of the historic events that have been shaping the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) for the past three years. Mr. Ivan Vejvoda, Vice President of Programs of GMF, provided opening remarks and introduced the keynote speaker, Amine Gemayel, former President of Lebanon. Hassan Mneimneh, Senior Transatlantic fellow at GMF, moderated the event.

H.E Gemayel began by contextualizing the nature of the upheaval sweeping the MENA region, asking whether these events are the catalyst of a new era of democracy, or the start of long term turbulence and war. He continued his analysis by illustrating the historical parallels of the MENA region today and that of post-war Eu-

SESSION II | DEVELOPMENT IN AN UNEVEN ENVIRONMENT: DISPARITY IN WEALTH, DEFICIT IN TRUST, AND THE PROSPECTS OF SUSTAINABLE GROWTH IN A CHANGING GEO-STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE

Moderator: Samuel Menassa, *Maison du Futur.*

Robert McFarlane, *Institute for the Analysis of Global Security.*

Saleh M. Nsouli, *Former Director, International Monetary Fund.*

Joshua Walker, *German Marshall Fund of the United States*

Temuri Yakobashvili, *German Marshall Fund of the United States.*

CONCLUDING REMARKS BY HE AMINE GEMAYEL AND HASSAN MNEIMNEH

rope in the 1940s. He listed infrastructure reconstruction, an intellectual counterbalance to political extremism, and government reforms as needed recipes for redevelopment in MENA region today just as they were needed in post-war Europe. From this basis, Gemayel proposed an "Arab Marshall Plan" that will utilize civil society, technology, and youth to bolster education, the economy, and democracy throughout the Arab world.

Gemayel's presentation was followed by the beginning of the first discussion session that centered on the concept of democracy in a pluralistic environment. As moderator, Hassan Mneimneh provided the initial focus of the discourse by introducing a theme of dichotomous outlooks for the region: pessimistic and optimistic. He cited the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen as examples of the positive forces catalyzing change, and contrasted those events with the multitude of challenges incumbent in the region; the vast water shortages and the Syrian civil war were two examples mentioned.

Presentations made by the invited discussants expanded on the theme of dichotomy and were then followed by moderated discussion. Each discussant provided their own unique perspective on the current political changes in the region, and what approaches should be used to ensure that positive change is realized. Sami Aoun, Professeur titulaire at École de politique appliquée de l'Université de Sherbrooke, examined the barriers toward greater democratization to emerging threats and more imminent threats, and argued that the wider global forces of democratization, liberalization, and secularization are the positive forces that combat those threats. Adding to the discussion was Karen Volker, Director of Volker Solutions, who brought her own experiences from civil society to outline some of the both successful and failed approaches used by USAID in Central and Easter Europe during the 1990s.

Following lunch, the conference was interposed by a short presentation by Mark Cunningham, Managing Director of Grantmaking at

GMF, on GMF's recently formed MENA partnerships for Democracy and Development. After describing the aims and approaches of the MENA partnership, a lively discussion followed by participants around the table. In one exchange John Bell offered his own advice to Cunningham by arguing that simply providing money to civil society organizations will be ineffective. Instead, he argued, providing real tangible benefits like water resources and education will have a greater impact on the region. To that point Cunningham agreed with Bell, and emphasized that a key approach of the MENA partnership is to operate as a facilitator of resources, and to have its strategies be indigenous in origin.

Samuel Menassa, General Manager of Radio Voice of Lebanon, moderated the second discussion session titled "Development in an uneven environment: Disparity in wealth, deficit in trust, and the prospects of sustainable growth". Here the main theme was of a more economic nature. Saleh M. Nsouli, Former Director of European Offices at the International Monetary Fund, provided a clear picture of the dire economic problems the regions faces. He outlined possible prescriptions that can improve the outlook of the region's growth, such as reenergizing credit institutions, restoring financial stability and promoting FDI to the region. To counter Nsoulis's presentation, Robert C. McFarlane, Chairman of Mc-

Farlane Associates, strove to understand the nature of the turmoil in the region. He stated the need for greater access to justice in order to combat oppression. He also specified how the rise of global energy demands will shape the Middle East in the near future. While there is a growing demand for oil, prices are reaching historic levels. This is driving larger research and development in renewable energies, which can give great impact on the region's economy. Joshua Walker emphasized the need to view the region collectively, rather than each revolution separately and in isolation to its neighbors. His comments prompted a discussion of the role of the United States, Europe, Turkey, and Iran in future. Yacoub Haddad, of AbbVie Biopharmaceuticals, raised the issue of healthcare and highlighted the need to move toward a multidisciplinary approach of increasing efficiency and, in turn, preventative medicine.

Questions raised by the second discussion session included the role of Erdoğan's Turkey and the responsibility of local actors, if and how an orderly transition may be achieved, education, and similarities within Tunisia and its changing role. Amine Gemayel and Hassan Mneimneh provided the concluding remarks for the conference, closing the day's timely and positive conversations and productive debate.

بعد العاصفة: الديمقراطية والتنمية في الشرق الأوسط الجديد

عقدت في العاصمة الأميركية واشنطن خلوة مشتركة بين بيت المستقبل ومؤسسة جيرمان مارشال فاند عقدت يوم الثلاثاء في ١٠ كانون الأول / ديسمبر تحت عنوان «بعد العاصفة: الديمقراطية والتنمية في الشرق الأوسط الجديد». افتتح الرئيس أمين الجميل الخلوة بالدعوة إلى وضع خطة مارشال عربية إصلاحية في سياق حاجة «الشرق الأوسط المضطرب إلى مبادرة إصلاحية وإنمائية»، وأكد عزم «بيت المستقبل ومؤسسة جيرمان فاند على استنفاد كلّ الفرص لمواصلة دعمهما للنخب المتنورة الساعية إلى إحداث تغيير جذري في العالم العربي... والمساعدة على بناء شرق أوسط أفضل ضمن إطار الحرية والسلام والاستقرار والتعددية وحقوق الإنسان».

وعن التحولات التي يشهدها العالم العربي، سأل الرئيس الجميل إذا كنا «نشهد بزوغ فجر عهد جديد من الاستقرار والرخاء، أم نحن أمام تداعيات جديدة وطويلة الأمد من موجات الحرب والدمار؟». ولفت الرئيس الجميل أنه على الرغم من موجة التشاؤم التي تظلل مستقبل المنطقة، هناك «توجّه يعتبر الشرق الأوسط منطقة ازدهار يعوّل عليها، إذ تشهد معدلات نمو مرتفعة لمؤشرات رئيسة، مثل رأس المال البشري وروح المبادرة والموارد الطبيعية وتكنولوجيا المعلومات». كما أشار إلى «أن العالم العربي على استعداد لإطلاق المبادرات وتطويرها بغرض إعادة بناء الحوكمة الرشيدة وتداول السلطة سلميا وتعزيز الشفافية وضمان الحرية والتعددية».

ودعا الرئيس الجميل إلى إطلاق خطة مارشال عربية من أجل الحرية والتعددية والحوكمة الرشيدة، على أساس تعاون عربي ـ غربي يقوم على «أنماط جديدة من الشراكة بين الشرق والغرب، وليس على أساس ممارسة الوصاية التي أفسدت العلاقة بين الأفرقاء سابقا والتي فقدت صدقيتها». وحدد أهداف هذه الخطة بالإصلاح الاقتصادي من خلال إعمار البنى التحتية وتحقيق التنمية الاقتصادية المستدامة، وبإصلاح المؤسسات من خلال المساعدة على تأسيس نظم حوكمة جديدة تقوم على الانفتاح والشفافية، وبالإصلاح الفكري من خلال تجديد أنظمة التعليم وتفعيل الحوار العقلاني وتعزيز قوى الاعتدال في كفاحها العادل والمحق ضد التطرف وتفعيل سبل تشجيع المجتمعات المتعددة على العيش بسلام.

ودعا الرئيس الجميل إلى عقد لقاءات ومؤتمرات أخرى تتبع هذه الخلوة الافتتاحية، تنخرط فيها مجموعة كبيرة من الشركاء العرب والأجانب وتهدف إلى وضع تصوّر ـ إطار مشترك لمبادرة بيت المستقبل ومؤسسة جيرمان مارشال فاند لتحقيق هذه الأهداف بنجاح وفعالية باعتبارها مسارًا طويل الأمد يتطلب الدراسة والتفكير والعمل.

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amine gemayel
Maison du Futur Chairman

welcoming address

Dear colleagues, ladies and gentlemen,

Thank you for participating in this seminar, convened jointly by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Maison du Futur in Lebanon.

As founder and director of the Maison du Futur, it is my profound hope and expectation that today we inaugurate a long and fruitful collaboration between the MdF and the GMF.

To my dear friend, President Craig Kennedy – and to the GMF's Vice President, Mr. Ivan Vejvoda – I say a heartfelt "thank you."

It has been due to your distinguished leadership that this conference and related initiatives have been launched.

I must also express gratitude to my friend and colleague Dr. Hassan Mneimneh, who has worked tirelessly to give shape and form to the shared GMF-MdF goal of improving conditions in the Middle East.

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As you all know, the Arab world is experiencing a great transformation of vast proportions and import, but the question that cannot be answered yet is this:

"Are we witnessing the dawn of a new era of stability and prosperity, or the first eruptions of another long cycle of war and destruction in the Middle East?"

Evidence can be marshaled to support both pessimistic and optimistic visions. Yet the MdF and the GMF are determined to seize every opportunity to keep faith with the

brave reformists pursuing fundamental change in the Arab world.

The MdF-GMF partnership accepts the challenge of helping to build a better Middle East defined by peace, stability, and human rights.

The narrative of the Middle East as a zone of conflict and instability finds easy confirmation in the big war now raging in Syria, and in a set of smaller violent conflicts that simmer and flare up in other crisis zones, including Lebanon.

Yet a counter-narrative also exists, even if it receives far less attention than it deserves.

This is a story of the Middle East as a zone of growth, where remarkable growth in key indicators like human capital, natural resources, and Information Technology are witnessed.

So, on the one hand, raging turmoil has led to the atrophy or outright collapse of governmental and social institutions in places like Yemen, Libya, Egypt and other Arab countries…

On the other hand, the Arab world is well positioned to launch and advance initiatives to rebuild better governance, enhance transparency and accountability, and – finally – ensure liberty, pluralism and freedom.

Reform efforts must focus on post-conflict reconstruction, new systems of education, economic development, and quality of social welfare.

The growth narrative that the MdF-GMF partnership must embody has the potential to improve not only the Middle East, but also the world economy and even global geopolitics.

But the positive narrative must be nurtured and empowered from within the region.

Arab champions of the growth narrative – including political leaders, technocrats, and academics – must cooperate with counterparts from the liberal democracies to build momentum based on new patterns of partnership, not the discredited practices of paternalism.

Even amid *"The storm,"* it is necessary – as we are doing here today – to forsee and consider the dictates and necessities of the post-tempest, post-crisis period that will eventually arise.

The institution named in honor of George Marshall can claim a special heritage and expertise in the vital enterprise of forging transformative coalitions.

Mindful of General Marshall's legacy, let us reflect for a moment on three parallels between conditions of post-World War II Europe, and realities that will prevail in the Middle East, post-Arab Awakening:

First, the requirement for physical reconstruction and economic development.

Second, the necessity for what can be called *"inspirational moderation"* to check the dangerous appeal of extremism.

In Europe the threat came from political extremism named Communism, in the Middle East it is religious extremism called terrorism.

Third, the need for new systems of governance, both domestically and on the level of regional cooperation.

Just as the historical Marshall Plan was an accelerator of economic

development, political moderation, and international cooperation, I firmly believe that today what I call an *"Arab Marshall Plan for Freedom, Pluralism & Governance"* could help transform the troubled Middle East.

In terms of freedom and pluralism, the proposed *"Arab Marshall Plan"* could give priority to education and dialogue to promote solutions of togetherness and respect for pluralism.

These and related educational measures can be bundled under the theme: *"Evolution of minds while maintaining identities."*

In terms of governance, the *"Arab Marshall Plan"* could focus on issues of openness, transparency, and the rotation of power.

We can call this approach: *"Reform of institutions."*

Above all, the *"Arab Marshall Plan"* must emphasize the promise of partnership as something separate and distinct from the old paternalism.

The historical Marshall Plan succeeded because it encouraged Europeans to cooperate with each other and – based on that cooperation – to build enduring partnerships.

Likewise, the *"Arab Marshall Plan"* must encourage talented Arabs in key sectors of state and society – especially the youth – to cooperate with each other across sectarian, ethnic, and national boundaries, and then to build lasting relationships with international partners, especially in Europe and North America.

Programs and activities of the new, *"Arab Marshall Plan"* should be designed to strengthen the Middle East's growth narrative.

This can be done by utilizing Information Technology and media to open up new public spaces and to energize the forces of moderation in their just struggle against extremism.

Civil society actors, especially those supported by the youth, have already transformed the region's political landscape.

The old military dictatorships are dead, dying, or – as in Egypt – forced to negotiate and compromise with the youthful forces of change.

In the Middle East, the growth narrative and civil society are co-dependent; they will rise or fall in tandem.

To prevent the worst, a coordinated and long-term effort is needed.

Ladies and gentlemen,

To achieve success our Maison du Futur-German Marshall Fund joint initiative must be conceived and implemented as a long-term process involving study, reflection, and action.

This inaugural meeting must be followed by other conferences involving an ever-expanding array of partners representing a diversity of interests, institutions, and constituencies.

To survive and thrive, the *"growth narrative"*, I mentioned a moment ago, must attract a network of supporting actors – Arab, European, North American, Russian, Japanese, and others.

During today's proceedings and others to be held in the future, the MdF and GMF invite a broad range of individuals and institutions to contribute their ideas and resources to the great tasks awaiting us.

Thank you.

SAMI AOUN SYNOPSIS

Notion of citizenship: the renewal of debate within the Arab spring.
The collapse of post-colonial Nation state and the need of a new citizenship debate.

The contribution undertakes a reinterpretation of the problem of internal conflicts and civil wars in the Middle East from the perspective of citizenship and rights. The central argument is that although the genealogy and dimensions of conflicts and civil wars are quite complex and varied; underlying most of these conflicts, especially those that erupted within the last years, is the issue of citizenship and rights. The development of a new concept of citizenship in the national polity that would go hand in hand with the nation-building process.

Actually citizenship is considered officially to be one of the key elements of successful nation-building.

The purpose is to consider the extent to which issues related of "constitutional citizenship" and "dual citizenship" are integral parts of the current citizenship debate within the Arab spring.

The concept of citizenship has received renewed interest, since globalization has become a popular issue in particular within the turmoil of the Arab spring. Various political events and trends throughout the Arab world are seen as being responsible for the increasing global importance of the concept of citizenship: for instance, the resurgence of political islamism and nationalist movements; the stresses created by an

increasingly multicultural and multiracial or multi religious population; the refugee problem which has created a new crisis of stateless persons in the Arab world.

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JOE KHOURY SYNOPSIS

My paper is about change in the mindsets of ordinary people and how failing to respond to such change by the system of governance leads to instability and turbulence.

I will be talking about mindsets of a more durable nature than public opinion: key case study Egypt, though it is possible to quote Lebanon and Arab countries as well.

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JOHN BELL SYNOPSIS

This is the basic concept of what I'd like to talk about:

The main focus of Arab political reform, before and after the revolutions, has been focused on terms like democracy, accountability, rights, and the traditional political structures related to these primarily Western terms. The focus on future political development, and the related resource expenditure is therefore mostly aimed in that direction.

However, this approach ignores the fundamental failure in "political culture" in the Arab world: the lack of trust between individuals as well as various identity groups. This deep-seated political habit ("culture") undermines any democratic structure erected in the region, or

attempts to develop consensus within or towards such structures. In other words, the Arab world suffers from a problem of political software as much, or much more, than one of political hardware.

How is it possible to address such an intangible and apparently diffi-cult challenge? Certainly, long term education regarding citizenship, po-litical involvement and pluralism is one solution, but there may also be others: Sometimes indirect methods of approaching the same issue, in-cluding those that address cultural habits within the Arab world that may be direct impediments.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION and TRANSPARENCY IN ARAB MEDIA

LE GABRIEL HOTEL, BEIRUT
[FEBRUARY 6, 2015]

INTRODUCTION

Despite a few variances [http://www.skeyes-media.org/en/Reports] among Arab countries in terms of censorship and violence against journalists, Arab journalists and media institutions are usually confronted with similar challenges.

According to Reporters Without Borders 2015 index [http://index.rsf.org/#!/], all Arab countries – except for Lebanon and Kuwait – were very poorly ranked. The reasons pertaining to the low ranking of media in the Arab world in terms of freedom of expression and transparency can be attributed to many reasons, but generally to the states' control of the broadcasting sector, political pressure – governments, the military or political parties – in addition to the unprofessionalism of media organizations and schools.

The Arab Spring opened the public space to the people, mainly to social media and citizen journalists, who used the transformations in the Arab streets to boost freedom of expression and set a new ceiling. However, state or political con-

PANEL 3 | MASS MEDIA AND SOCIAL MEDIA: BETWEEN COMPLIMENTARITY AND DIVERGENCE

Moderator: Rabih Haber, *Journalist, Lebanon Files*.

From News Placement and Broadcasting to Engagement and Networking
Speakers: Eli Khoury CEO, *Quantum*.
Gino Raidy.

PANEL 4 | THE ARAB TV EXPERIENCE

Moderator: Nadim Koteish, *Talk show host, Future TV*.

Transparency amid Regional Discrepancy
Speakers: Mushriq Abbas, *Bureau Chief of Al Hayat Newspaper – Iraq*.
Dr. May Chidiac, *Journalist and President of May Chidiac Foundation (MCF) Media Insitute*.

PANEL 5 | SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Hanin Ghaddar, *Managing Editor – Now Lebanon*.

trol ensued right after new governments took place and the crackdown on bloggers and journalists increased. Egypt is a perfect example of how media's freedom evolved briefly before it dropped down to its worst levels.

A Free media is not necessarily a credible media. Freedom of expression is not enough if not accompanied by professional standards, credibility and accountability, in addition to a modern media law that guarantees its freedom and efficiency. Without a free and credible media, and without access to information, true transition to democracy and reform will always be hindered.

Based on this approach, MDF "Maison du Futur" and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung organized a one-day roundtable discussion among journalists and media professionals. The discussion took place on the 6th of February, 2015, and the panels addressed the topic of freedom of expression and transparency in the Arab world's media institutions.

Mr. Sam Menassa, from MDF, opened the discussion with a note on the significance of media for the evolution and development of the Arab world "after the storm." MDF plans to kick-off a comprehensive Marshal plan for the region, which would address political, social, cultural and economic advancement. All this will be based on good-governance initiatives, in addition to educational and economic development plans. Freedom of expression is significant for this kind of reform and development, especially when it comes to the role media can play in terms of boosting transparency across the board. To play this role, media institutions need to be transparent as well.

SESSION I:
TRANSPARENCY AND ITS CHALLENGES

All attendees agreed that without transparency, media is not independent. But what is transparency in media? Transparency is the transparency of the news, but it also means that the administration and the management of media institutions should also be transparent

about their resources, funding and sources, in addition to how day-to-day news gathering is managed. These are usually absent from Arab institutions for the following reasons:

– Sources of funding and sponsorship of governments and political parties challenge institutions' credibility and therefore its independence.

– Media laws do not give journalists access to information.

– Media schools and curriculums are outdated and graduates usually lack the minimal level of professionalism.

In the session on Challenges and opportunities of transparency in Arab media, Giselle Khoury – BBC Arabic host – stressed that the Lebanese media law is outdated to guarantee journalists' right to access information.

She introduced Pascale Monin, professor and director of the department of media and communications at USJ. Monin said that it is difficult to have transparency in media which functions in a country where transparency is absent on all levels. Media in Lebanon is owned by or affiliated with political powers or personalities, making both journalists and the audience mere tools that repeat the rhetoric of the party or political group. Lebanese media law made sure to distribute media institutions among political parties and sects, leaving no room for independent media that could actually hold political parties and figures accountable.

According to Monin, the Lebanese government and public institutions are not allowed to share information with journalists. The absence of open sources on this level makes it almost impossible for journalists to get information and subsequently inform the public. Journalists eventually abandon their role and duties to fact-check information and deliver credible information.

Monin gave three recommendations to foster professionalism and transparency in media:

1. Reconsider and moderate the media law in Lebanon, in terms of allowing the establishment of newspapers. Otherwise, publications will be owned by the same sects and parties.

2. Establish necessary laws that would allow journalists to access information.

3. Modernize and revamp media schools and departments – and curriculums – in order to produce a new generation of professional journalists.

On the same issue, Abdel Wahab Badrakhan blamed both media institutions and state authorities for the lack of transparency. According to Badrakhan, without access to information, media institutions and journalists cannot be transparent, and without freedom, transparency cannot be confirmed. Access to information and freedom are two signs of a healthy democracy. However, Badrakhan said that this is still far-fetched in our societies, even after the Arab Spring attempts to call for freedom.

An example of the lack of transparency and freedom in Arab media is the simple failure to answer the question of ISIS in our media. Our take on this issue usually leaves the audience with more questions than answers regarding ISIS' resources, funding and strategies.

Session II :
Security and Self-Censorship

Another issue brought up during the discussion is the issue of self-censorship. Nada Abdel Samad from BBC Arabic brought up the issue of personal safety – away from laws and regulations. In the midst of wars conflicts and the absence of protection, journalists tend to censor their own work because of the fear factor.

The fear of assassination or arbitrary arrests is based on a number of precedencies all over the Arab world. Even if one complies with every law and regulation, it does not mean that they are safe. Threatening journalists has become a very common practice in our region, but the absence of protection measure for journalists – especially independent journalists – has amplified self-censorship.

She also stressed that in times of conflict, objectivity in media becomes meaningless. Although everyone agreed that the objectivity of news means to report everything, with no regard to political agendas or affiliations, Abdel Samad raised the issue of ISIS in the media. According to her, broadcasting all ISIS' videos and statements could be indirectly assisting ISIS' media strategy. This is what ISIS wants and by giving them a platform in our media, we are incidentally helping them. She also called for a new definition of transparency, taking into consideration the impact of giving ISIS a platform in the name of objectivity and transparency.

During the same panel, AnNahar Deputy Editor in Chief Nabil Bou Monsef stressed the significance of professional standards in journalism. However, Bou Monsef assured the discussants that objectivity does not contradict opinion. A professional journalist does not have to be neutral. Reporting news requires the utmost of objectivity; but media is not only about news. Analysis should involve opinion and that's essential, especially during critical times and conflicts. Bou Monsef concluded that a journalist should carry a message.

SESSION III :
SOCIAL MEDIA AND TRADITIONAL MEDIA

Right after Bou Monsef emphasized classical professional standards, a new panel discussed the relation between social and traditional media.

According to Eli Khoury – CEO of Quantum – channels of expression differ, but at the end of the day, content is based on the same tools : the picture and the word. Today, these tools have become digital, but social media is more often operating outside a professional framework.

Therefore, Khoury stressed, "The issue is to focus on the professional rhetoric instead of the channels of this rhetoric".

Lebanese blogger Gino Raidy spoke about the high reach of social media in comparison to traditional media. For example, while there are 1.2 or 1.4 million Lebanese who watch Lebanese TV channels, there are 1.5 million Lebanese on Facebook, 1.1 million of which visit FB every day. On YouTube, there are 300 videos every minute. According to Raidy, social media and traditional media should work together and try to complement each other's work, instead of competing against each other.

Raidy also discussed how Social Media helps him and other journalists understand how people think and what topics they're interested in, but social media – despite its reach – really requires credibility and the trust of the audience. It is a free-of-charge channel, but its currency is trust.

At the end of the day, the reader decides what to read and they have the authority, concluded Khoury.

session iv :
arab conflicts and arab tv channels

Head of the Al-Hayat office in Baghdad, Mushreq Abbas, raised two points. First, he stressed the issue of internal sensitivities within each countries and why media institutions fail to address them. He emphasized the importance of taking these sensitivities and specifics into consideration while covering different countries in the region.

Second, Abbas brought up the role of the reader/receiver of news and how they gained more responsibility due to the increase of sources of news and their affiliations. The audience is now expected to double-check the information they receive and try to validate it through various sources.

May Chidiac, MSF president, put the same emphasis on the role of the audience. When transparency and objectivity are absent in our media, the viewer should make extra effort and go out of their comfort zone to try to watch more than one channel – with different agendas and views – in order to understand the story.

Chidiac said that the audience is part of the problem, because they do not hold media institutions accountable. On the contrary, they support their agendas and promote them. There is always a relation between the ignorance of the audience and the lack of transparency in media. The more viewers act as blind followers instead of observers with critical approach, the more media tends to hide information and avoid transparency. Eventually, media becomes part of the hatred and sectarian rhetoric which ignites conflict.

The role of the journalist here becomes crucial. If media institutions do not require transparency and objectivity, it all becomes the job of the journalist – as an individual – to act professionally and determine their priorities. But Chidiac – despite her stress on the significance of objectivity in media – went back to the earlier debate on objectivity and neutrality through a different angle. Chidiac discussed the importance of "positive subjectivity" during times of conflict and on issues related to sovereignty, independence, freedom, and human rights. According to Chidiac, a journalist cannot be neutral or a mere observer when injustice is being practiced against people.

CONCLUSION

It was obvious throughout the conference that the security situation and conflict in the Middle East have a big impact on any discussion on media and transparency. The safety of the journalist often weighs on his/her decision to be professional, objective or transparent.

Therefore, the question that still needs a more thorough discussion is how to protect the journalist from threats on their personal safety. The mechanisms are not easy to implement during war times, but there are channels or measures that media professionals could resort to in case of risk.

When journalists feel secure, they could be able to focus more on the professional standards of writing or producing news. In the notes attached to its 2015 Index, RSF "REPORTERS SANS FRONTIERES", noted that many of the armed conflicts of the past year were partly conducted as information wars. "The opposing sides attempted to shut down independent news sources or use them to broadcast their own propaganda," RSF reported, implying that truth is the first casualty of war.

National security has always been used to justify restrictions on press freedom and basic civil and human rights. In the Arab world, especially after the Arab Spring, people are presented with a choice; freedom or stability, but never both. If you chose freedom at the risk of insecurity – as people or journalists – it means that you are responsible for your own safety.

However, conflicts also present non-govermental groups who do not even give the journalist this choice. For example, in Syria, Iraq and Libya, militias have killed journalists in the name of religion or national security, and no one was held responsible. RSF reported that 66 journalists were killed in 2014. The most threatening countries for journalists' lives were Syria, where 15 died, followed by Iran, Eritrea, Eastern Ukraine, Iraq and Libya.

The Arab world is currently a turbulent place for journalists, but it doesn't mean that media institutions or journalists should give up to the status-co and surrender their integrity and professionalism. That's why this discussion should continue.

CULTURE OR CIVILISATION. THE RETURN OF POLITICAL EXTREMISM IN THE 21ST CENTURY

A Lecture and Conversation by
ROB RIEMEN
Founder and President of the International Nexus Institute

MAISON DU FUTUR, BIKFAYA
[APRIL 27, 2015]

Good afternoon everybody!

I feel extremely privileged to be invited by "Maison du Futur" and also to be able to share my thoughts on what I think is an extremely important topic.

I am afraid that I am an old fashioned European intellectual, so I prepared a very serious lecture. I hope that after my lecture we can have a discussion on my views.

I wanted to tackle the return of political extremism, but I gave it a new title which is "Culture or Civilization", and I decided to speak and share with you my views on culture or civilization because as you may remember in 1993, Samuel Huntington, one of the most important political scientists predicted what he called "a clash of civilizations". The idea that we are facing a clash of civilizations still has a strong political impact because, especially, in my part of the world it still dominates many people's view on Islam and the region which is dominated by Islam.

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I think it is very unfortunate, as the idea of the clash of civilizations is the main cause of wars, and political extremism is in my opinion fundamentally wrong. Huntington should have made the distinction between culture and civilization, and the reason for not making this distinction is that he forgot or was not aware of the fact that the term culture has a double and even a contradicting meaning.

The original meaning of culture comes, as many of you shall know, from Cicero's expression "cultura animi" which means "the cultivation of the human soul". Of course, this idea of Cicero is the translation of Socrates' idea of Phaedo which is the Greek expression for the idea that every human being carries the spiritual principle inside him or her which is the image of our true being, and that our life is one ongoing effort to educate ourselves to live according to who we should be instead of who we are.

So culture in its original meaning is a moral concept, it is a critical notion. As my friend Georges Tinabel said, "culture is about coming to our better selves." Culture, in this meaning, is indeed indispensable for any form of civilization. However, culture also has another meaning which is more often used; therefore culture is longer a normative concept, but it is descriptive. It is the anthropological description of customs, beliefs, tradition, etc, according to which a certain group lives. Not every culture is compatible with the notion of civilization; in fact some cultures clash with civilization. So the future will not be deterred by hunted guns, clash of civilizations but by the clash with civilization. I identified three cultures which are dominating our society and will always clash with civilization. The three cultures are:

1- The culture of religious fundamentalism.

2- The culture of fascism in each dominated mass democracy.

3- The culture of high tech, scientific world view

These three cultures have their own characteristics. On one hand, they are completely different from each other, but on the other hand they have four characteristics in common. All three different cultures, and based on their four characteristics, will clash with civilization because all four incorporate:

a- The denial of human nature

b- The denial of human freedom

c- The denial of human excellence

d- The denial of the grammar of life

Those four denials combined make clear what the ultimate denial always is, the denial of human dignity. Human dignity is the celebration and cultivation that makes the essence of any form of civilization. You cannot have civilization without the celebration of cultivation and human dignity. These three cultures are not everywhere on the globe but are becoming more and more dominant. Civilization in the civilized world and its citizens is in retreat everywhere. In the variety of crisis which are manifest everywhere, the financial, social, economic, political, democratic, religious and environmental crisis are no more than different expressions of the world crisis we are facing, which is the crisis of civilizations. Yet, we are facing this crisis again! So we will find out what the consequences will be when civilization indeed collapses, and that's always violence, war, destruction and self-destruction. As we are now living in the nuclear age, it is even imaginable that we are facing the destruction of mother earth herself. For instance, we are all part of mankind and we have no choice but to accept the obligation to act wisely and decisively.

This starts by understanding what these cultures are about, why they are attractive to many people, although they are so destructive, and last but not least, what's to be done?

Let me start with the first culture, the religious fundamentalism. In nowadays media culture, religious fundamentalism is mostly associated with Islam extremism, in particular the Islamic State. Obviously, religious fundamentalism exists in all times and all religions: Christianity with its crusades, the Klu Klux Klan in the U.S. has its own legacy of men burning and beheading. All of these actions are done under the pretext that the others are heretics and represent the incarnation of the devil, etc. What lies behind this horror and why religious fundamentalism will always clash with civilization is their denial of human nature; their denial of the fact that we human beings do have a physical nature; that we have our senses, that we have a sexual instinct, and that there is something like female beauty. They try to deny it as much as possible in favor of

men's spirit, which has to remain pure. There is nothing wrong with a pure soul, but among religious fundamentalists this purity of a soul is based on a profound lie, and it's due to the worst transgression. A transgression occurs when a man starts to believe to be in possession of the absolute truth and absolute justice. Any form of theocracy is the worst form of idolatry. Religious fundamentalism is a Prescott, and priests act as if they are God. They have an absolute knowledge; they know everything about right and wrong, and they believe that they want to purify mankind of whoever is not like them. With this view of human nature, they are in denial of the sense of life; they do not know what compassion is; their world view is tribal; there is no tolerance, nor any understanding for the unity of mankind.

Religious fundamentalist can exist because of a deep fear of freedom for only a tiny minority is always part of the priest class; the rest are followers. They follow those people out of fear of freedom. The famous legend of "The Grand Inquisitor", which is part of the novel of Dostoevsky, "The Brothers Karamazov", where he has a beautiful picture of the Islamic State 400 years ago which was then the Christian state. The novel explains that everybody was thrilled by the fact that there will be a burning of ten heretic, that everybody wanted to be part of it. While waiting for the big event, abruptly from the back of the square a stranger appears, and suddenly people who are blind can see, and an ill child recovers immediately etc. and people realize he is back... Jesus is back!

"The Grand Inquisitor", who is a cardinal, also recognizes that Jesus is back, and he orders his guards to put Jesus in prison immediately. Trying to obey, the guards put him in jail. That evening, the Cardinal visits the jail. Jesus doesn't say anything, but the Cardinal tells him: "What a kind of bastard are you for coming back. Don't you realize that we, the church, are busy to

redo your work! You did something very silly 70 centuries ago, when you wanted people to believe that they should be free, but that is a serious mistake; you never understood human nature. People are afraid of freedom because it puts responsibility on them, and the church have taken that responsibility from them. In exchange, we will give them miracles, authority and wonders, hence, people are happy. If people have to make the choice between being happy or free, everybody will choose happiness, so next morning, we will set you on fire as well." That is the end of the famous legend of "The Grand Inquisitor."

Religious fundamentalism has always existed, in all religions, and unfortunately, Christianity had its own share of it. Religious fundamentalism always celebrates the cult of death. They have no clue about the grammar of life. Again, because it is tribalism, and its mission is to purify mankind. Their mission is to make what is sacred and absolute their own. They can only aim for destruction, and they will never aim for any form of construction. According to their logic, they always have to prefer death over life; it will always be their choice.

The second culture which will always clash with civilization, is the culture of fascism in each dominated mass society. Unfortunately, this phenomenon is occurring in Europe right now. All over Europe, much to my embarrassment in my country the Netherlands, there are new fascist parties, and of course many people are in denial of their existence, but they are there in the Netherlands, in Belgium, in France, in Italy, in Spain, in Hungary, in Romania, etc...

What is fascism? Fascism is a political phenomenon that started to manifest itself at the beginning of the 20th century, and it is something inherit to a mass democracy. It can be described as the politization of the mentality of a society that is totally fooled by resentment. It is a form of politics used by democrats whose only motive is the enforcement and extension of the wrong power to which end they will exploit resentment, use scapegoats, insult others, incite hatred and hide their own intellectual emptiness.

When Ortega y Gasset first analyzed mass democracy and the rise of fascism at the end of the twenties beginning of the thirties, he summed up in one sentence in his analysis, that the mass society on line: "It comes out to defect that Europe no longer has any morals." Again, this relates to the denial of human nature. Why? Because we human beings are the species that have a double nature. On one hand, we have our physical nature; our body needs our instincts and it drifts in many ways we are equal to animals, but we also have our spir-

itual nature. We do have an awareness of ideas about failures; we know about truth, beauty, justice and freedom, but the mass man does not want to be confronted let alone be burdened with intellectual or spiritual failures, because he believes the truth will restrict him.

Life for mass man must be easy and abundant everything must be permitted, for there are no constraints. The mass man does not think and without any spiritual guidance, he clings to the weight of masses, which will lead him to life. In this nihilistic society, spiritual failures are replaced by greed and fear, and spiritual life is replaced by kitsch. The need for kitsch is there because we need a cover for our spiritual emptiness and the pointlessness of life.

This said, it is very important to understand what is going on in Europe and in the United States of America. For example, if you go to the airport here in Beirut, and then fly to any other place you will discover that the magazines ad are everywhere the same. In every shop the magazines you will find are dealing with computers and technology, and because our faith in engineering and technological progress is enormous, you will always find sports, cars and motor racing magazines, for we do have this deep faith that fast is better, speed became a value. Bill gates became tremendously rich by windows 7.0 and 8.0 because everything is 20 seconds faster. Of course there are always the shares of money, we also find the lifestyle, celebrities and sex magazines because we cannot imagine a life without amusement. Commercial TVs and internet will only confirm how dominant these values are in our culture.

Therefore, since we are living in the 21th century, why does the modern world give so much value to technology, to speed, to money, to fame and to sexual pleasure?

200 years ago, Socrates said, "Your lifestyle is only focused on pleasure and you ignore the best." This is one of the most beautiful definitions of kitsch, which is based on pleasure and the ignorance of the best.

Please do understand the political societal consequences of kitsch for there are no longer any spiritual values, there isn't

any objective measure to our actions because everything became subjective, and you can hear it in the language. The only thing that counts is what I feel, what I think, my taste and that my opinions are respected, otherwise I will be offended because the sensitive ego is the master of all the things and cannot stand any form of criticism or deal with self-criticism.

Human identity is no longer based on an expression of who you are but rather on materiality, what you have, what you look like, you can literally now buy your identity, adapt it and change it. So our permanent drive to buy and to own is not so much an expression of greed and consumerism, it is based on our deep identity; you have to have this car; you have to have this watch, or you have to have this whatever thing because then you can say this is my identity, and you post it on Facebook hoping to get many likes. The spiritual life is no longer relevant; it is about feeling good. You feel best when everything is pleasant and therefore fun. Fun is the ultimate measure for all things you invest in: your friends must be nice, your school, your studies, your work, and in your free time you want amusement. Mass media, sports, games, everything has to be nice; the mindset must be nice, and you also have to be nice. However, if things go wrong, you take some pills because you have to feel good again. If you watch American television, you will learn so much about our society since all the commercials are about feeling good.

When nothing is absolute, when everything is transitory everything goes down to the now, to the moment, and that is the fundamental reason that we are no longer having time anymore, everything has to happen now; and then we call it multitasking. In politics, it is no longer about having a serious discussion about the best and good society. It is about people who want to gain political power and hold it in their slogans and their image. Forget political substance, nowadays in politics, they have no ideas. Fascism exploits these crisis, these fears, and these instincts of men. The fascist politics is based on crude materialism; it's a politics of resentment and hatred and based on permanent lies. Fascists are the best liars ever; they always have to have scapegoats; the Jews, the Americans, the Muslims, the poor, whoever abuses the fear of freedom, it's an anti-democratic strategy, that's why they will never engage in a serious discussion. It's nationalistic, and it's build on tribalism. You can even hear it in the language of Mme Le Pen, and Mr. Putin is the greatest fascist we are having now. Our ignorance of history is huge; we are not even capable to recognize that Mr. Putin is the new fascist leader of nowadays.

The famous American historian, Robert Paxton, wrote a wonderful book on fascism in which he says that fascism is be-

yond definitions, because it has no intellectual content at all, so you will always recognize it by the characteristics which are prevalent in every situation.

Fascism is spreading all over Europe because after World War II, we cultivated the fantasy of eternal economic growth. This is also how we created the business leaders and the heroes of our time. The business leaders are interested in everything expect society; they created a mass society, a kitsch society, and we are now facing the consequences.

The third and last culture, the culture of high tech, scientific world view, is our culture and is in many ways the biggest threat. As we are facing the barbarism of the Islamic State and religious fanatics, it is terrible to see that Europe is again getting into the grip of fascism, but on the long term, the biggest threat is scientism; it is this holy faith in high tech and scientific culture. In his book "Brave New World"(1935), Huxley created "Utopia", an island where everybody was happy. The point is no longer science fiction, it is here already; you can go to Oxford or any other very serious universities, where they already have the department of so called transhumanism. In America, the most powerful university is a singular University in California. They are working on the fusion between computer and men; it is based on the exponential growth of technology and the creation of the perfect man; cloning is already possible, and if you have enough money and you want to have a specific child you can go to L.A where according to the cult of neuroscience, you are your brain. Neuroscience is the idea that we don't have any free will because we are completely determined by our brains, by our genes. There is no free choice. Everything is based on how your brains are wired, and of course, the wiring can be changed through technology, and yet through it change our behavior.

Two years ago, Nexus held a conference tackling this matter. People were honest and very explicit about what they can do. The first element of this culture is embraced by all of us, and what we still do not realize is that with Google and Facebook, privacy is gone, but privacy in Georges Orwell's 1984 is the essence of freedom, when there is no privacy anymore you can never be free. Therefore, there is no free pace anymore; there is no free time; we are connected all the time, and the old idea of philosophy is now replaced everywhere by a tsunami of data. The next step, and it's already there, is becoming like robots, this is the idea of the Silicon Valley. The whole idea of human dignity is replaced by efficiency, transparency, and robots. In Japan, there are already hospitals more cost efficient, where nurses were replaced by robots.

This culture is completely null of human nature; there is no freedom, and human excellence in terms of virtue and creativity is already replaced by technology; a kind of English techno bubble and smileys are replacing true human interaction. It was Ludwig Wittgensteinand old fashioned intellectual who wrote in 1921; "We feel that even if all possible scientific questions are to be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all", but in our age of science, we don't want to engage with those questions as we think we are no longer having any problems in life because everything can be fixed by technology.

We are not only living in the age of science, but we are living in the age of fundamentalism. They also think that we don't have problems in life because they have already answers given by God, and through magic the priest will know all the answers, and he will tell you what to do. The only thing you have to do is obey. So yes we are living in the age of capitalism also the age of kitsch and fascism. The simple but horrifying truth is that the West in particular has lost its ideal of civilization. Why? How could this happen? I want to quote briefly something very important written by poet Fernando Pessoa who lived at the end of the19th, beginning of the 20th century. He was one of the very few writers who was not interested in any form of recognition. He wrote the most beautiful poems and prose. Only 60 years after his death, they found a book called the "Book of Disquiet"and instantly became a world classic for all the good reasons. My quote from the "Book of Disquiet" is something he wrote around 1920, "The generation I belong to was born into a world where those with a brain as well as a heart couldn't find any support. The destructive work of previous generations left this world with no security to offer us with regards to religion, no anchor with regards to morality, no stability with regards to politics. We were born in the middle of a metaphysical and moralaguish, more anxiety and more political disquiet. Drunk on external formula, on the mere processes of reason and science, the preceding generations destroyed the foundations of the Christian faith because their Biblical exegesis, which shifted from the textual to the mythological, reduced the gospels and the earlier hierography to a collection of hypothetical myths and legends, to mere literature. Under the influence of a vague theory, they called "positivism" these generations criticized all morality and scrutinized all the rules of life. All that remained from this clash of doctrines was uncertainty and the pain of that uncertainty. He goes on and on about the scientific positive views; it became impossible for us to be connected to the great narratives, to the great stories that

explain something about the meaning of life and its dignity. He concluded with "In today's life, the world belongs only to the stupid, the insensitive and the agitated. The right to live and triumph is now conquered almost by the same means by which you conquer internment in an asylum: the inability to think, amorality and nervous excitability."

We got disconnected, Nietzsche predicted it and many other philosophers and writers like Camus mentioned it too…

So what's to be done? To quote our friend Lenin, the first thing to be done is to remind ourselves what it means to be civilized, and how to celebrate and cultivate the dignity of men. Being civilized has everything to do with the four phenomena, which are denied by the mentioned cultures: the nature of men, freedom, human excellence and the grammar of life. And these 4 phenomena are interrelated and cannot be disconnected. As I already stated, we may never forget that the human being is one single creature with a double nature, and this fact is part of the secret of the human existence. Yes, we are equal to animals, and often we behave like animals, but the dignity of men is the human spirit. This is the essential difference in religious fundamentalism. Although the image of our true being (according to the bible we are created in the image of God), although that true image is given to us because we know about truth, about love, friendship, freedom although these failures are absolute and transcendental, nobody can claim to be in full possession of them. So our whole life is one effort, one permanent practicing education to live according to the spiritual principle of our soul, in order to develop intuition and consciousness for what has quality, what's good and what is evil, to acquire wisdom for the experience of life, to have compassion to keep our senses open for the so often hidden poetry of life, and to practice an open dialogue with all those people who have different backgrounds and different views. This attitude, this process of lifelong learning to become whom we should be, again Socrates called it Phaedo which means to speak and to act based on the grammar of life because freedom and truth, friendship and loyalty, wisdom and courage, love and poetry, justice and harmony form the basic grammar of our existence, because these are the qualities that give life to our life, that inspire us, that make what is meaningless meaningful, that can transform what is transitory into the intransitory, and this is what art is doing, and this is exactly because these life values are absolute, and we cannot own them; we cannot manipulate them or instrumentalise them. It is in these words that we see the image of whom we should be, and in these words we are confronted with the standards.

In the mirror of these values, of this grammar of life, all wealth, fame, power no longer matter and neither do birth, tradition or position or agenda. There is only one question asked in all serious religions: how do you live? Do you live as a just human being whether you're famous or not simply doesn't matter, so it is not for nothing that Spinoza finished his ethics with: All things excellent are as difficult as they are rare. Because the grammar of life is difficult, it is extremely difficult to live accordingly because we cannot do it our physical nature and the gifts of our senses. There will always be our desires, our fears and our prejudices and our aggressions and our stupidity and our mortality. The fact that you are human beings says you are limited, but we are free; we have to be free it is a moral imperative method to give up the notion that we are free because it is only based on our freedom that we will have a chance to become that person whom we should be. Again, this is the big lie of religious fundamentalists because they take away our freedom and say you just have to obey. It is also the big lie of fascism which has the similarity of just follow the leader, and it is the big lie of the high tech science because they deny your freedom. We cannot give away our freedom because it will turn us into slaves or robots. At the end, we pay the price of our own dignity, and the society which is not free; the society where the dignity of life and all freedom is not cultivated, where the grammar of life is being spoken, there will never be a civilized society.

Which brings me to my last point, the responsibility of the ruling class, the responsibility of power elites. Since a long time our spiritual and cultural elites have been completely marginalized in western society and as an example the Time 100 list of world influencers, we don't find a single writer, not one artist, not one poet, they are not considered to be influential in any way. So our current elites are nowadays representatives of an entire different world. It is the world of money, business, politics, media and sports, but these are not true elites in the true sense of the word because rather than being the best which is the original meaning of elite, and strive for the best, they are not characterized by being the best; they are characterized by acquiring the most money, the most power, the most influence, the most awards. Instead of quality, quantity reigns within the power elites. How these power elites and their values dominate our society and how little relevance of value are attributed to culture and arts is evident in the state of our educational system. Universities and institutions where younger generations can acquire their knowledge of life may satisfy the hunger for intellectual information through the study of phi-

كما عالج سلة من التساؤلات وأدرجها ضمن السياق التالي:

1. هل ما يشهده العالم من عودة للتطرف يندرج في إطار الخطأ في التقييم السابق الذي افترض أن مرحلة ما بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية قد حققت إحياء للقيم التنويرية، وهل تفرض الوقائع الخطيرة إعادة النظر بهذا التقييم؟

2. الى أي مدى يمكن اعتبار التماهي الفكري بين الطروح التعسفية في العالم العربي وأوروبا على السواء من قبيل ردة الفعل الدفاعية، أم هو انعكاس لشروخ أعمق في ثقافتنا العالمية المشتركة؟

واعتبر ريمن ان المسألة ليست صدام حضارات كما تنبأ صامويل هانتينغتون، بل هي صدام الثقافات الثلاث التي عددها وهي الأصولية الدينية، والشعبوية الاستهلاكية، والعلماوية. واستفاض في الحديث عن العلماوية. وأشار الى اربع سمات مشتركة لهذه الثقافات تشكل مجتمعة الدافع لمواجهة الحضارة، وهي انكارها لطبيعة الإنسان، ولحرية الإنسان وللامتياز الذي يسعى اليه الإنسان ولقواعد الحياة.

وتحدث باسهاب عن قواعد الحياة وهي القيم والحب والصداقة والحرية والحقيقة والجمال

والعدالة، مستندًا الى قراءة سبينوزا بهذا الخصوص وخلاصتها ان كل عمل ممتاز صعب وفريد.

واعتبر ان هذه الثقافات الثلاث تتفق على أن تطوير الإنسان يكون من خلال القضاء على حريته وتنمية روح الطاعة لديه، والقضاء على حب التفوق لديه، وهذا سلوك يعارض الطبيعة البشرية وحرية الإنسان وقواعد الحياة.

وشدد المحاضر على أهمية الكرامة الإنسانية التي تعتبر بمثابة الروح لدى الناس، داعيًا إلى تمرين الذات على الحوار المنفتح والتلاقي مع جماعات من خلفيات مختلفة.

وحذّر من الوضع الراهن الذي يعمل على إقصاء النخبة الفكرية والثقافية من المجتمع، وتمكين نخبة بديلة هي جماعة المال والسلطة والرياضة والإعلام، والأقوى فيها هو من يملك أكثر.

وتوقف أخيرًا عند مسؤولية الطبقة الحاكمة وعلى تغليبها الكم على النوع والكيف، وسعيها وراء الربح السريع.

وراهن على دور بيت المستقبل كحاجة للمستقبل في إنشاء النخب الفكرية والثقافية والمجتمعية.

losophy and the classics in order to form a cultural and moral consciousness, hardly exist anymore. Completely indoctrinated by the material values of the common power elites, our universities all over the globe are completely corrupted and reducing the focus of education to what is useful, cost effective, practical, commercial or amusing only. Culture and intellectual building progressively has to make way for data size and entrepreneurship, and it is completely illustrative for the structure tendency of power elites to only consider the now to engage short term thinking, and for their inability to open their eyes to real crisis which again is not the economic crisis but the crisis of civilizations right at the heart of the western society.

Ladies and gentlemen, I consider this "Maison du Futur" as not only a "lieu de mémoire mais c'est un lieu de futur" and I count on you to be that place where you will become a counter weight to nowadays power elites, wishing you success in your civilized mission. Thank you!

ثقافة أم حضارة؟ عودة التطرّف السياسي في القرن الواحد والعشرين

استضاف بيت المستقبل في بكفيا في 27 نيسان 2015 مؤسس ومدير معهد ناكسيس الدولي روب ريمن الذي ألقى محاضرة حوارية بعنوان: «ثقافة أم حضارة. عودة التطرف السياسي في القرن الواحد والعشرين؟»

اللقاء الذي انعقد باللغة الانكليزية وتخلله تفاعل ومداخلات من المشاركين باللغات الثلاث، العربية والفرنسيّة والانكليزيّة، شارك فيه النائب الدكتور فريد الخازن، وسفيرة الإتحاد الأوروبي في لبنان انجلينا ايخهورست، وممثل مؤسسة كونراد اديناور في لبنان بيتر ربمليه، والنائب السابق مصباح الأحدب، والسفير رياض طبارة، والسفيرة ميشلين ابي سمرا، وحشد من أهل الديبلوماسية والثقافة. وأدار اللقاء الدكتور حسن منيمنة.

منسّى

بداية تطلع الأستاذ سام منسى الذي ألقى كلمة باسم «بيت المستقبل»، الى مستقبل واعد للتعاون بين «بيت المستقبل» ومعهد ناكسيس الدولي وقال: «هذا النشاط هو الأول في هذا المكان، والثالث لبيت المستقبل بعد غياب طويل جزّاء الحرب الرهيبة التي عصفت بلبنان. النشاط الأول كان في واشنطن، والثاني في فندق لوغابريال الأشرفية، وهذا اللقاء يشكل الخطوة الآذنة بافتتاح المركز رسميا. وأعلن عن تنظيم المؤتمر السنوي الأول لبيت المستقبل في شهر أيار المقبل».

ريمن

وعالج المحاضر الدكتور روب ريمن الأحداث التي تشهدها المنطقة، والممارسات التي ترتكب على يد تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في العراق وسوريا (داعش)، وما تشكله من تحدٍ صارخ للقيم الإنسانية.

وتطرّق الباحث الى ارتدادات هذا النهج الأصولي في القارة الأوروبية التي تشهد بدورها استهدافًا للقيم الانسانية ولو بوتيرة أقل حدّة.

واستعرض المحاضر كل الفرضيات التي تكمن وراء عودة التطرف من الباب الواسع ومنها الظروف الاقتصادية والاجتماعية والضغوط الثقافية.

AN ARAB MARSHALL PLAN: A PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION FOR THE FUTURE OF THE MIDDLE EAST

MAISON DU FUTUR, BIKFAYA
[MAY 30, 2015]

La Maison du Futur (MDF) held its annual international conference on the theme of "An Arab Marshal Plan: A Partnership and Cooperation for the Future of the Middle East" at Serail Bekfaya, on Saturday, May 30, 2015.

The conference was organized in partnership with Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), a think tank closely associated with the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU), and focused on the future of the geopolitical order in the Middle East in light of the growing unrest throughout the region.

Eminent European, American, Canadian and Arab political and academic figures participated in the conference, which was held in three sessions.

The Marshal Plan, officially known as the European Recovery Program (ERP) was an American initiative of $13 billion in economic support to help rebuild European economies, secure the free flow of commerce, modernize industry and prevent the spread of communism following the World War II.

SESSION II | BEYOND TUR-BULENCE : THE REGION'S FUTURE

Moderator: John Bell, *Director, Middle East and Mediterranean Program, Tolido Centre, Madrid.*

From Oslo to ISIL to Iran : Competing American Policies and Narratives in the Middle East
Philip J. Crowley, *former US Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.*

Beyond Turbulence : The Region's Future
Abdulaziz Sager, *Chairman, Gulf Research Center.*

Tectonic Shifts in the Middle East's Strategic Environment
S. Enders Wimbush, *Managing Partner of State Various LLC, a global strategy consultancy.*

SESSION III | TOWARDS A GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE MIDDLE EAST : A COMPARATIVE GEO-STRATEGIC DISCUSSION

Moderator: Raouf Abou Zaki, *CEO, Al-Iqtisadwal-'Amal-Group'.*

Amine Gemayel, *former President of the Lebanese Republic (1982-1988).*

Naguib Sawiris, *Executive Chairman of Orascom Telecom Media and Technology Holding S.A.E.*

Hassan Mneimneh, *Principal at Middle East Alternatives in Washington, D.C.*

WRAP-UP & CONCLUSION

MDF is looking into a rescue project along the lines of the ERP, designed for the Arab World : An Arab Marshal Plan based on a partnership between the Arab countries and the international community to revamp their economy and achieve wider aims, such as democracy, dignity, human rights, social equality and economic security.

OPENING SESSION

The event kicked off with a welcome address by the Chairman of MDF President Amine Gemayel, who briefed the attendees on the historical role of MDF, as a pioneering center of studies and research in Lebanon and the Middle East since the mid-1970s, charged with the task of promoting peace and furthering strategies and studies to shape a brighter future for Lebanon and the region.

President Gemayel underscored Lebanon's historical status as a land of freedom, a model of pluralism and a special space for dialogue and co-existence of different cultures, ethnicities and religions. He said that amidst the turmoil that is engulfing the region, it is paramount to keep Lebanon's stability, highlighting two major challenges : the widespread of illegitimate weapons among sectarian non-state actors, and the overt regional sectarian and ethnic rift and fighting impacting the domestic situation.

Emphasizing the seriousness of countering the spread of extremist ideology and totalitarian projects, President Gemayel made a strong case for the urgency of a large-scale rescue program inspired by the US-led Marshal Plan to rebuild post-war Europe, revamp its economy and prevent the spread of dogmatic totalitarian ideology. He added that the current situation in the Arab countries is not different : We are facing a devastated region with a destroyed economy, shattered social environment and the threat of the radicalism raise.

He said that the recent upheavals and wars that buffeted the region greatly affected the development in the Arab countries, which emphasize the utmost need to establish an Arab Bank

for Reconstruction, with the task of creating long-term sustainable development plan to boost economic growth in conflict-devastated Arab countries, in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund, and national resources within the framework of a real partnership and not a tutelage.

The proposed Arab Marshal Plan should also help the prospects Arab states to institutionalize their achievements, embrace the principles of good governance and improve the education systems.

In this vein, President Gemayel said: "(…) the answer and solution to our predicament is an open and civil education".

Finally, the President pledged that he would dedicate his time, effort and expertise to uphold and sponsor such initiatives for the sake of Lebanon, freedom and humanity.

For his part, Christian Clages, ambassador of Germany to Lebanon gave opening remarks, highlighting the long-standing close relations between President Gemayel and his country. He spoke of the Yugoslav refugee crisis in Europe, in general and Germany in particular, and how the EU dealt with it through partnership memberships, assistance and a billions euros-project. He stressed that the region needs huge investment to create employment and that before the outbreak of the current crises the region's countries were in need of massive economic and social reforms.

He also added that among the major triggers of the Arab Spring revolutions was the fear of young people that they would not find an appropriate political and economic perspective in their societies at the beginning of the 21th century, which is the key to stability and peace.

He suggested to deal with the current regional conflict from a European perspective and to launch a healthy process for the Middle East, one that can benefit from the European experience.

In turn, Peter Rimmele, KAS Resident Representative in Lebanon, applauded MDF leading role in forwarding its mission to draw a better future, and the key Lebanese intellectuals who were part of it and have striven to achieve a better tomorrow.

"The future is not shaped by itself, but it is being shaped. Where do societies want to go? MDF mission is to help answering that question, contributing to shaping the future for the Lebanese people and the region," he concluded.

SESSION I :
THE APTNESS OF GERMANY'S POST WWII EXPERIENCE ON THE REGION'S FUTURE IN THE WAKE OF THE ARAB SPRING

Joe Khoury, Professor of social psychology in charge of postgraduate courses in social phycology at the Lebanese University, was the moderator of the first session. He introduced the three panelists of the session, Selim Sayegh, former Minister of Social Affairs in Lebanon, Sami Aoun, Professor at the School of Applied Politics, University of Sherbrook, Canada, and Gunther Beckstein, former Prime Minister of the State of Bavaria, Germany.

Sayegh started his presentation by wondering if the concept of resilience equates submission and surrender, adding that this question is an invitation to reflect and determine whether Lebanon's stability, in the absence of a real social and political peace, is the result of weariness, passivity and a sense of powerlessness against the force of the hegemonic status quo, or otherwise. In his quest to respond to this query, Sayegh distinguished between the resilience of the status quo and the resilience of the transformation.

Speaking about the resilience of the status quo, that is according to him helping maintaining Lebanon's volatile stability, he outlined its main displays: The nature of the current political system and our inability to change it. This status quo is beneficial since it prevents the recurrence of uncertainties and instability drivers, specific to the advent of new actors within the system, communities' fear of each other, the centrality of the regional issue, and the marginalization of the Lebanese issue, saying that knowing "what will be the cost of the return of Hezbollah from Syria to Lebanon" is essential to determine whether this resilience is precarious or stable, the capacity to absorb and adapt, and that's one of the secrets of Lebanon which lies essentially in the Lebanese themselves, finally, the economic resilience which have two pillars: the private sector and the banking sector.

As for the resilience of the transformation explained by Sayegh as an active resiliency that can turn crisis into opportunity, he said it should start by implementing a comprehensive political reform based on an inclusive participation, decentralization, a neutral foreign policy, investing in education, culture and technology and forging a new social pact that enhances the intrinsic Lebanese values of freedom, tolerance and plurality.

For his part, Aoun said that throughout its history, Lebanon has not suffered the pangs of despotism prevalent in the Mid-

dle East and long before any other regional nation in the Near East, the idea of a republic and the experience of a civil society had sprouted in its Mountain. He added that despite the obvious failure of establishing cross-community parties and the dominant mercantile mentality, Lebanon has maintained a lead in embracing liberal democracy, and therefore the country could again reconnect with its heritage and survive its current political and constitutional crisis.

Conversely, the fact that The Arab Spring has been a hotbed to extremist ideology using violence as the only way to attain societal changes, shows that the Arab Countries do not share to the same extent the Lebanese liberal and democratic values. The extremist Islamic ideology impedes the democratic culture and shall not be regarded as a solid foundation for social peace and harmony within pluralistic societies.

Notwithstanding that in the near term, the Arab spring prospects are for instability, in the long-term it may usher in an era of a freer Middle East, with nations escaping the handgrip of long entrenched dictatorial regimes. Aoun added that the Lebanese intellectual spectrum and hence La Maison du Futur, should contribute at sustaining this new freedom and supporting transitions to democracy through the creation of liberal institutions and economic problem solving that offer the promise of a region with better governance and less abusive of human rights. La Maison du Futur should also strive

to alleviate the regional rampant tension between Sunnis and Shia, and entrench the separation between politics and religion through a liberal perspective.

In this respect, and as the Middle East's sectarian temperatures rise and the Saudi-Iranian geopolitical rivalry intensifies, Aoun said that walking the tightrope between these two big rivals will prove a difficult balancing act. He stated that neither the Wahhabi model, nor the Iranian clerical model and not even the Turkish-Islamic one could be applied in the Arab region and hence the urgency for the region to find its own model. Lebanon can help meeting this challenge.

As ways to deter the current Islamist wave engulfing the region, Aoun underscored that Arabic societies desperately need a reform agenda movement leading to formulate an alternative to Islamism that can sustain a pluralistic, participatory politics. He added that in recent years, the search for an alternative to Islamism has been thwarted by the widening sectarian conflict within Islam, which has increased tensions and driven violence across the Arab world. In light of this emergency, the need to reform Islamic jurisprudence and social thought has become more urgent than ever. Islamism's menace to the Arab world, however, has been compounded by the weakened state of critical thinking within Islamic religious and political traditions. In developing a reformist alternative to Islamism, Arab societies will have a substantial body of both historical as well as contemporary thinking that they can draw upon to help improve their political and social structures and create more just, inclusive societies.

Aoun stated in this vein, that we should capitalize on Al Azhar proposed ideas on the rule of law, equity, justice, freedom, which are much more moderate than the conservative Islamist discourse in all its variations.

Finally, Aoun stressed on Lebanon's role in enhancing liberal democracy in the Arab world, fostering dynamic interfaith dialogue and entrenching a culture of tolerance and acceptance of others.

Beckstein provided details on how the European Marshal Plan was implemented in Western Europe after WWII. He started his lecture by saying that when the Second World War ended, Germany was a wasted country economically and intellectually. Without the help of the United States and the United Kingdom, it would have been even much worse, he added.

The idea behind presenting a program for the reconstruction of Germany and revival of European economies, the Mar-

shal Plan was: Only a united Europe can be economically healthy and can oppose any totalitarian regime. The goals were to rebuild war destroyed regions, to remove trade barriers, to modernize industries, and to make Europe prosperous again with the aim of preventing the spread of communism. The Marshall Plan required the lessening of interstate barriers, a dropping of many regulations constraining business and an increase in productivity, labor union membership, as well as the adoption of modern business procedures.

Beckstein stressed that The Marshall plan was one of the first elements of European integration. For hundreds of years, there were wars after wars in Europe. After WWII the European integration had to make war in Europe impossible, he said. The third pillar of the economic miracle was the implementation of the social market economy. He added that in putting social policy on par with economic policy, Germany reached the third way between capitalism and communism. The Marshall Plan was very successful in Germany and in Europe for social welfare and peace and human rights. It was not only an economical program for it created peace by exploring the principles and practices of pluralism, human rights and democracy.

He concluded on stressing that Lebanon with its mosaic of 18 religions and the coexistence of Christians and Muslim Sunnis and Shia, with its culture of tolerance and respect for other religions and political opinions, Lebanon should be a model for a new Arab world.

SESSION II:
BEYOND TURBULENCE: THE REGION'S FUTURE

John Bell, Director of the Middle East and Mediterranean Program at the Tolido Center in Madrid, was the moderator of the second session. He presented the panelists, Philip J. Crowly, former US Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Abdulaziz Sager, Chairman of the Gulf Research Center represented by Mustafa al-Ani and Enders Wimbush, Managing Partner of State Various LLC.

Bell said that in order to tackle opportunities to implement a Marshal plan for the region, there are a few questions that need to be raised:

– Is partnership and cooperation between the Middle East and other partners viable?

– Is the situation in the region containable or manageable?

– Is there a need to deal with the conflicts of the region

before moving on to socio-economic developments, or do these two things happen in parallel?

Crowly talked about the US policy to promote a new order in the Middle East and praised MDF initiative to hold such debates and dialogues to promote peace and stability in the region.

He said that it is not an overstatement to suggest that we are experiencing the most complex strategic environment in the Middle East in at least 70 years and perhaps a century. The international structure put in place at the end of World War I is coming apart at the seams. In critical places, such as Syria, Iraq and Yemen, we cannot be certain that the existing order will survive. In any case, repairing the damage will take decades.

He added that given the developments of the past decade, no country is the same as it was, the list of conflicts and challenges continues to grow, as well as the list of regional spoilers, the latest being the Islamic State.

In the midst of this complexity, questions arise. What does the United States want to see in the Middle East? And what is it prepared to do to promote a stable new order?

He underlined the US objectives in the region during the late decades beginning with regional stability, a comprehensive Middle East peace, the security of Israel, combatting violent political extremism and terrorism, protecting the freedom of navigation to ensure the flow of energy across the world, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the containment of Iran, and promoting good governance in the region, greater economic opportunities, and respect for human rights, particularly for women and minorities.

Pinpointing the US achievements in the region as compared to its pre-set goals, he said that a comprehensive peace "is still in a coma," especially in light of the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict, stressing that the two-state solution is the only viable solution. The US was also unable to protect regional security and toppling regimes in Iraq and Libya backlashed. In the same vein, Crowly criticized President Barack Obama's policy towards the Syrian crisis, describing it as weak and lax. He underscored that Syrian President Bachar al-Assad has survived four years of civil war only because of "the support from Iran and Russia."

He also addressed the nuclear negotiations with Iran, stating that despite the "rapprochement" with Tehran, Iran continues to define the United States as the "Great Satan" and most of its ongoing policies are rooted in opposition to the US and its

regional objectives. Iran continues also to sponsor terrorism, rebuffing concerns that a nuclear agreement will come at the expense of America's traditional allies in the region.

He stressed that Washington is currently far more cautious about the use of military force today. When it does, the United States hopes to act with regional partners and based on a strong international consensus for action. He added that our recent experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, has become a powerful American political narrative and will be an influential sub-text regarding American policy for the foreseeable

future. He refused to brand this policy as "disengagement", rather calling it "sustainable engagement", trying to pursue multilateral rather than unilateral solutions. The question becomes not what the United States decides alone, but what can be achieved together. This requires key actors here to develop a consensus for action that both the United States and the region are able to support.

Mustafa al-Ani, representing Abdulaziz Sager, joined the conference via Skype call.

He stated that from a GCC point of view, and amidst the post-Arab spring hectic regional situation, the urgency for the Gulf States was to avert its repercussions and impact, and to a certain extent, it succeeded in this endeavor due to a series of economic, social and political conditions. However, today the Gulf States have to deal with the repercussions of the Arab

spring in Yemen. This is a challenge and a fundamental problem for us, but "I take it that the Arab Spring is no longer a threat for the GCC regimes because we were able to contain it and deal with it", he added.

Al-Ani harshly criticized the US foreign policy, saying that US President Barack Obama wants to avoid any confrontation or engagement and to cut losses during his remaining term in office. He added, today we are paying the price of US policy mistakes, and we are still dealing with the consequences of the US invasion of Iraq. American wrong politics are responsible for a large part of our current problems, starting with the George W. Bush administration's irrational policy and excessive use of unjustified force, to the blurred, ineffective and negative Obama administration's policy towards the region. Al-Ani said that Obama policy in the Middle East is based on the "Too little too late" strategy.

He condemned the US "disengagement" policy and raised many questions, saying : "Why ISIL intervention in Syria is seen as a crime and an external interference, while the intervention of the Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi militias and Iran's Revolutionary Guard are not seen as such ?"

"Why does the US policy tolerate Hezbollah interference in Syria ? Why is ISIL sectarianism rejected, while the US has supported Nouri Maliki's sectarian policies for eight years, pushing the country towards the edge of the abyss ? Why does Iranian General Soleimani move freely in Iraq and Syria's cities, without being tracked down by the US aircrafts ?" he added.

Al-Ani also said that there is a major trust issue in the "US lax indecisive foreign policy," especially with Iran's policy of expansion in the Arab world, stressing that the US position towards Iran's expansionist and interventionist policy will define the commitment and ability of the Gulf States to cope with Sunni extremist groups and terrorism. We cannot fight the ISIL's expansion and Iran's expansion at the same time, especially with the US light-handed policy towards Iran's expansionist ambition.

He urged the US to fight against the Sunni and Shia terrorism on equal footing, away from the policy of selectivity.

Al-Ani also stressed that the GCC believes that the only solution to the Iranian nuclear issue is the political and diplomatic solution, reaching an agreement that inhibits Iran's military nuclear ambition, otherwise, any other agreement would set the wheel of nuclear weapons in motion in the region.

He concluded that the post-Obama era will usher a new form of bilateral relations between the US and the GCC, and

will see the emergence of an independent policy less committed to protect American interests in the region.

Wimbush underlined the significance of tectonic shifts in the Middle East and the role of external players on shaping the future of the region, adding that no other region of the globe has been affected so powerfully by the interests of outside actors, whether they seek to harvest the region's abundant resources or enhance positions in an ongoing geostrategic competition that occurs elsewhere, or both. He doubted that the United States' appetite for pursuing what it considers vital national interests in the Middle East has dimmed, anticipating that US interests will remain strong here, and that any new administration will adjust strategies to facilitate the United States remaining a strong player and constant presence for the foreseeable future.

Alternatively, he suggested that despite Russia fierce comeback into the Middle Eastern political scene, it will not be a durable presence in the Middle East. While Putin's ambitious and assertive Kremlin has behaved as if it is a regime on the geopolitical ascent, by most indicators (political, military, economic and social) the Russian state is actually on a downward trajectory.

Russia is likely to seek new supporters for its risk-taking from amongst state and, particularly, non-state actors who share Russia's risk-taking mentality and antipathy toward the United States in particular and the West generally while bringing to the relationship high geographic reach. This will include, prominently, the Middle East.

Similarly, he stated that Europe as a traditional Middle East actor is also declining in its capacity to play a major role in the region, as investment in military capability is down in virtually every European state. It is not difficult to imagine a Europe in the not too distant future that is divided, weak, and whose deep unhappiness is reflected in the bitter rhetoric of its increasingly dominant extreme political parties, he added. However, individual states, such as Germany, France or Great Britain could play a role in shaping the region's activities.

On the other hand, he stressed that Asia's economy depends – in part – of what happens in the Middle East. He spoke about China and India, which are witnessing significant growth at the economic, military, and energy levels, making them potential major players and place them in competitive strategic positions in the Middle East.

China's continued development depends fundamentally on an interrupted supply of energy from the Middle East. To pro-

tect energy supplies and to enhance its geostrategic position relative to the United States and, importantly, to rising India, China will invest heavily in securing a strong strategic position in the Middle East, including establishing military installations and relationships.

India is rising, as it is reflected in recent economic growth rates. Its new leadership shows promise for creating a more assertive, outwardly focused India than its predecessors. One example of this intention is India's development of substantially more military power, with special emphasis on naval power, especially submarines, aircraft carriers, and aircraft.

All of these actors – new, old, rising, or declining – will place Iran near the center of their strategic planning. Its size, location, and resources make this inevitable. The tectonic tremors that would result from Iran becoming a nuclear weapons power would affect the strategies of all of these competitors powerfully, and will propel a number of them to begin planning nuclear futures for their countries.

He concluded by asserting that The Middle East "I see" will thus increasingly become a tapestry of intersecting strategic interests of relatively new players, while some traditional competitors and forces of restraint – for example, Russia and Europe – will fade. At very least, the strategic architecture of the emerging Middle East will have many more moving parts represented by new actors with significant capabilities pursuing unfamiliar strategic outcomes.

Before lunchtime, Bader Al Humaidi, former Minister of Oil and Finance in Kuwait, applauded the initiative of an Arab Marshal Plan, and expressed his optimism and admiration for Lebanon.

SESSION III :
TOWARDS A GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR THE
MIDDLE EAST : A COMPARATIVE GEO-STRATEGIC
DISCUSSION

The final session kicked off with Raouf Abou Zaki, CEO of Al-Iqtisadwal-A'mal Group, who praised President's Gemayel initiative to revive MDF role and stressed that the Middle East remains central in the international strategies, politically and economically. He presented the panelists, who were in addition to president Amine Gemayel, Naguib Sawiris, Executive Chairman of Orascom Telecom Media and Technology Holding S.A.E and Hassan Mneimneh, Principal at Middle East Alternatives in Washington DC.

Before giving the stage to president Gemayel Former Syrian Minister of Economy and Trade Ghassan al-Rifai, made an intervention in the session. He suggested calling the Arab Marshal Plan a "global initiative, as it goes beyond the reconstruction process and economic reforms to reach social pattern," an initiative that should not be funded by Arab players in the region only, but by all concerned actors all over the world.

In the same vein, President Gemayel said that the main objective of this strategy, regardless of its name, boils down to one issue : "How to achieve humanity and the well-being of humans," and uphold human rights, "whether through a Marshal Plan or a Global Initiative," which is the ultimate goal of MDF.

On the ongoing conflicts and struggle against radical movements, Gemayel stated that Sunnis were the first to fight against extremist and fundamentalist groups, whether politically or militarily. He stressed that "several awakening groups" have risen in the face of extremism throughout the Arab world, and that the "dynamics of the goodwill" is victorious over evil to give people back their humanity.

He also said that this subject will be further elaborated on during workshops that will be organized in the future by MDF in coordination with other centers of researches and studies.

President Gemayel focused on four pillars to uphold human rights and to promote social and economic development in the region, starting first and foremost with education, to produce young generations that are open to dialogue, freedom, and acceptance of others.

Secondly, he underscored the need for the establishment of good governance, which is essential to serve humanity and fight corruption, unlike the case of the totalitarian Arab regimes that have prevailed in the region.

Thirdly, there is also need for "development projects," in the region, which are crucial to the Arab world as "its resources are being squandered."

Finally, President Gemayel reiterated the need to engage "in partnership" instead of "paternalism."

For his part, Sawiris, said that the European Marshal Plan in Germany and Europe took place following the end of the war, while the war and conflicts in the region are seemingly dragging on, especially in light of inaction on the part of the US and Europe.

Thus, he suggested a "simpler plan" for the region that could be achievable amidst the ongoing wars, which is "the establishment of safe zones" for investments. Sawiris gave Kurdistan as a successful example of such safe zones, designed to create job opportunities and investment projects under international insurances against political threats.

He concluded that Lebanon is not neutralized in the ongoing regional crises, but "is at the core of the conflict," whether "we like it or not." However, Lebanon could play a prominent role in finding economic solutions to the region.

Finally, Hassan Mneimneh, Principal at Middle East Alternatives in Washington DC, talked about the revival of the Arab world with the cooperation of international partners, wondering about the existence of a sole Arab world today, and where is it? He said that the current state of things propels us to talk from now on about different Arab worlds instead of a single Arab world. He sorted out different regions within the existing Arab geographic reality, and each one of those constitutes by itself an isolated Arab world. These regions are:

– The Maghreb region, (Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria), which is witnessing the ascendance of a "Maghrebian" awareness exceeding the national boundaries and seeks to connect with the European countries instead of the Arab world.

– The second is Egypt and its regional surrounding, currently focused on pursuing its national interests, in addition to the geopolitical factors that push Egypt towards Sudan and up to Ethiopia.

– The third Arab world is the Gulf, essentially connected to Asia. This region is stable and cannot be disintegrated

– The forth Arab world is the Levant (Mashriq), which includes Iraq and the Levant: Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan and Israel

He explained that when we talk about the decay and collapse and war-ravaged area, we are actually designating the

Levant. He underscored the importance of this area of the Arab world by stating: "should the Levant fail, this would inevitably lead to the failure of the other Arab worlds as well as the entire world", a fact that was politically and ethically neglected by the American administration.

Mneimneh stressed that Lebanon remains, however, "immune to" what is happening in the region, despite having "an army affiliated with Iran." He attributed this immunity to the civil war that prevailed in Lebanon and that led Lebanese to give priority to their national interests

He also agreed with President Gemayel on the suggestions he made to promote development and stability in the region. He added the need to uphold "the humanitarian reference," beyond any other political or religious references and to overcome the crisis of "cultural flattening," and "the Islamization of sciences." Furthermore, he spoke of "hollow education," which is also at the heart of the crisis in the region, stressing the need to introduce reforms in the education sector throughout the Arab worlds.

Mneimneh also talked about optional partners of the Arab world, which includethe US, China, India and Russia, while Europe has "no other choice but to be involved" in what is going on in the Arab world, he said, as part of the "Mediterranean partnership and alliance."

The conference ended with cocktail on the terrace.

Selim el Sayegh

Former Minister of Social Affairs in Lebanon.
Vice-President
of al Kataeb Party

La résilience du Liban :
mythe ou réalité ?

Dans une discussion avec un jeune étudiant en droit sur la résilience au Liban, il m'a exprimé son inquiétude quant au choix du terme résilience, et m'a suggéré, non sans le ton de défiance propre à son âge, de remplacer résilience par résignation. Cet étudiant est parmi nous aujourd'hui. En d'autres termes, il s'agit d'une invitation à réfléchir et à déterminer si au Liban, la stabilité, à défaut d'une véritable paix sociale et politique, était la résultante d'une lassitude, d'une passivité, d'un sentiment d'impuissance face à la force du statu quo hégémonique au détriment du citoyen.

Je vais essayer de répondre à cette question en deux points très rapides, puisqu'on ne m'a laissé que 12 minutes pour exposer mon point de vue. Je vais répondre rapidement en deux points, tout d'abord la résilience du statu quo,

et en second lieu, je vais parler de la résilience, de la transformation.

Tout d'abord, le statu quo : nous sommes en train de vivre cette résiliation du statu quo, avant tout du fait que notre système politique provoque le blocage du système et la division de la rente, que ce soit au sein des groupes politiques ou au travers des groupes politiques. Cette incapacité à débloquer le système politique, a un effet résilient, c'est-à-dire bénéfique pour la paix au Liban, puisqu'elle bloque du coup toutes les incertitudes et tous les facteurs d'instabilité propres à la venue de nouveaux acteurs dans le système. Nous voyons ainsi que dans les communautés, il est très difficile de percer avec de nouvelles forces politiques et de nouvelles propositions du fait de ce blocage, avec l'effet pervers mais peut-être aussi bénéfique, qui est celui de préserver la situation telle quelle.

En second lieu, je parlerai du discours de la peur de l'autre, c'est à dire au lieu de saisir le moment essentiel, pour obtenir une certaine évolution de la situation, on se rabat sur le moment existentiel. Tout le monde a peur de l'autre, et essaye de défendre son existence. C'est le sens de ce discours de marginalisation des chrétiens à un moment donné, ou du fameux 'Al Tah-mich", qui a contribué à alimenter ce discours de la peur. Aujourd'hui avec l'extrémisme, le discours de la peur se généralise avec deux tendances, l'une communautaire qui pousse vers un repli identitaire, et l'autre nationale avec comme les statistiques l'indiquent, une prévalence très précaire du national sur le communautaire.

Il existe un blocage sunnite chiite au Liban avec les effets de la crise syrienne et la présence d'un grand nombre de Syriens déplacés au Liban. Dans ce cadre, certains chrétiens jouent un rôle subsidiaire, un rôle de tampon entre ces deux grandes communautés, sans pour autant réussir à opérer une entente durable du fait de leur faible force de marchandage à cause de leurs divisions. Il s'agit aujourd'hui d'une entente de désengagement d'un conflit plutôt que d'une entente sur un engagement civil et un engagement de paix.

Ensuite, l'une des raisons de la résilience dans laquelle nous vivons au Liban est la centralité de la question régionale et la marginalisation de la question libanaise. La question qui se pose donc à mon sens – et je l'évoque très brièvement puisqu'on laissera plus tard au débat le soin de poser des questions et d'y répondre – est celle de savoir quel sera le coût du retour du Hezbollah de la Syrie. Un jour ou l'autre, le Hezbol-lah rentrera définitivement au Liban, et c'est alors qu'on saura laquelle des dynamiques prévaudra : la dynamique d'interventions extérieures, ou celle de pacification interne qui prévaut déjà à l'intérieur aujourd'hui, l'une étant la cause de l'autre. Je suppose que la question sur laquelle il faudra se pencher pour examiner la précarité ou la stabilité de la résilience est de savoir quels seront les dividendes du retour du Hezbollah au Liban.

Par la suite, il y a la capacité d'absorber et de s'adapter, et c'est l'un des secrets du Liban qui réside essentiellement dans le Libanais lui-même. Le Liban est fait de libertés et d'initiatives privées, et le Libanais s'est implanté dans ce pays, s'est greffé sur ce territoire au fil des âges, parce qu'il fut un creuset d'hommes et de femmes libres, sans comprendre cette aspiration à la liberté qui est une aspiration identitaire. On ne comprendra pas aujourd'hui comment la société libanaise elle-même génère le dynamisme interne qui lui permet de suppléer l'État, lorsque celui-ci ne peut plus subvenir aux besoins sociaux en particulier. Nous avons vu dans la dynamique de la société civile, que plus de 15 mille ONG sont opérantes au Liban et suppléent plus de trois quarts du coût social de notre société alors que l'État ne peut assurer qu'un quart. Cela montre combien cette société est capable d'absorber les chocs comme celui des déplacés syriens au Liban qui ont augmenté le coût comme vous le savez, et qui est capable aussi de s'adapter pour subvenir à ses besoins. Comme nous avons des représentants de la communauté internationale parmi nous, et que nous sommes dans le cadre d'une discussion d'un plan Marshall pour la région, il faut dire

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مرونة لبنان: أسطورة أم حقيقة؟ سليم الصايغ

ما هو المقصود بمصطلح المرونة؟ هل يعني الخضوع والاستسلام؟

إن هذا السؤال هو دعوة للتفكير ما إذا كان استقرار لبنان في ظل غياب السلم الاجتماعي والسياسي الحقيقي هو نتيجة التعب والسلبية والشعور بالعجز إزاء قوة الوضع الراهن المهيمن. للإجابة عن هذا السؤال، لا بدّ من التمييز بين مرونة الوضع الراهن ومرونة التغيير.

أول مظاهر مرونة الوضع الراهن التي ساهمت في المحافظة على استقرار لبنان وإن بشكل هش، هي طبيعة النظام السياسي وعجزنا عن تغييره. إن هذا الأمر عاد بالنفع على لبنان لأنه حال دون بروز الشكوك وعوامل عدم الاستقرار التي تتزامن مع ظهور أطراف جديدة داخل النظام. ثانيها هو خوف الطوائف بعضها من بعض. أما ثالثها فهو

مركزية القضايا الإقليمية مقابل تهميش القضية اللبنانية: إن معرفة ثمن عودة حزب الله من سوريا، تحدّد إذا ما كانت هذه المرونة هشّة أو إنها عامل استقرار. ورابعها قدرة اللبناني على استيعاب الصدمات والتكيّف، وهذا سر من أسرار هذا لبنان وينبع من شخصية اللبنانيين أنفسهم. وأخيرا المرونة الاقتصادية التي لها ركيزتين أساسيتين: القطاع الخاص والقطاع المصرفي.

وبالنسبة إلى مرونة التغيير، فهي مرونة فعالة تتمتع بالقدرة على تحويل الأزمات إلى فرص، وتبدأ بتحقيق إصلاح سياسي شامل قائم على تأمين المشاركة السياسية لجميع أطياف المجتمع اللبناني واعتماد اللامركزية وسياسة خارجية محايدة والاستثمار في التربية والثقافة التكنولوجيا، إضافة إلى وضع عقد اجتماعي جديد يعزز القيم الجوهرية التي تميز لبنان وهي الحرية والتسامح والتعددية.

que le coût de la crise syrienne au Liban est à l'échelle de 22 milliards de dollars comme l'a annoncé la semaine dernière le Ministre libanais des Affaires Sociales, la communauté internationale n'a assuré qu'environ 10% de ce montant. Donc les 20 milliards que supporte le Liban aujourd'hui sont assurés non pas grâce aux dépenses publiques mais à cette fabuleuse capacité du Libanais et de la société libanaise, cette solidarité de la communauté, et cette capacité à absorber et à s'adapter.

De surcroît, je souhaite dire deux mots sur la résilience économique. L'un des secrets de cette résilience serait le mécanisme du secteur privé, ce légen-daire secteur privé, qui crée toujours l'emploi malgré un taux de chômage de 20%, un État qui dépense à tour de bras en créant un emploi non productif, en employant à peu près 18% de la population libanaise active, et qui supporte environ plus de 30% de l'ensemble de la masse salariale dans le pays, cet État qui n'arrive plus aujourd'hui ni à créer l'emploi productif ni à dépenser comme il se doit pour relancer la machine économique.

Le deuxième pilier de notre résilience économique est la politique monétaire. Si nous avons encore un système bancaire sain, c'est parce qu'il y a eu des décisions courageuses prises au plus fort

de la crise monétaire et économique au Liban qui a permis de maintenir la réserve d'or du pays sans y toucher. Je parle bien sûr du Président Amine Gemayel qui, par un acte courageux, a su non seulement préserver la réserve d'or du pays, mais a su aussi par le biais de décrets, honorer tous les engagements extérieurs du Liban parce qu'il s'agit avant tout quand on parle du secteur bancaire, de confiance et de crédibilité. Depuis les années 80, le Liban a été remis sur les rails, et avec la politique actuelle adoptée par la Banque du Liban depuis une bonne vingtaine d'années, nous avons vu que finalement la dette publique qui a augmenté et qui peut être un véritable boulet pour notre économie, reste principalement intérieure. Selon les chiffres du gouverneur de la Banque du Liban, le taux de la dette est estimé à 143% du PIB, mais on n'a pas les chiffres exats qui varient (selon les sources) entre 60 milliards et 102 milliards ; et j'ai d'autres chiffres qui parlent de 200 milliards, ce qui met quand même une zone d'ombre sur le sujet. La dette est détenue par sept des plus grandes banques libanaises, qui ont finalement intérêt à honorer ou à renouveler leurs engagements quant aux bons de trésor.

Si nous n'avions pas cette stabilité bancaire monétaire, je pense que nous aurions souffert au niveau macroéconomique dans tous les autres secteurs. Il est certain que l'effet négatif de cette politique conservatrice du système bancaire est l'absence de prise de risques puisque cela sécurise en temps de crises. Il n'y a pas de prise de risques donc il n'y a pas un encouragement réel pour passer du commercial à l'investissement même malgré les quelques réglementa-

tions très limitées en cette faveur. Ainsi le Liban honore toujours ses dettes. J'ai quelques propositions rapides à faire durant le temps qui me reste.

Par suite, si je parle de ces facteurs de résilience, je dirai que c'est une résilience à minima, de statu quo, mais il faudrait passer, et c'est là mon deuxième point, vers une résilience de transformation active qui peut transformer la crise en une opportunité, transformer la crise syrienne et les crises dans le monde arabe en opportunité pour le Liban. Alors là nous restons assez conservateurs. Pour ce faire, il faut rapidement prendre des mesures courageuses. Tout d'abord, et là encore je commence par le plus urgent : nous parlons tous les jours devant l'assemblée nationale de la législation d'urgence pour adopter une loi autorisant de nouveaux prêts, comme si le Liban qui souffre maintenant de 22 milliards du coût de la crise syrienne, pour faire fonctionner son infrastructure, avait besoin de nouveaux prêts ! Si la communauté internationale voulait véritablement aider le Liban à travers un plan Marshall ou autre, il s'agirait de ne plus permettre au Liban de prendre des prêts mais des dons.

On ne peut plus hypothéquer notre richesse nationale par une politique volontariste en prenant le chemin le plus facile des prêts. Cela suppose un acte politique courageux certainement, cela suppose aussi l'élection d'un Président de la République, un Président de sortie de crise, non pas un Président de crise ou un Président qui génère lui-même une crise. Il y a encore d'autres mesures à long terme. On ne peut pas parler d'une stabilité réelle du Liban sans un

assinissement du régime politique. On ne peut pas parler si les communautés ne trouvent pas leur pleine expression au sein d'un Sénat libanais où le pouvoir central est libéré de la tutelle des hégémonies des uns et des autres.

On ne peut pas parler de réforme s'il n'y a pas une véritable décentralisation qui renoue avec la démocratie participative locale où le citoyen contrôle, suit ses affaires et participe à la gestion de ses affaires immédiates. Cela suppose que nous ayons un pays, un État préservé dans sa souveraineté par le biais d'une neutralité active et positive. Cela rassurera toutes les communautés, surtout celles qui se trouvent aujourd'hui renforcées par les armes ou le soutien extérieur, celles-ci se trouveraient un jour affaiblies, ce sont elles qui demanderaient un jour qu'il y ait une souveraineté libanaise protégée par la neutralité.

Je tiens encore à dire qu'au Liban nous avons une société civile qui s'élargit. Selon un sondage en ma possession, nous avons vu que le Liban passe premier au Moyen-Orient en matière d'expression des valeurs réelles mais silencieuses aujourd'hui : la tolérance au niveau de laquelle le Liban est classé numéro 1 au Moyen-Orient. Ces valeurs englobent de même l'expression personnelle, les questions du genre, le soutien à la démocratie, à la séparation de la religion et de l'État. L'un des indicateurs de ce sondage est une question qui est la suivante, celle de savoir si l'amour devrait être le fondement du mariage ou l'accord des parents, et là les chiffres sont éloquents puisque 69% des Libanais considèrent que c'est l'amour qui doit fonder le mariage, par

rapport à 47% en Arabie, 31% en Iraq, 29% en Egypte, et 26% en Tunisie. Cela est un indicateur sur les choix et sur les préférences personnelles. Cela indique aussi où se trouve le citoyen libanais réel, nouveau, qui doit avoir des chances dans un système de résilience assaini à l'avenir. Donc concernant la croissance du sentiment national chez le citoyen libanais, et selon les sondages dont je dispose, 60% des Libanais préfèrent le sentiment national au sentiment communautaire. Mais dans le même sondage, il est dit que 35% des Libanais seulement sont fiers de leur pays, contrairement aux Egyptiens qui se déclarent à 90% fiers de leur pays.

Sur les plans économique et social, nous avons pu découvrir auprès du Président Gemayel concernant la question de la gestion des déchêts, l'intersection entre les différentes hégémonies qui s'exercent, loin de l'État de droit qui est lui seul capable de fonder un système de résilience pour l'avenir. On ne peut donc parler d'avenir au plan économique et social sans un assinaissement du secteur de l'énergie, à travers une privatisation ou autre, et sans une bonne gestion et une bonne gouvernance du pétrole et du gaz. Nous allons comprendre de plus en plus la relation entre la citoyenneté nouvelle et une bonne gestion étatique en matière de pétrole et de gaz, parce qu'ils sont des fonds souverains qui doivent être gérés sans passer par les écoles intermédiaires, le système de clientélisme et les hégémonies au sein des groupes. Ceci affranchira et protègera de plus en plus le citoyen libanais. Aussi faut-il arrêter les prêts et opter pour les dons, et comme le dit aussi le gouverneur de la Banque du Liban, investir dans la

société de la connaissance. Je pourrais de même ajouter l'investissement dans la technologie verte, qui est désormais de plus en plus créatrice d'emploi. Pour le partenariat entre le secteur privé et le secteur public ou le fameux PPP, il faudrait en réalité prendre les meilleures expériences qui se trouvent actuellement au Liban en incluant la société civile et les ONG. En Allemagne, 5% du PIB est produit par les ONG, un taux plus important que celui de Mercedes Benz! Il faut donc croire que la société civile et les ONG ne sont pas simplement des associations caritatives mais elles peuvent être aussi créatrices de la richesse nationale.

Enfin je dirai qu'il faudrait rechercher un nouveau pacte citoyen, que nous avons appelé le pacte social, qui pourrait prendre le Liban comme modèle de gestion de la gouvernance et de la pluralité. Ainsi nous aurions saisi les occasions que nous présentent les crises, pour les transformer en opportunités. Je vous remercie.

sami aoun

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en défense du libéralisme libanais : l'impasse des idéologies religieuses au milieu du chaos déclenché par le printemps arabe

L'objectif de cette intervention est de suggérer un mandat idéo-culturel possible pour la Maison du Futur à la lumière des valeurs fondatrices de l'expérience libanaise étatique, constitutionnelle, pluraliste au niveau religieux et confessionnel, ainsi que pluri-ethno-culturel. Cela est certainement sur un aveu partisan qui croit que le convivium libanais est toujours porteur d'espoir (même d'espérance) pour être une plateforme de la nouvelle Renaissance arabe tant souhaitée.

Selon ses pères fondateurs, chrétiens et musulmans, ainsi que les élites de la Renaissance arabe, le Liban a été voué et projeté comme un espace de liberté et de loyauté citoyenne fondée sur les liens civiques, en dépit de la précarité et la dose d'artificialité, de son entité annoncée en 1920. En un certain sens le Liban a déjà été projeté comme un modèle référentiel démocratique et pluriel pour un certain Plan Marshal avant la lettre !

En ce moment critique de l'histoire du Liban où les effets désastreux du Grand Jeu au Petit Levant sont subis, il est de la sagesse la plus élémentaire de conserver et même de consolider les acquis de l'État libanais et ce, dans le but de faire affranchir du spectre de l'effondrement des États faillis ou presque et l'éclatement des entités pluri-religieuses, et du coup dilapider les acquis de la modernisation de la période de post indépendance.

Sans un excès de zèle de patriotisme, il est bien manifeste, et à titre comparatif avec son entourage proche-oriental, que le Liban garde les prérequis pour être – et encore une fois – une plateforme du renouveau culturel et un lieu de synergie avec les idéaux de la moder-

nité surtout en leur rapport avec les matrices interreligieuses et interculturelles, et un modèle d'hébergement de la démocratie libérale.

La survie de l'État libanais est la condition sine qua non pour que chaque communauté reste un acteur dans le concert des États-Nations.

Il est de coutume de dire que le Liban n'a pas subi les affres du despotisme oriental, non plus un féodalisme lourd. Même en sa Montagne s'est formée avant d'autres coins du proche Orient, une société civile et une idée républicaine. L'avantage historique du Liban est dû aussi au fait qu'il a été régi selon les modalités du contrat social et non pas par l'allégeance traditionnelle pour gérer son pluralisme. Toutefois, malgré la faillite évidente de la gestion du confessionnalisme (antinomique avec les piliers du libéralisme), surtout l'échec des partis transcommunautaires, couplé par une mentalité mercantile, le Liban a maintenu une avance dans l'encadrement des idées fondatrices de la démocratie libérale et donc il est réhabilité pour renouer avec sa mission originelle et il faut le souhaiter survivre à la crise institutionnelle et politique actuelle.

Sur cet arrière-plan je formule une critique sur la crise des idéologies combatives islamistes :

Un simple survol du chaos dans les sociétés arabes permet de juger ses idéologies religieuses et sectaires ainsi que de noter le constat de leur attitude inhibitrice de la culture démocratique dans cet espace libanais et son voisinage. Ainsi, par le fait même et à l'instar des approches anti libérales se formeront des obstacles majeurs contre la paix citoyenne et le développement durable et

citoyen. Ce ne sont surtout pas des alternatives aux idéologies autoritaires même les plus laïques et les semi-laïques parmi elles. C'est encore par leur exclusivisme sectaire ou religieux elles ne seront pas considérées comme un socle solide pour la paix sociale et l'entente harmonieuse dans les sociétés plurielles.

Cette crise actuelle qui traine depuis le Printemps arabe et ses déboires et bien avant, confirme la fin des grandes utopies de la culture politique arabe moderne et contemporaine qu'elle soit le panislamisme ou l'utopie califale, l'arabisme dans ses différentes expressions institutionnelles, ou tout autre nationalisme sans contenu démocratique et même la vision de la gauche socialiste ou marxisante.

En accompagnement avec cet âge des extrêmes que traverse l'espace politique arabo-musulman, la Maison du Futur pourrait contribuer à une réflexion critique en quête des solutions appliquées aux enjeux suivants :

– Les enjeux du Printemps arabe

Ce virage qui n'a pas livré tous ses sens, porte en lui en principe malgré ses soubresauts volcaniques le mince espoir d'un âge libéral et dont la mort annoncée reste prématurée. D'où le rôle impératif de la MDF de contribuer aux efforts de faire sortir le Printemps arabe de sa crise. La participation des élites libanaises dans l'avancement de la démocratie libérale est incontournable. Leur apport au sein de la culture arabe est majeur pour la rendre hospitalière à l'idéal libéral et ses exigences pour la création de l'État de droit civique, gérante, garante et neutre, du primat de l'individu et les droits égaux des citoyens, tout en œuvrant pour l'État Providence avec une décentralisation

administrative accrue. Ce qui devrait être à l'opposé de l'État sultanique qui a formé une chape de plomb sur la société civile. Ceci dit, le libéralisme n'a pas la robustesse apparente des idéologies totalitaires et autoritaires, religieuses plus spécifiquement! Il traine le dilemme de Böckenförde: qui annonce que le libéralisme n'a pas de garanties sur la validité de ses prémisses!!!

– Les enjeux de la "Fitna"

Qu'elle soit au sens religieux propre à une guerre fratricide au sein de l'Islam, ou au sein des branches sunnites et chiites, ainsi qu'un usage à un degré alarmant de la violence sectaire tragiquement autodestructrice, une rivalité à somme nulle et des débordements désastreux sur le vécu des deux idéologies selon les dires de Wajih Kawtharani: Un Faqih avec un sultan et un Faqih sultan! Tout au plus que cette guerre inter-musulmane pour des raisons géopolitiques et idéologiques touche aussi les communautés diasporiques et déclenche une dynamique de radicalisation et de violence extrême et d'endoctrinement identitaire qui met en péril leur image et ternit celle de leur foi religieuse et leurs aptitudes à l'intégration citoyenne.

– La polarisation autour de l'autorité entre pouvoirs militaires et islamistes et l'essoufflement de la politisation de l'Islam.

En ce sens les élites libanaises sont intensément sollicitées à contribuer et à raconter leur expérience sur la bonne distance entre le politique et le religieux. Ceci sans pour autant minimiser l'instrumentalisation constatée et prouvée par des régimes laïcisant ou semi-laïques des idéologies religieuses intégristes et combatives, qui ont mené au chaos du Printemps arabe, à l'aggrava-

tion du rôle des idéologies contre-révolutionnaires et à l'anarchie des fatwas anti-culture démocratique.

– La polarisation géopolitique

Elle s'avère désastreuse entre les puissances islamistes particulièrement l'Arabie saoudite, (perçue comme sunnite rigoriste, ou fondée sur une alliance tribale avec l'establishment des prédicateurs wahhabites) et l'Iran, (puissance cléricale persano-chiite adoptant une approche d'exportation de sa révolution idéo-religieuse). En outre sa dynamique autodestructrice, cette polarisation entre les deux puissances islamiques a engendré un glissement de la configuration de l'ennemi (de la guerre avec l'Autre à la guerre intestine).

Sur le plan référentiel, ni le modèle wahhabite ni le clérical iranien, ni même celui islamo-turc (en éclipse pour le moment) pourrait être répandu dans l'espace arabe, d'où l'urgence de la quête de son propre modèle.

Le Liban pourrait être un lieu et une tribune via la Maison du Futur et ses partenaires, pour relever ce défi.

Il va sans dire que l'accomplissement réussi d'un projet de développement humain durable trouve sa plénitude dans un espace démocratique libéral.

La question du libéralisme se pose au moment des échecs des idéaux et des slogans du Printemps arabe, suite auxquels des convictions dans les cercles de pouvoirs, des élites journalistiques, des observateurs diplomatiques et des perceptions populaires surtout en Occident, répandent encore une fois que les valeurs libérales sont soit rejetées soit menacées par l'islam en général et les islamismes en particulier.

D'où les questions récurrentes et du-

دفاعًا عن لبنان الليبرالي: هل تواجه الإيديولوجيّات الدينيّة طريقًا مسدودة في ظل فوضى الربيع العربي؟

سامي عون

لم يعان لبنان عبر تاريخه من وطأة الأنظمة الاستبدادية التي سادت منطقة الشرق الأوسط، وعرف جبله قبل أي دولة أخرى في الشرق الأدنى تجربة الجمهورية والمجتمع المدني. و على الرغم من فشل لبنان في إنتاج أحزاب سياسية عابرة للطوائف والعقلية التجارية المهيمنة فيه، حافظ على الصدارة في احتضان الديمقراطية الليبرالية، ما مكّنه تاليا من التواصل مجددا مع تراثه وتخطي الأزمة السياسية والدستورية الحالية.

في المقابل، إن انتشار الفكر المتطرف الذي يستخدم العنف كوسيلة وحيدة لتحقيق تغييرات اجتماعية والذي أعقب ما يسمى بالربيع العربي، يثبت أنه بخلاف لبنان لا تحمل دول المنطقة في جذورها قيم الديمقراطية الليبرالية. الفكر الإسلامي المتطرف يشكل عائقا أمام ثقافة الديمقراطية ولا يمكنه أن يؤسس لسلام أهلي في المجتمعات المتعددة.

ومع ذلك، وعلى الرغم من حال إنعدام الاستقرار التي انتجها الربيع العربي على المدى القصير، فهو دون أدنى شك يؤشر على المدى الطويل إلى قيام شرق أوسط حر مع إسقاط دوله للأنظمة الاستبدادية التي كانت راسخة. وبإمكان مجتمع المفكرين في لبنان ومنهم بيت المستقبل المساهمة في ترسيخ هذه الحرية الجديدة ودعم الانتقال إلى الديمقراطية من خلال تأسيس مؤسسات ليبرالية وحل المشاكل الاقتصادية، ما يعد بمنطقة تعتمد الحوكمة الرشيدة القائمة على احترام حقوق الإنسان. على البيت المستقبل السعي لتخفيف التوتر السني ـ الشيعي المتزايد والعمل على ترسيخ فصل الدين عن الدولة عبر مقاربة ليبرالية.

وفي هذا الصدد، ومع ارتفاع حدة الطائفية في منطقة الشرق الأوسط زيادة التنافس الجيوسياسي السعودي ـ الإيراني، فالسير على الحبل المشدود بين هذين المتنافسين الكبيرين سيكون صعبا وحساسا. لا نموذج الوهابية، ولا نموذج الملالي الإيراني ولا حتى النموذج التركي الإسلامي يمكن أن يطبق في المنطقة العربية، وبالتالي تحتاج المنطقة بشكل ملح إلى استشراف نموذج خاص بها، ويمكن للبنان أن يساعد في تحقيق هذا التحدي.

وعن سبل كبح المد الاسلامي الذي يجتاح المنطقة، تحتاج المجتمعات العربية إلى حركة إصلاحية تنتج نموذجا بديلا عن النموذج الإسلامي المتطرف يحافظ على التعددية والسياسة التشاركية. إن النزاع الطائفي داخل الإسلام أعاق في السنوات الأخيرة عملية البحث عن هذا النموذج البديل، ما أجّج التوترات وأغرق العالم العربي في دوامة من العنف. في ضوء هذه الحالة الطارئة، أصبحت الحاجة إلى إصلاح الفقه الإسلامي والفكر الاجتماعي أكثر إلحاحا من أي وقت مضى. إن التهديد الذي يشكّله الاسلاميون المتطرفون للعالم العربي، ضاعف من حالة الضعف في التفكير النقدي للتقاليد الدينية والسياسية الاسلامية. ومن خلال وضع بديل إصلاحي للفكر الإسلاموي، يصبح لدى المجتمعات العربية هيكلية صلبة ذات بعد تاريخي، تعتمد التفكير المعارض وتؤسس لقيام أنظمة سياسية واجتماعية أفضل ولخلق مجتمعات عادلة تحتضن جميع الأطياف.

وفي هذا الإطار، علينا الاستثمار في الأفكار التي عرضها الأزهر مؤخرا حول سيادة القانون والمساواة والعدالة والحرية، والتي جاءت أكثر اعتدالا من الخطاب الاسلامي التقليدي في كل تنوعاته.

نشدد أخيرا على دور لبنان في تعزيز الديمقراطية الليبرالية في العالم العربي، وتعزيز الحوار بين الأديان وترسيخ ثقافة التسامح وقبول الآخر.

bitatives sur la probabilité d'implanter la démocratie des valeurs dans cet espace, malgré la proximité géographique, le fonds gréco-romain et les ressemblances autour de la Méditerranée ainsi que la parenté entre l'islam et les deux autres monothéismes, (le judaïsme et le christianisme). Ce qui fait réellement que les musulmans ne donnent pas des réponses sans ambiguïté et claires sur le sort et la pertinence du libéralisme dans leur devenir face à leurs enjeux !

Cela tout en gardant dans l'esprit que toutes les idéologies dans la culture arabe ont tenté de ternir l'image du libéralisme, l'accusant de jouer le tremplin des intérêts occidentaux ou d'être importé et dénudé de racines culturelles. Un bon croyant n'est pas un bon libéral et vice versa !

Signalons au passage et à titre comparatif que les fondements théologiques du libéralisme ont été largement soulignés par plusieurs penseurs et auteurs, qui considèrent que la modernité est la fille légitime du christianisme porteur en lui-même les germes de la sécularisation. Dans le célèbre discours du Pape Benoît XVI à l'université de Ratisbonne (2006), à propos de la relation entre la foi et la raison dans la pensée occidentale, celui-ci explique que le christianisme a effectué une synthèse entre la philosophie grecque et la foi biblique. Ce qui a permis une promesse de la pensée chrétienne de s'engager sur le chemin d'une connaissance rationnelle. Il est important de signaler que le Pape Benoît XVI reconnait dans ce discours les bienfaits et les grandeurs de l'idéal de la modernité.

Cela signifie que des parentés similaires avec la vision de l'islam et ses cultures sont probables. Les deux centralités référentielles dans la culture universelle humaine sont manifestes et imposantes : La centralité du religieux et la centralité de la modernité politique.

Ainsi dit et constaté, les axes de recherche et de réflexion suivants sont à explorer :

Premier axe : La réforme religieuse

Elle est sollicitée et recommandée comme sortie de crise des idéologies islamistes, surtout vue la difficulté d'imaginer l'islam se placer à contre sens de l'ordre international hors des institutions étatiques modernes. Il est encore difficile, même improbable, de prévoir l'islamisme bâtir son État sans considération de la sécularisation et ses dynamiques et exigences qui sont en cours dans ses propres cultures, notamment sans conserver l'ordre étatique de ses propres pays.

On ne manque pas à la rigueur en affirmant la centralité de la religion dans les imaginaires identitaires et les mémoires collectives et individuelles. C'est une raison de plus que le religieux ne soit plus ou pas la seule affaire de l'islamisme politique, ou celle des croyants eux-mêmes. Vue que ni le fondamentalisme ni l'intégrisme ne peuvent s'entendre sur un dialogue fructueux avec les exigences de la modernité. Pire : ils sont inaptes à s'engager même dans un dialogue interreligieux et interculturel en vue de consolider le vivre ensemble.

Malgré les apparences, et indépendamment des lectures intégristes et fondamentalistes des textes sacrés, le religieux est multifonctionnel, et en plus d'être polysémique, il se porte à l'usage et ainsi qu'au service du despotisme et

de l'autoritarisme. Mais paradoxalement, il se prête à être un tremplin de démocratisation et de modernisation. Grâce justement à la polysémie des Textes sacrés et au phénomène de transvasement des valeurs, le religieux est une source justificatrice et légitimatrice de Modernité (Pierre Manent)

C'est dans cette approche qu'on est en position d'affirmer l'échec des discours islamistes exclusivistes et leur inaptitude à inclure les idéaux de la modernité surtout le primat de la liberté individuelle et celui de la liberté de conscience. Ajoutons aussi la pauvreté sémantique des récits islamistes devant l'ascendance de la modernité politique surtout avec son expression démocratique.

Second axe : L'utopie califale

Ces idéologies islamistes sont restées éprises des approches de domination (wilayet al moutghaleb), et ce depuis les premiers moments de l'émergence de l'autorité califale (as-sakifa). Ce qui révèle les conséquences désastreuses de la politisation du religieux et surtout l'inclusion du religieux dans le processus décisionnel politique et institutionnel. Ce qui a été révélé par leur échec dans le ta'ssil (enracinement) des valeurs de la démocratie et en se limitant à légitimer la démocratie procédurale, et dans la même avenue leur échec à conceptualiser l'État-nation ou l'État territorial (ad dawla al watania) comme couveuse de démocratie et comme un moyen efficace et prometteur de la modernisation.

LES PISTES DE SORTIE DE CRISE

Cela étant, la MDF à ce niveau de réflexion idéo-culturelle, s'engagera sur les pistes de sortie ou les politiques appliquées pour le déblocage des liens entre l'étatique, le religieux, et la politique :

S'engager dans le débat pour la laïcité ouverte ou la neutralité de l'État, soit par un retour à la Constitution de 1926, soit en s'inspirant de la Constitution tunisienne actuellement en vigueur. Finir avec cette invraisemblable binarité "le fondamentalisme est authentique et la laïcité est étrangère" sans toutefois glisser vers un fondamentalisme laïc qui est de la même matrice que le fondamentalisme religieux rejetant la démocratie ! C'est dans ce sens qu'on rappelle que dans la foulée des changements survenus après le printemps arabe, Al-Azhar a proposé des idées sur l'État de droit, sur l'équité, la justice et la liberté, qui sont nettement plus modérés que le discours islamiste en toutes ses variations.

Dans un célèbre document après le printemps égyptien, il redéfinit la relation entre l'islam et l'État. Ce document inclut plusieurs points essentiels qui visent entre autres, à :

– Soutenir la création d'un État national constitutionnel démocratique et moderne, basé sur une constitution approuvée par la nation, qui assure la séparation des pouvoirs et des différentes institutions dirigeantes.

– Adopter un régime démocratique, basé sur le suffrage universel direct, une forme moderne reconnue pour la réalisation des principes de la Choura islamique qui garantit le pluralisme et la transmission pacifique du pouvoir… etc.

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– S'engager au respect du système de libertés fondamentales de pensée et d'opinion, dans un total respect des droits de l'homme, de la femme et de l'enfant, l'affirmation du principe de pluralité, le respect de toutes les religions monothéistes, tout en définissant la citoyenneté comme le seul critère de responsabilité au sein de la société.

– Respecter la culture de la différence et l'esprit du dialogue, la prévention de l'accusation d'athéisme, ainsi que l'instrumentalisation de la religion afin de créer la discorde et l'hostilité entre les citoyens et criminaliser l'incitation à la haine confessionnelle et raciale.

L'éthique citoyenne *hautement inspirée de la morale religieuse et de la morale humaniste et de la modernité, en vue de l'émergence d'une éthique politique non violente.*

Justement sur cet aspect, il est impératif de poursuivre la réflexion sur le Fiqh al Aqliayt. La mise en application du principe pertinent pour une approche libérale: Darourat tobih al-mahdourat (La nécessité permet l'interdit). Ainsi le spectre des nécessités s'agrandit alors que celui des interdits se rétrécit. Par ce fait même, se donner comme obligation d'actualiser les mécanismes de la jurisprudence musulmane, pour se conformer aux registres normatifs de la démocratie libérale. La reformulation des maqassed (finalités) comme envisagé par l'imam Shatibi (mort en 1388).

Approfondir le débat sur les conséquences négatives de la réduction de la Foi religieuse à une idéologie de combat *ou de gestion belliqueuse des subjectivités et des factions concurrentes et rivales qui sont foncièrement anti humanistes et anti modernes. Par ce fait,* les idéologies religieuses s'avèrent anti développement et anti renouveau culturel et une recette de cette dégradation dans la logique raciale et raciste au sein de la sphère de l'islam. Ce qui, en ce sens, provoque l'enlisement dans l'éloignement de l'esprit du siècle: s'enfoncer dans leur logique de bellicosité et d'exclusivisme, et leur incapacité endémique à se reconnecter aux valeurs universelles et universalisables.

Ce qui est devenu une évidence: il n'y a pas un religieux viable sans une synergie avec la modernité e*t il n'y a pas une modernité enracinée dans la culture arabe sans une profonde interaction de celle-ci avec celle-là. Ni le passéisme, ni le fondamentalisme ni l'intégrisme ne sont porteurs de projets de société surtout en insistant à écarter des interactions avec la modernité politique et culturelle. Sous cette optique la MDF pourrait abriter un débat avec des méthodologies des sciences humaines et sociales pour trouver les meilleures conditions pour un développement modèle Plan Marshall et en particulier avec une nouvelle vision sur le dépassement de la double instrumentalisation du politique et du religieux. Ce qui est en soi un prérequis pour faire la distinction entre ce qui est du dogme et ce qui est de la coutume ou du culte et du cultuel.*

Par conséquent la MDF pourrait être utile dans le débat incontournable sur la loyauté citoyenne où devraient primer les loyautés communautaires dans la gestion du pluralisme et le primat de la Raison de l'État. Il est aussi impératif de faire remarquer que l'État n'est pas émergé du fond religieux abrahamique ou de la révélation monothéiste et expressément islamique. Le

fondement qui cimente l'État reste la Assabiya et non pas le lien de la Foi et de la croyance religieuse! Cela est vrai pour l'Occident et l'Orient, tout au long de l'histoire du Moyen-Orient arabo-musulman!

Reconnaître ces faits garderait vivante la question de la possibilité de la démocratie islamique. Encore plus, il la rend de plus en plus probable, en invitant à une autre approche de la nécessité de l'inclusion du religieux dans le projet de modernité dans les parcours arabes et musulmans sans nier des racines et des préludes possibles dans la Tradition et l'Idéal coraniques de la possibilité de la démocratie.

Toutefois, Il est bien évident que les idéologies intégristes étouffent cette possibilité par leur concentration utopique identitaire et leur déficit dans le contenu social. En ce sens, ces intégrismes, par leur littéralisme par leur concentration sur le Texte, ils en ignorent le contexte; par leur bellicosité et leur conflictualité due à leurs approches "Takfiris" deviennent une force anti démocratique et étouffent les grains possibles de l'éclosion de la démocratie en terre de l'Islam. La réalité dramatique que des millions des adeptes des idéologies religieuses combatives se lancent dans des batailles apocalyptiques et prétendument justifiées par de utopies mahdistes et millénaristes.

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en guise de conclusion, il faut dire qu'en ce moment de la montée criante et apeurante en Occident de la radicalisation menant à la violence au sein des société démocratiques, et pour avoir une expertise sur ce phénomène,

qui est de toute évidence une source de nuisance pour la démocratie libérale bien ancrée mais qui est par contre une menace existentielle pour un pays comme le Liban et les États et les sociétés composées et multiculturelles.

La MDF devrait assumer un rôle de prévention vigilante dans une période qualifiée de "La Brutalisation du monde : du retrait des États à la dé-civilisation", selon le fameux titre de Joseph Laroche. Alors sur ce point, un débat ouvert interreligieux et interculturel sur la responsabilité de la religion en général et l'Islam en tant que tel et en tant qu'une des visions qui garde une emprise avancée sur l'étatique et le politique, vu la polysémie de ses textes fondateurs, est nécessaire pour établir l'approche socio-culturelle des profils du l'activiste radical antidémocratique. Ceux qui œuvrent pour le déraillement des projets de développement durable.

Enfin il est important de souligner que le religieux ne meurt pas avec la modernité, mais ses formes et ses expressions, ainsi que son rôle, connaissent une mue positive vers le vivre en commun nécessaire pour une société plurielle comme le Liban. De la sorte la pensée religieuse (ou la réflexion sur le sacré) n'est pas sacrée. Et les idéologies religieuses ne sont pas le dernier mot sur l'interprétation du religieux. Une lecture démocratique, libérale et forcément laïque est donc toujours possible. Sur cette avenue, le Liban, ce passeur culturel, grâce à son convivium islamo-chrétien et sa tradition libérale, reste le lieu privilégié au Moyen-Orient pour articuler des plans de développement humain durable.

GÜNTHER BECKSTEIN

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THE MARSHALL PLAN
AND THE SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY
IN POST-WWII GERMANY

I want to refer to the theme: The Marshall Plan and the social market economy in post World War II in Germany. Germany had started the war when Hitler was the aggressor against Poland, later France and nearly all other European Nations including Russia.

The Second World War ended with millions of soldiers and civil persons dead. Millions of people were murdered in Germany: Jews, gypsies, priests, people who spoke against the Nazis… All these men came into concentration camps; many of them were murdered. Germany was a wasted country economically and intellectually. German cities were destroyed by millions of bombs. For instance, the city of Dresden was destroyed by 98%; my home city Nuremberg was destroyed by 95%. It was a huge and terrible

war which ended with an unconditional surrender. We had in Germany more than 10 million refugees and displaced people. Afterwards, the Western allies started a program to reeducate German people to democracy and to clean them from Nazi ideology. Russia had some millions of prisoners of war and took them to coal mines in Siberia. The machines in German factories were destroyed and brought to Russia. In winter time 1946-1947, there was a great need in Germany. The harsh winter had been a catastrophe. The nutrition, energy supply and transportation sectors collapsed. Without the help of the United States and the United Kingdom, it would have been even much worse.

The former Foreign Minister George C. Marshall presented in a speech to Harvard University students

a program for the reconstruction of Germany in June 1947. As a precondition for American aid, he demanded a joint initiative for the European States. His idea was: only a united Europe can be economically healthy and can oppose any totalitarian regime, and he developed the European recovery program. The Marshall plan's official title was the European Recovery Plan. It was an American initiative to aid Europe in which the United States gave about 15 billion dollars, around 120 to 150 billion dollars in the current value, to help rebuild European economies. The plan was an operation for four years beginning in April 48. The goals were to rebuild war destroyed regions, to remove trade barriers, to modernize industries, and to make Europe prosperous again to prevent the spread of communism.

The Marshall plan required the lessening of interstate barriers, a dropping of many regulations constraining business and an increase in productivity, labor union membership, as well as the adoption of modern business procedures. The Marshall Plan aid was divided among the participant States, roughly on a per capita basis. A large amount was given to the major industrial powers. The recipients of Marshall Plan money were the UK (26%), France (18%), and West Germany (11%). 18 other European countries received Marshall Plan benefits. The Soviet Union refused the plan's benefits and also blocked benefits for Eastern bloc countries such as Poland and East Germany. The reason was that the Russians feared the US control over communist economies.

The Marshall plan had bipartisan support in Washington where Republicans controlled Congress and Democrats controlled the White house under Truman's presidency. The State department provided the expertise of William Clayton and George Kennan to craft the plan. Help was given by think tanks and NGOs. Additionally, there was a technical assistance program were the US bureau of labor statistics could use its expertise in the field of productive efficiency to implement a productivity drive in each European country receiving aid. The bureau of labor statistics used existing data to calculate how much a worker produces per hour of work and the average output rate, than it compared it to other output rates in other nations, which lead to identifying strengths and weaknesses in each country's industrial production. They could recommend technologies that each individual nation could implement, and these technologies often came from the United States. The American government sent hundreds of technical advisors to Europe, and vice versa, the technical assistance program funded 24000 European engineers and industrial leaders to visit American factories. The European countries joined an organization for a European Economic Cooperation, the EEC.

The Marshall plan looked to the future and did not focus on the destruction by the war. Money was important, but much more important was the effort to modernize European industrial and business practices using high efficient American models, reducing artificial trade barriers, and instilling a sense of hope

مشروع مارشال واقتصاد السوق الاجتماعي في ألمانيا
ما بعد الحرب العالميّة الثانية

غونتر بكشتاين

عندما أرخت الحرب العالمية الثانية نيولها، كانت ألمانيا مدمرة اقتصاديا وفكريا ولولا مساعدة الولايات المتحدة والمملكة المتحدة لكان الوضع أكثر سوءا.

إن الفكرة خلف وضع برنامج لإعادة إعمار ألمانيا وإنعاش الاقتصادات الأوروبية، مشروع مارشال، كانت أنه فقط من خلال وحدتها تستطيع أوروبا أن تنتعش اقتصاديا وأن تتصدى لمحاولات تغلغل الأنظمة التوتاليتارية. أما أهداف هذا المشروع فكانت بناء المناطق التي دمرتها الحرب، إزالة الحواجز أمام الحركة التجارية، تحديث الصناعة، وإعادة الازدهار إلى أوروبا لمنع انتشار المد الشيوعي. وكان مشروع مارشال يقتضي تخفيف الحواجز بين البلدان وإلغاء القوانين المعيقة لتقدم الأعمال وزيادة الانتاجية وتفعيل العمل النقابي، فضلا عن اعتماد إجراءات الأعمال الحديثة.

إلى هذا، كان مشروع مارشال من أول العناصر التي ساهمت في تحقيق الاندماج الأوروبي. عانت أوروبا لمئات السنين من الحروب، ولكن الاندماح الذي تحقق بين دولها في مرحلة ما بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية يجعل من اندلاع حروب جديدة أمرا مستحيلا. أما الركن الثالث لهذه المعجزة الاقتصادية، فهو تطبيق اقتصاد السوق الاجتماعي. إن وضع السياسة الاجتماعية على قدم المساواة مع السياسة الاقتصادية، مكّنت ألمانيا من شق طريق ثالث بين الرأسمالية والشيوعية. كان مشروع مارشال ناجحا جدا في ألمانيا وأوروبا في حقل الرعاية الاجتماعية والسلام وحقوق الإنسان. فهو ليس فقط برنامج اقتصادي لأنه تمكن من تحقيق السلام من خلال استكشاف مبادئ وممارسات التعددية وحقوق الإنسان والديمقراطية.

على لبنان أن يكون نموذجا للعالم العربي الجديد، مع فسيفساء الطوائف المكوّنة لنسيجه الاجتماعي والتعايش بين المسيحيين والمسلمين السنة والشيعة، إضافة إلى ثقافة التسامح واحترام الأديان الأخرى والآراء السياسية المتجذرة فيه.

and self reliance. By 1952, as the funding ended, the economy of every participant state had surpassed pre war levels; output was at least 35% higher than in 1938. Over the next two decades, Western Europe enjoyed unprecedented growth and prosperity. The Marshall plan was one of the first elements of European integration. For hundreds of years, there were wars after wars in Europe. After WWII the European integration had to make war in Europe impossible. Indeed, within the

European community, no war took place during the last 70 years; the Yugoslavian war was in Europe but not in the European community. France that was the enemy of Germany became its most narrow ally.

As for the third pillar of the economic miracle, it was the implementation of the social market economy. It is a form of market capitalism combined with a social policy favoring social goods especially social insurance. Social market economy aimed to combine free initiatives

and social progress on the basis of competitive economy. Social market economy is opposed to laisser-faire politics in Anglo American capitalism and to social economies that obviously failed in the 1990s. Social market economy combines private enterprise with State regulation and State intervention to establish fair competition maintaining a balance between economic growth and low levels of unemployment, good working conditions, social welfare, and public services.

Ludwig Erhard and Konrad Adenauer implemented social market economy. In putting social policy on par with economic policy, they reached the third way between capitalism and communism. The essence of the social market economy is to maximize the output of private markets through state macroeconomic management. By decreasing poverty and broadening economic prosperity to the middle class capital market, participation would be enlarged. Social market economy also requires that government regulations and even sponsorship of markets can lead to a superior economic outcome. The social market economy corresponds to the social ethics. In

the center of economy is the human being not the money. I think it would be very interesting to compare Christian economic ethics with Islamic rules for economy, but it is not the theme of my speech today. The Marshall Plan was very successful in Germany and in Europe for social welfare and peace and human rights. It was not only an economical program for it created peace by exploring the principles and practices of pluralism, human rights and democracy.

I think the existence of Lebanon with its mosaic of 18 religions and the coexistence of Christians and Muslim Sunnis and Shiites depends on tolerance and on denying fanatism and extremism. The existence of Lebanon depends on tolerance and respect for other religions and political opinions. So Lebanon should be a model for a new Arab world. Lebanon is a messenger State for tolerance, democracy, human rights and economical success for the entire world, especially for the entire Arab world. Lebanon has to be a delight house for the Arab world and the Middle East. The idea of Maison du Futur is great. I wish all the success for this think tank, and for this conference day. Thank you.

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FROM OSLO TO ISIL TO IRAN : COMPETING AMERICAN POLICIES AND NARRATIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

First of all, let me thank the Maison du Futur and the Konrad-Adenhauer-Stiftung for the kind invitation and welcome opportunity to return to the Middle East and to visit Beirut. Let me pay tribute to the people of Lebanon for what you are doing to support those who have been uprooted by the tragic civil war in Syria. You know only too well how challenging it is to recover from conflict. You are shouldering an incredible burden. The resilience of the Lebanese people is nothing short of remarkable.

I don't think it is an overstatement to suggest that we are experiencing the most complex strategic environment in the Middle East in at least 70 years and perhaps a century. The international structure put in place at the end of World War I is coming apart at the seams. In critical places, such as Syria, Iraq and Yemen, we cannot be certain that the existing order will survive. In any case, repairing the damage will take decades.

Given the developments of the past decade, no country is the same as it was. The ground does seem to be shifting beneath our feet. The list of conflicts and challenges continues to grow, with most of them beyond the ability of any country, including the United States, to resolve it alone. The list of regional spoilers also continues to grow, the latest being the Islamic State, with sufficient capability to inhibit an effective international response.

In the midst of this complexity, questions arise. What does the United States want to see in the Middle East ? And what is it prepared to do to promote a stable new order from the current confusion ?

Those are good questions.

In the United States, the American people have their own questions. What is going on in the Middle East? Why should we jump into the middle of problems rooted in the 7th and not the 21st Century?

These are valid points as well.

Between these two perspectives, there is a wide gap of understanding – in terms of both policy and politics – that has strategic significance and will impact what America is likely to do – and not do – in the years ahead.

Over the past quarter century, since the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy towards the Middle East has included several core objectives. The list hasn't necessarily changed, although the priority given to any one objective has over time. These objectives include:

Regional stability.

Comprehensive Middle East peace.

The security of Israel.

Combatting violent political extremism and preventing acts of terrorism that pose a danger to the United States and its allies.

Protecting the freedom of navigation to ensure the flow of energy vital to both the regional and global economies.

The containment of Iran.

Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and precluding a regional nuclear arms race.

Promoting responsible governance that gives the people of the region a greater voice in the direction of their countries, greater economic opportu-

nity, inclusive civil societies and respect for human rights, particularly for women and minorities.

These objectives include initiatives that have not yet succeeded. They also include clear contradictions and unintended consequences from actions the United States has taken.

One of the positive side effects of the Gulf War in 1991 – besides restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty – was the development of the Oslo process and the prospect of comprehensive Middle East peace and a Palestinian State. While there have been important accomplishments, including peace treaties between Israel and Egypt and Jordan, comprehensive peace remains stubbornly elusive. The peace process is currently in a coma and is likely to stay in that condition until there are leadership changes on all sides – in Israel, in America and in Palestine as well.

The sad irony of the peace process is that the parameters of the solution are well known, but the political will and imagination to enable the necessary compromises to achieve peace are not yet manifest. Nonetheless, we must preserve hope in a two-state solution as the only viable path forward.

The United States does value regional stability, but recently has been a leading disruptor of the status quo. Attempts to change the nature of regimes in Iraq and Libya have created significant ripple effects.

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 did little to advance America's democratic narrative; it did for a time reinforce Osama bin Laden's narrative

من أوسلو إلى داعش إلى إيران:
تنافس السياسات والخطاب الأميركي تجاه الشرق الأوسط

فيليب كراولي

اسمحوا لي بداية أن أشكر بيت المستقبل ومؤسسة كونراد أديناور على دعوتي وأن أشكر لبنان على كل ما يفعله في سبيل مساعدة اللاجئين السوريين الذين غادروا بلادهم هربا من أتون الحرب.

ليس من المبالغة بمكان القول إننا نشهد اليوم البيئة الستراتيجية الأكثر تعقيدا في الشرق الأوسط منذ 70 عاما على الأقل، وربما قرن. الهيكل الدولي الذي وضع في نهاية الحرب العالمية الأولى بدأ يتمزق، بحيث لم نعد نستطيع الجزم بأن الأنظمة القائمة في الدول المشتعلة كسوريا والعراق واليمن ستبقى على قيد الحياة. في جميع الأحوال، سيتطلب الأمر عقودا لإصلاح الضرر الذي حصل.

إن التطورات التي شهدتها المنطقة خلال العقد الأخير، أحدثت تغيرا جذريا في العديد من دول المنطقة، وضاعفت المشاكل والأزمات وأدت إلى بروز جماعات عديدة من المخرّبين أخرها تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام. وفي ظل هذا المشهد، تبرز عدة أسئلة لجهة الموقف الأميركي من هذه المشهدية: كيف تنتظر الولايات المتحدة أن يتشكل هذا الشرق الأوسط الجديد؟ وإلى أي مدى هي مستعدة لتعزيز قيام نظام مستقر؟

لأكثر من ربع قرن اعتمدت السياسة الأميركية تجاه المنطقة الأهداف التالية: المحافظة على الاستقرار الإقليمي وتحقيق سلام شامل وضمان أمن إسرائيل ومكافحة التطرف السياسي والإرهاب وحماية حرية حركة الملاحة لتأمين وصول موارد الطاقة إلى العالم أجمع واحتواء إيران ومنع انتشار أسلحة الدمار الشامل وتعزيز الحوكمة الرشيدة في المنطقة، إضافة إلى خلق فرص اقتصادية أكبر والدفع باتجاه احترام حقوق الإنسان، لاسيما بالنسبة للنساء والأقليات.

إذا ما استعرضنا ما أنجزته الولايات المتحدة من هذه الأهداف، نرى أنها عجزت عن تحقيق السلام الشامل وبخاصة في ظل استمرار النزاع الفلسطيني الإسرائيلي، كما أنها لم تتمكن من المحافظة على استقرار المنطقة، وجاء قلب الأنظمة في العراق وليبيا بنتائج معاكسة لتلك المرجوّة. في الإطار نفسه، نعلم أن سياسة الرئيس الأميركي باراك أوباما تجاه الأزمة السورية، كانت دون الحد المطلوب، متراخية ومتخاذلة، ولم يتمكن الرئيس السوري بشار الأسد من الصمود بعد أربع سنوات من الحرب الأهلية إلا بسبب دعم إيران وروسيا له.

بالنسبة إلى المفاوضات النووية مع إيران، وعلى الرغم من حصول تقارب مع طهران، ما زالت إيران تعارض الأهداف الأميركية في المنطقة وتعتبر أن الولايات المتحدة هي «الشيطان الأكبر». إلى هذا ما زالت إيران تدعم الإرهاب، وكل حديث عن صفقة تجريها الولايات المتحدة مع إيران على حساب حلفائها في المنطقة هو باطل.

بعد الحرب في أفغانستان والعراق، أصبحت واشنطن حذرة من التدخل العسكري المنفرد في الأماكن التي تشهد صراعات، ولا تتدخل عسكريا إلا ضمن تحالفات دولية تضم أطرافا إقليمية. إن التجربة الأميركية الفاشلة في العراق على هذا الصعيد ستؤثر لعقود على السياسة الأميركية الخارجية، وليس من الصحة بشيء وصف هذه الأخيرة بأنها أضحت سياسة «فك ارتباط» مع قضايا المنطقة، بل هي سياسة تسعى إلى تحقيق «شراكة مستدامة» من خلال عملها الدؤوب للتوصل إلى حلول متعددة الأطراف بدلا من فرض حل من جانب واحد، تساعد في الوقت عينه على «بناء القدرات الإقليمية» وتترك للاعبين الإقليميين في المنطقة فرصة أخذ زمام المبادرة.

regarding the western occupation of sacred lands in the Islamic world. It also opened the door to increased Iranian influence in Iraq and beyond, and the advance of malign actors like al Qaeda and the Islamic State.

While the United States has reengaged both politically and militarily in Iraq, it has struggled to define a coherent and sustainable strategy regarding Syria that the American people and the region are willing to support. Certainly the Obama administration did not enhance the credibility of American policy in the region with its mismanagement of the so-called red line regarding Syria's use of chemical weapons, and even though chemical weapons have been removed and destroyed over the past two years, the Assad regime's use of chlorine barrel bombs is a gross violation of international norms that the United States, United Nations and Arab League need to address with greater urgency.

The region is obviously focused on the ongoing negotiation with Iran regarding its nuclear program. This was a major topic of discussion at the recent U.S.-GCC Summit at Camp David. It appears the outcome was an agreement that the dialogue is important, and a disagreement whether the dialogue will result in the desired behavioral impact.

Assad has survived four years of civil war only because of the support of Iran and Russia. There is concern that a nuclear agreement will come at the expense of America's traditional allies in the region that will involve a concession that allows Assad

to remain in power, or signals a rapprochement with Tehran.

I believe these concerns are vastly overstated.

The backdrop of the negotiation is more than 35 years of hostility between the United States and Iran. The complex history between the two countries, the nature of the Iranian revolution, the takeover of the American Embassy in 1979 and Iran's ongoing support for terrorism as a major dimension of its foreign policy. Iran continues to define the United States as the Great Satan and most of its ongoing policies are rooted in opposition to America and its regional objectives.

These are not the ingredients that lend themselves to a rapprochement. That said, we should not dismiss the possibility that further engagement can identify common interests that can contribute to a just resolution of the crisis in Syria.

If the broad objectives of U.S. regional policy have not changed substantially in recent years, what has changed is the manner in which the United States pursues these objectives.

Chastened by its interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington is far more cautious about the use of military force today. When it does, the United States hopes to act with regional partners and based on a strong international consensus for action. In the case of a conflict like Yemen, where the regional interest may be more compelling than the American interest, the United States will let the region take the lead. In many respects, this is the result of two decades of U.S. policy, to help

build regional capabilities to implement local solutions to neighborhood problems.

Where possible, given the narratives advanced by al Qaeda and the Islamic State, if boots on the ground are required, ideally, they should be first and foremost regional forces, promoting a regional political solution, not one imposed by Washington. This is harder than it sounds as we have seen with support to the Syrian opposition. The process has been too slow, frustrating and uncertain.

This revised regional approach – leading from behind is one way it has been described – is controversial within political and policy circles in Washington and will undoubtedly be much debated during the upcoming 2016 presidential campaign in the United States. Regardless of who becomes the next president of the United States, he or she will confront our recent experience in

Iraq, which has become a powerful American political narrative and will be an influential sub-text regarding American policy for the foreseeable future.

Here in the region, many have interpreted this policy as the beginning of a disengagement by the United States. I don't see it that way. The Obama administration did believe America was over-invested in purely military solutions in the region – I dare say many in the region agreed. This is not disengagement. It is sustainable engagement.

The United States will remain the most influential actor in the region, but is interested in pursuing multilateral rather than unilateral solutions. The question becomes not what the United States decides alone, but what can be achieved together, but this requires key actors here to develop a consensus for action that both the United States and the region are able to support.

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TECTONIC SHIFTS
IN THE MIDDLE EAST'S STRATEGIC
ENVIRONMENT

The future of the Middle East will be the result of the interaction of events occurring in the region itself with forces and dynamics occurring beyond its borders. I am particularly interested in the latter – the external forces and influences that will contribute to the strategic architecture of the Middle East going forward. We tend to focus on profound changes within the Middle East's states and societies as evidence that the future is likely to be rather different from today. I wish to concentrate attention on the tectonic shifts occurring all around the Middle East that ultimately will go far toward shaping what happens here. These shifts are among both old actors and new.

Perhaps no other region of the globe has been affected so power-fully by the interests of outside actors, whether they seek to harvest the region's abundant resources or enhance positions in an ongoing geostrategic competition that occurs elsewhere, or both. I will not speak of the United States, whose interests and strategies can be described better by other participants in this conference, except to register my own view that despite the political, economic, and social turmoil America's recent involvement in the Middle East has caused at home, I doubt that the United States' appetite for pursuing what it considers vital national interests in the Middle East has dimmed as much as most media pundits and a few candidates for the presidency would have us believe. To the contrary, I anticipate that U.S. interests will remain strong here, and

that any new administration will adjust strategies to facilitate the United States remaining a strong player and constant presence for the foreseeable future.

Russia, one of the Middle East's formative actors and an aspiring player once again, will not be a durable presence in the Middle East. Today, Russia is a declining state across virtually every measure of its corporate viability. While Putin's ambitious and assertive Kremlin has behaved as if it is a regime on the geopolitical ascent by most indicators, the Russian state is actually on a downward trajectory.

The elements of Russia's national unraveling – and thus, the unraveling of Russia's sources of state power – are more or less well-known. They include:

– Severe and intractable demographic constraints, including an ongoing and inescapable long-term labor force contraction, a seemingly irresolvable public health nightmare, profound and rapid population aging where "greying" starts at the shockingly young, and other deep dysfunctions in the realm of human resources

– Ethnic imbalances favoring "population replacement" by non-Russians that are fundamentally changing the complexion of Russia's overall population, especially its younger cohorts, and its institutions (e.g., the military)

– One-commodity economy –

للولايات المتحدة، والأهم من ذلك، بالنسبة إلى الهند، تستثمر الصين بشكل كبير في تأمين موقع استراتيجي قوي لها في منطقة الشرق الأوسط، ويشمل ذلك إنشاء المنشآت العسكرية وتمتين العلاقات.

إلى هذا، بدأ نجم الهند أيضا بالصعود كما تدل عليه معدلات النمو الاقتصادية الأخيرة، وتظهر قيادتها الجديدة عزما على تحويل البلاد إلى قوة حازمة وفاعلة. ما يؤكد ذلك، قيام الهند بتطوير قدراتها العسكرية إلى حد كبير، مع التركيز بشكل خاص على القوة البحرية وبخاصة الغواصات وحاملات الطائرات، والطائرات.

وسيضع جميع هؤلاء اللاعبين ـ الجدد والقدامى والأيل نجمهم إلى الصعود أو إلى الأفول ـ نصب أعينهم إيران نظرا لحجمها ومواردها. إن التحول الجذري الذي سيشكله حصول إيران على قدرات عسكرية نووية سيؤثر على استراتيجيات هذه البلدان ويدفع عددا منها إلى التخطيط لاكتساب قدرات نووية أيضا.

أخيرا، إن منطقة الشرق الأوسط ستصبح على نحو متزايد نسيجا من تقاطع المصالح الستراتيجية للاعبين جدد نسبيا، في حين سيتلاشى نفوذ بعض اللاعبين التقليديين كروسيا وأوروبا. في أقل تقدير، ستتعرض الهيكلية الستراتيجية للشرق الأوسط الناشئ لتحولات أخرى مع دخول لاعبين جدد يتمتعون بقدرات كبيرة وينتظرون نتائج استراتيجية غير مألوفة.

تحوّل جذري في الإطار الاستراتيجي
لمنطقة الشرق الأوسط

س. إندرز وينبوش

لا توجد منطقة في العالم تتأثر بمصالح القوى الخارجية كمنطقة الشرق الأوسط، حيث يتكاثر تدخل الجهات الفاعلة الخارجية إما سعيا للسيطرة على موارد المنطقة أو تعزيزا لموقعها في الصراع على النفوذ الجيوستراتيجي المستمر والذي قد يحدث في أماكن أخرى، أو الاثنين معا. اسمحوا لي على هامش مداخلتي أن أعارض الآراء التي تتحدث عن تخلي الولايات المتحدة عن حماية ما تعتبره مصالح حيوية لها في الشرق الأوسط، وأتوقع أن يحدث العكس تماما، أي أن تبقى مصالح الولايات المتحدة قوية في المنطقة وأن تعمل أي إدارة جديدة على تعديل استراتيجيتها لتأمين بقاء الولايات المتحدة في المستقبل القريب لاعبا قويا في المنطقة، له فيها وجود مستمر.

بالنسبة إلى روسيا، وعلى الرغم من عودتها إلى المشهد السياسي في الشرق الأوسط، فوجودها كلاعب دولي لن يستمر. وفي الوقت الذي يتصرف فيه الرئيس الروسي بوتين والكرملين كما لو أن بلادهم باتت تمتلك نفوذا واسعا في المشهد الجيوسياسي الدولي، فإن كل المؤشرات تدلّ على أن روسيا تشهد بخلاف ذلك انحدارا كبيرا.

ولا أستبعد أن تلجأ روسيا في لعبة الخطر التي تلعبها للاستعانة بدول أخرى أو حتى

بمنظمات خارجة عن الدولة على نطاق جغرافي واسع يطال منطقة الشرق الأوسط، لاسيّما أولئك الذين تتشارك معهم في كرهها للولايات المتحدة بخاصة وللغرب بعامة.

على نحو مماثل، بدأ دور أوروبا كلاعب تقليدي في الشرق الأوسط بالتقلص لاسيما وأن الاستثمارات في القدرات العسكرية آخذة في الانخفاض في كل دولة أوروبية تقريبا. وليس من الصعب أن نتخيل أوروبا في المستقبل غير البعيد كيانا منقسما وضعيفا، تنعكس تعاسته بالخطاب المرير للأحزاب السياسية المتطرفة الآخذة في التصاعد. ومع ذلك، ما زالت بعض الدول مثل ألمانيا وفرنسا وبريطانيا العظمى قادرة بشكل منفرد على لعب دور في مسار أحداث المنطقة.

من ناحية أخرى، شدد على إن اقتصاد آسيا يعتمد في جزء منه على الأحداث التي تشهدها منطقة الشرق الأوسط. وتحدّث عن الصين والهند، اللتين تشهدان نموا كبيرا على المستويات العسكرية والاقتصادية والطاقة، ما يجعلهما لاعبين رئيسيين محتملين في المنطقة ويضعهما في مواقع استراتيجية تنافسية في الشرق الأوسط. ويعتمد تطور الصين بشكل أساسي على استمرار تدفق موارد الطاقة إليها من الشرق الأوسط. ولحماية إمدادات الطاقة وتعزيز موقعها الجيوستراتيجي بالنسبة

hydrocarbons – whose volatile global price keeps Russia at the precipice of economic crisis, while the state's dependence on energy prices for public finances smothers human resource-based development policies

– A remarkably underdeveloped and ineffectual "middle class"

– A seemingly unstoppable brain drain, with many of the brightest of its younger generation opting to participate in the global economy from countries beyond Russia

– Degradation of "knowledge production" capabilities, caused by the collapse of both elite and mass education and the exodus of skilled talent with scarce opportunity in a Russia

– Brittle political system, with few safety valves for dissent, succession planning, and an entrenched stake-holding political elite

– Rapacious leadership, which takes every opportunity to harvest the state's wealth for personal gain, while parking its profits abroad

– Military decline (notwithstanding its successful adventures in the near abroad), and the loss of the technical ability to produce the next generation of weaponry

This is an almost classic depiction of a waning power.

Russia's leadership knows that Russia's window of competitive advantage is small, and that the window is closing rapidly. It will take increasingly greater risks to remain in the game while employing a variety of dicey strategies and tactics to remain competitive. It must of necessity play its cards with greater abandon, letting the risks and attendant missteps mount while embracing chancy, and in all likelihood precipitate, behaviors with high probabilities of failure. Russia is likely to seek new supporters for its risk-taking from amongst state and, particularly, non-state actors who share Russia's risk-taking mentality and antipathy toward the United States in particular and the West generally while bringing to the relationship high mobility and geographic reach. This will include, prominently, the Middle East.

The Middle East's other traditional actor, Europe, is also declining in its capacity to play a major role here, for reasons in plain sight. The united Europe that its framers dreamt about has not come to pass, and today one sees what could be the beginnings of a long drawn out process of its dissolution. One should always speculate with caution about the viability of such a group of dynamic states, but, certainly, one alternative world – increasingly plausible – is a disunited Europe, where the European Union has devolved into an unmanageable mélange of increasingly conservative nationalistic states, with immigration, not least from the Middle East, as the touchstone of their nationalism.

That Europe is an unlikely candidate to exert strong influence on the shape or activities of a new Middle East, although individual states – for

example, Germany, France, or Great Britain – could pursue more traditional historic interests in the Middle East without the anchor the European Union to restrain them. Most of this engagement will be economic, but no European state will have the capacity to project more than anecdotal military power into the region in any significant way. Investment in military capacity is down in virtually every European state. The trend lines on this are clear. Most European states are slowly going out of the defense business.

It is not difficult to imagine a Europe in the not too distant future that is divided, weak, and whose deep unhappiness is reflected in the bitter rhetoric of its increasingly dominant extreme political parties.

In contrast, China's visibility in the Middle East is likely to increase and persist. Many of the Middle East's ports have already entertained visits by Chinese warships. We can be confident that China's blue water navy will grow apace with its interest in the resources of both the Middle East and Africa. These include energy from both the Middle East and West Africa and land for producing food to export to China, where food shortages loom due to water scarcity and environmental degradation.

Some strategists assume today that American interest in protecting sea lanes from the Middle East to Asia will wane as the indigenous production of the energy accelerates in the United States. It is conceivable

that the U.S. may lose interest in this way, although I doubt it. The Asian economies kept afloat by Middle East energy are the lifeblood of the American economy, so the U.S. can abandon at its peril energy security measures that might lead to disruption in Asia's economies.

Whether the U.S. stays or goes, one should expect the Chinese navy to assume a growing role in the protection and control of sea lanes in this region, rather than to remain a free rider for sea lane security on America's navy as it is today. China's continued development, indeed its economic wellbeing, depends fundamentally on an interrupted supply of energy from the Middle East. To protect energy supplies and to enhance its geostrategic position relative to the United States and, importantly, to rising India, China will invest heavily in securing a strong strategic position in the Middle East, including establishing military installations and relationships.

India is not a new player in this geostrategic game, although it has been a muted one. India's diplomatic, economic, and, at times, military influence in the Middle East – or West Asia, to Indian planners – is a strategic concern of long-standing, especially in the Arabian peninsula (e.g., Oman) and Iran, where Indian influence is deep. India is rising, as is reflected in recent economic growth rates. In contrast to China, its population will remain young for a long time. Its new leadership shows promise for creating a more assertive, outwardly focused India

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than its predecessors. One example of this intention is India's development of substantially more military power, with special emphasis on naval power, especially submarines, aircraft carriers, and aircraft.

China's expanding inroads to the Middle East will spur India to compete for influence and advantage with considerable vigor. It views China's economic diplomacy in Central Asia and its naval expansion into the Indian Ocean and the Middle East as efforts to outflank India strategically. Of particular concern to India in this regard is China's pursuit of new port and air facilities stretching thorough the Middle East to Africa, and even into the Mediterranean. Indians see China's leading involvement in the development of the western Pakistan port of Gwadar at the top of the Middle East as emblematic of China's powerful push westward into regions of strong Indian strategic interest. India's warming to a strategic relationship with the U.S. should surprise no one in this context. Balancing China will be a preoccupation of both India and the United States. Their strategic interests in this regard will converge in the Middle East.

All of these actors –new, old, rising, or declining – will place Iran near the center of their strategic planning. Its size, location, and resources make this inevitable. The tectonic tremors that would result from Iran becoming a nuclear weapons power would affect the strategies of all of these competitors powerfully.

We should assume, I believe, that the willingness of the United States to publicly contemplate Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability – which most Middle East states understand as the subtext of the current negotiations between Iran, Europe, Russia, and United States – will propel a number of them to begin planning nuclear futures for themselves. They are unlikely to await clarity on Iran's intentions to either continue developing a nuclear capability or disavow it, or the Unites States' willingness to tolerate this capability or its readiness to de-

stroy it. Good strategic planning would anticipate the worst and begin building strategies to deal with it. Dealing with it will lead some to developing or buying nuclear weapons of their own. If this is correct, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and perhaps others, will begin planning their own strategies for survival in a more fluid nuclear world; indeed, this planning is probably well underway already.

Thus could the Middle East's future strategic landscape feature more nuclear actors with small arsenals that lack the traditional ability to deter, while simultaneously offering strong incentives to incorporate these weapons in doctrines of use, even first strike. The strategic complexity of such a landscape is difficult to imagine, but one hopes that organizations like Maison du Futur dedicates itself to doing so.

The Middle East I see will thus increasingly become a tapestry of intersecting strategic interests of rela-tively new players, while some traditional competitors and forces of restraint – for example, Russia and Europe – will fade. The forces and dynamics that produce these tectonic shifts could also draw others into the Middle East competition in new ways, for example Japan, which has begun to flex its muscle more openly as China exerts itself in regions where Japan has vital interests, including the Middle East. At the very least, the strategic architecture of the emerging Middle East will have many more moving parts represented by new actors with significant capabilities pursuing unfamiliar strategic outcomes.

LE LIBAN ET LA SUISSE : REGARD CROISÉ SUR DEUX DESTINS

Conférence donnée par M.
PASCAL COUCHEPIN
Ancien Président de la Confédération Suisse

MAISON DU FUTUR, BIKFAYA
[13 OCTOBRE, 2015]

La Maison du Futur a organisé le mardi 13 octobre à 18 heures dans son siège au Sérail de Bikfaya une conférence présentée par l'ancien Président de la Confédération Suisse Pascal Couchepin intitulée "Liban et Suisse : regard croisé sur deux destins".

Le Président Gemayel a inauguré la séance en disant : "Malgré la situation difficile, le Liban assume son message de liberté et d'ouverture (…) Le combat devrait continuer, et c'est là que s'inscrit le rôle de la Maison du Futur comme un centre de culture et de recherche, pour prôner un avenir meilleur pour le Liban et la région ainsi que développer les valeurs de paix, de liberté, de démocratie, et de respect de pluralisme."

Le Président Gemayel a de même annoncé le thème du prochain congrès annuel de la MDF qui se déroulera en mai 2016 : "Sykes Picot, 100 ans après". *Il a alors repris :* "Le thème de notre conférence aujourd'hui s'inscrit dans le cadre du cheminement du Liban qui rappelle celui de la

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Suisse. Notre objectif est de respecter le pluralisme et de réaliser la décentralisation et la neutralité. Cette neutralité n'est pas uniquement un acte politique mais un acte de foi portant en lui-même plein de valeurs et de principes qui ont préservé le Liban malgré toute l'histoire de guerres qui l'a déstabilisé. Notre neutralité n'invite pas à l'isolationnisme mais à l'ouverture qui permet au Liban de jouer un rôle dans le monde arabe afin de participer à la résolution des conflits."

Au début de son intervention, M. Couchepin a exprimé "son admiration pour le Liban qui vit sous le stress d'un afflux de réfugiés très important, dans une région très difficile, et qui tient le coup face à cette extraordinaire pression démographique. On ne peut qu'admirer le respect que les Libanais ont envers leurs frères dans le malheur qui se sentent forcés à l'exil. Cette admiration doit aussi s'étendre à l'Italie qui reçoit des milliers de réfugiés, et de même à la Grèce qui traite ce problème avec beaucoup de dignité et d'efficacité. Imaginez que 200 et 300 réfugiés français arrivent à Lausanne : je ne suis pas sûr que la Suisse aurait la même capacité à affronter le problème avec tant de dignité comme vous l'avez fait."

"J'ai souvent réfléchi : de quel droit je me permettrais de porter un jugement sur ce qui se passe au Liban, sur une réalité que je n'ai pas vécue ? C'est pour cette raison que mon intervention est un récit basé sur ce que la Suisse a pu faire, tout en me demandant si ceci pouvait animer le débat entre ceux qui voudraient fédéraliser le Liban, et ceux qui préféreraient une décentralisation et ceux qui conserveraient le statu quo."

M. Couchepin a d'abord présenté un aperçu historique de la Suisse depuis la guerre de Marignan, jusqu'à la période de la tutelle française qui a duré 200 ans : "À cette époque, les ambassadeurs de France avaient un droit de veto sur la politique nationale. C'était une période de stagnation politique qui a duré jusqu'à la révolution française (…) avec une expansion du service mercenaire de la Suisse à l'étranger. À cette époque, on disait en Europe que La confédération helvétique est gouvernée par la confusion des hommes et la grâce de Dieu. De temps en temps, je pense que le Moyen-Orient est dans une situation semblable, et je me demande lequel des deux il faudrait améliorer : plus de grâce divine ou moins de confusion humaine ?"

Il a poursuivi : "La Suisse était, à la fin du XVIIIe siècle, totalement inefficace et paralysée. Les troupes françaises avaient envahi la Suisse et l'ancien régime était déchu. La République

Helvétique Centrale et indivisible a été introduite. Le pays était gouverné par un directoire de sept membres. C'était un pouvoir collectif qui a été sans doute le seul soviet qui a bien fonctionné."

Les Français ont cassé les structures traditionnelles, des révoltes sont apparues partout, et il a fallu l'intervention de Napoléon (par l'acte de médiation de 1803) pour rétablir dans une certaine mesure l'ancien système fédéraliste. De 1815 à 1848, c'était une période d'agitation libérale pour adapter les structures politiques du pays. Canton par canton, les institutions ont changé. Une courte guerre civile très peu sanglante a éclaté entre cantons libéraux et cantons conservateurs catholiques, pendant trois semaines. Pour illustrer la confusion du système, Couchepin a aussi rappelé que "les troupes catholiques conservatrices étaient commandées par un Protestant."

"Comment s'est par la suite constitué l'État? D'abord sans vengeance, et à travers l'établissement de régimes radicaux avec une réforme démocratique du système (…) Les efforts se sont axés sur l'Éducation. On avait deux choix: soit nationaliser les universités, soit faire quelque chose de neuf et c'est ainsi que deux écoles polytechniques ont vu le jour pour forger la Suisse moderne avec des techniques telles que le chemin de fer, l'électricité… Le pays s'est transformé grâce à une élite de gens ouverts à la modernité, à la technologie et à la science (…) Ces écoles polytechniques qui appartiennent à la Confédération ont été un centre de débat passionnant, ce qui a permis de fonder l'esprit national de la Confédération."

"De 1850 à 1900, les Suisses ont essayé de créer un esprit national qui dépasse les confessions. Créer l'unité par de grandes sociétés patriotiques de chant, de gymnastique, de tirs etc. qui dépassaient les frontières des communautés linguistiques ou confessionnelles, et avec l'aide des fondateurs de la théorie de Marignan comme étant le début de la neutralité suisse. Le pays a pu petit à petit faire émerger l'esprit de l'unité Helvétique (…) Donc on a essayé avec toute une série de symboles qui ont été rendus plus vivants par le biais de leur rapprochement de la masse populaire: école polytechnique, armée fédérale, volonté de dire que ce qui nous unit est plus important que ce qui nous sépare. Il faut de même dans un état moderne, pour créer un patriotisme commun, que l'aide sociale soit le produit de la communauté nationale et non pas d'un groupe pour faire en sorte que chacun puisse bénéficier d'une partie de la prospérité commune, ce que nous appli-

quons à travers la péréquation financière c.à.d les cantons les plus riches et la Confédération aident les cantons les plus pauvres qui sont à moins de 80% de la moyenne nationale des revenus pour que l'État cantonal qui s'occupe de l'éducation primaire, des routes secondaires, et d'une partie de la sécurité sociale, ait les moyens de faire face à ses obligations de solidarité."

"Un système comme celui-là ne peut réussir que si l'on a confiance en le pouvoir central. Comment est-ce qu'on construit la confiance? C'est par une certaine méfiance à l'égard du pouvoir politique, d'où la nécessité de justifier toute et chaque dépense. À titre d'exemple, les ministres ont chaque année un montant pour les frais annexes, et chaque mois ils reçoivent un état des dépenses. Si le montant annuel d'environ 25000 dollars est dépassé, le Président de la Confédération leur demande des justifications."

Il a de même porté l'accent sur le fait que "L'état est impartial et nous avons cultivé depuis toujours une participation de toutes les forces politiques au gouvernement. Mais Lorsqu'on est au gouvernement on abandonne le lien étroit qui nous lie à notre parti, et on dépend toujours des positions du gouvernement prises par la majorité."

Les mots clés seraient donc la confiance, l'effort intellectuel, l'effort social et la modestie du système politique.

"La neutralité suisse ne signifie pas le refus de juger mais le refus de participer à tout conflit armé. Nous ne sommes pas neutres idéologiquement mais nous ne participons jamais à des alliances, et nous offrons le territoire national pour des rencontres."

M. Couchepin a conclu son intervention en se demandant : "Est-ce que les choses sont transposables au Moyen Orient ? La seule issue serait la préservation de la paix civique. Vous avez une chance de pouvoir montrer que dans cette partie du monde délicate il peut y avoir de la tolérance et la reconnaissance politique de l'autre."

Suite à la conférence, une séance de questions et réponses a eu lieu, suivie d'un vin d'honneur à l'occasion.

SHARED LIVING: A THREATENED LEBANESE IDEAL

MAISON DU FUTUR, BIKFAYA
[OCTOBER 29, 2015]

La Maison du Futur, in cooperation with Konrad Adenauer Foundation, organized a closed meeting away from the media in its headquarters in Bikfaya under the theme "Shared Living: A Threatened Lebanese Ideal", aiming at highlighting and understanding the structural changes that the Lebanese society has been subject to after the war. In addition the meeting adopted a comprehensive vision that would pave the way for a conscious initiation towards achieving civil peace, and that focuses on the priority of belonging to Lebanon as well as the importance of shared living and pluralism.

Fifteen academic, legal and diplomatic personalities participated in the meeting. The main points of the discussion focusing on the challenges faced by the shared living ideal in Lebanon can be summarized as follows:

PSYCHO-SOCIAL AXIS

The participants shed the light on the culture of double standards adopted by the Lebanese; all speak about a common shared Lebanese identity while the truth is that the components of this Lebanese identity are sectarian belongings in the absence of citizenship.

The participants spoke about the fear of the other and the lack of trust amongst Lebanese people in light of the policy of intimidation adopted by a party against the other.

POLITICAL AXIS

The participants highlighted the crisis of the State in Lebanon that is reflected by the failure of the political administration, the atrophy of the political elite and the absence of integration of the social components in the citizenship melting pot.

The participants considered that Lebanon is still in a state of latent war opposing different communities, due to the spread of weapons and the absence of a true reconciliation.

The participants shed the light on the role of foreign interference in the disintegration of the Lebanese unity, prohibiting the establishment of the unifying State.

The participants mentioned the need to overcome the sectarian political system that made sectarian quotas the basis of the State administration in the context of the so-called consensual democracy.

The participants highlighted the need to replace the shared living equation by a shared national project that determines a common vision for the Nation and paves the way for a unifying culture for all Lebanese people regardless of their religious and sectarian belongings.

The participants stressed on the need to adopt a new constitution that paves the way for a Civil State adopting positive neutrality towards the convictions, beliefs and ideologies of its citizens, and that consecrates the idea of citizenship, preserving the current diversity

The participants stressed on the need to safeguard Lebanon from regional conflicts and crisis.

educational axis

The participants stressed on the importance of education in building citizenship and the need for a unifying culture that promotes the cohesion within the diversified Lebanese social fabric.

THE POPULAR MOVEMENT:

The participants spoke about the importance of the current popular movement in Lebanon that unified the Lebanese regardless of their affiliations, around social, economic and environmental issues that established a political call for changing the political elite through the adoption of a new electoral law and through combating corruption.

The participants considered this movement as a first step towards building a unifying Lebanese identity.

NATIONAL SECURITY IN LEBANON : TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

MAISON DU FUTUR, BIKFAYA
[16 OCTOBRE, 2015]

FIRST SESSION :
NATIONAL SECURITY IN LEBANON, POLITICAL APPROACH

Doctor Fahed Sakkal presented this session, and gave the floor to Doctor Fadia Kiwan who considered that "The logic of the political class is based on the sectarian division of authority that leads to foreign alliances. It is impossible to preserve neutrality unless the sectarian composition is changed, yet this file cannot be open today due to the sensitivity of the current period. We have partial solutions through the following measures :

Focusing on the common issues around which the Lebanese can gather like weakness of services, favoritism, corruption…

Separating the daily life affairs from the Middle East conflict

Adopting a positive policy in two files that are considered time bombs : Syrian refugees and Palestinian refugees.

A Lebanese vision for the return of Palestinians.

Adopting policies that encourage economic growth and ensure food safety and economic security.

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Persevering to reach a modern electoral law that imposes succession of power and alleviates sectarianism.

– Strengthening the Lebanese Army's capabilities and promoting the efficiency of all other security forces.

– The sectarian structure of the system as well as favoritism and corruption are an issue that cannot be solved without a deep reform and without the abolition of political sectarianism.

Doctor Hareth Sleiman commented on what Doctor Kiwan said, and added that "I agree with you on the need to redefine national security as a concept, and there is in fact an Arab will to move away from historical ambiguities that were the fruit of authoritarian regimes. Yet we have to add to Dr. Kiwan's list the demarcation of international borders and geopolitical borders with Israel, and Syria as well as our maritime boundary."

second session:
national security in lebanon, security approach

General Abdelrahman Shuheitly spoke about the ingredients of national security: military security, economy, resources, energy, information, nutrition, internet, and then moved to presenting the phases of military Lebanese national security since 1970.

"We have to immunize the political decision and adopt a comprehensive security vision through assessing all the internal and external dangers. These dangers include the security of the borders with Syria and all the northern borders, in addition to studying and analyzing all these dangers without forgetting the need to reform and activate the security sector, which requires a comprehensive strategy".

Brigadier General Nizar Abdel Kader commented: "We should focus as well on the need for legislations on security and for a national security council that has the power to implement its decisions. We need a citizenship law, a terrorism law, a new law for parties and associations as well as a law that controls the external financing of parties and associations".

third session:
national security in lebanon, socioeconomic approach

Doctor Joseph Gemayel considered that "We should think about restructuring the Lebanese economy in light of the engagement in globalization in addition to focusing on the economic role of the State and implementing structural reforms.

"We have a competitiveness and productivity issue. The cost of production is high and salaries are not sufficient; there-

fore the only solution is focusing on quality. We need to re determine the role of the Lebanese economy".

Ms. Nancy Kanbar spoke about sustainable economic and social development:

"The basic concepts are eradicating poverty, ensuring social justice, higher education, democracy, national independence and freedom of choice. The new concept is sustainability. Sustainable development is based on individuals and profit without putting the planet at risk. Can we separate the environment from economic and social development? Of course not, and the garbage crisis is the best proof".

FOURTH SESSION:
NATIONAL SECURITY IN LEBANON,
DIPLOMATIC APPROACH

Ambassador William Habib declared: "The National Pact established by the independence leaders was based on an incomplete national security concept. Lebanon lost its natural role as a consensus and moderation factor due to the indifference of other countries towards its interests, the immigration of its people, and the indifference of the Lebanese abroad towards the conflicts that are destabilizing the country. Lebanese diplomacy is suffering from non harmonious positions."

Ambassador Jihad Mortada spoke about the golden Lebanese diplomacy era, in spite of the civil war and said: "Even during the war, the Lebanese foreign diplomacy did not collapse. It was maybe less efficient, but the most important thing is that Lebanon was represented by one position."

FIFTH SESSION:
NATIONAL SECURITY, A MEDIA APPROACH

Mr. Gayath Yazbeck raised the following questions at the beginning of his intervention: "What national security is the media conveying when we see how the dialogue of Baabda failed because the concept of national security or the strategy of defense was contradictory to the strategic opinion of one political party? How can media promote national security when a specific battalion launches attacks and drags Lebanon into conflicts without consulting any party?"

Mr. Nasri El Sayegh concluded the session saying: "I might disagree with many colleagues, and I have little hope coming from the civil movement that I strongly support. I am with Rome even if Rome leads me to hell. Is the problem resulting from the system, from the people or from the entity that was initially established for religious communities?"

INNOVATIVE WAYS TO DEAL WITH VIOLENT EXTREMISM

COMMODORE HOTEL, BEIRUT
[DECEMBER 11, 2015]

La Maison du Futur in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, held on Friday, 11 December 2015 a conference entitled **"Innovative ways to deal with violent extremism"** at the Commodore Hotel, Beirut, as part of its duties to raise awareness regarding contentious issues plaguing the Middle East region and shed light on sustainable and viable solutions.

The event brought together a broad spectrum of western and eastern pundits, to explore new ways of understanding the political, social, economic, cultural and psychological drivers of the violent extremism phenomena, and has to draw a road map to counter this scourge, which have imperiled the stability of human societies in the wake of the twenty-first century.

OPENING SESSION:

In his opening remarks, Chairman of La Maison du Futur, **President Amine Gemayel**, welcomed the attendees, especially foreign and Arab experts, and noted that La Maison du Futur

Jean-Pierre Katrib, *Member of the Foundation for Human & Humanitarian Rights, and Strategic Relations Director at Quantum Communications.*

SESSION III | DEALING WITH EXTREMISTS: APPLICABLE METHODS

Moderator: Hanine Ghadare

General Fuad Allam, *Former Agent in the State Security Investigations and Former Director of the Port Said security device.*

General Abdel Rahmann Sheihtly, *Director of Administration and Member of the Lebanese Military Council at the Ministry of Defense (Lebanon).*

Max Taylor, *former Head of the Department of Applied Psychology at the University College Cork, and former Professor in International Relations at the University of St Andrews and Director of CSTPV (Ireland).*

SESSION IV | TERRORISM THROUGH THE EYE OF THE ARAB WORLD

Moderator: Sam Menassa

Oraib Al Rantawi, *Founder and Director of "Al Quds Center for Political Studies". Writer and political analyst in the Jordanian daily newspaper "Ad Dustour".*

Safa Hussein, *Deputy National Security Advisor NSC. Before 2003 he was Brigadier General in the Iraqi Forces and Director of R&D in the military industry (Iraq).*

Ubaidly Ubaidly, *journalist and researcher working for Arabic newspapers and magazines such as As Safir (Lebanon), Al Hadaf - (Palestine), Al Wasat (Bahrain), Arab Alyawm (Jordan), Al Roya (Sultanate of Oman) (Bahrain).*

and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung decided to debate the terrorism phenomenon acknowledging the scale of challenge it has represented since its rise in the seventies of the late century until the present day, where its escalation and unprecedented brutality left the world with the reality of a new dimension of international terrorism, stretching out to Arab and European countries and the US like a plague. Hence, he added, a conscience driven approach was crucial to tackle the terrorism issue, especially with the new religious dimension it has acquired faraway from its former branded ideological dimension, along with the lack of a judicious strategy to deter it. He explained that there are several approaches to counter-terrorism, with the military intervention being at the forefront, akin to the international coalition against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) we are witnessing today, and the Arab coalition against the Houthi movement in Yemen and the Russian-Iranian-Syrian alliance against ISIL in Syria. This military approach is useful at this stage, that even the Vatican has supported the resort to military intervention to curb the prevailing violence. Yet, military force alone is seldom sufficient to counter-terrorism. He added that since its re-launch, La Maison du Futur has organized conferences and symposiums focused on debating the problems afflicting contemporary societies in a bit to explore creative and viable solutions. President Gemayel also emphasized on the urgency for an Arab Marshall Plan to address the problems stalking the Arab world and lay the foundations for a better future.

He stressed on three pillars that must be underlined when reflecting on a counter-terrorism action agenda, concurrently with military intervention.

The first one is good governance, underscoring that for too many countries, the absence of good governance was a breeding ground to extremist groups. Good governance requires transparency to prevent corruption and ensure alignment with contemporary and modern governance frameworks.

He pointed out that la Maison du Futur intends to study this issue.

The second is education, considered as a cornerstone to counter political violence. "Lack of a culture of tolerance and respect for others have constituted an incubator for extremism", he said, especially in light of the chaotic proliferation of faith schools. He stressed that through education and culture we can directly address religious extremism and political violence, noting that reforming education is a keystone to protect new generations.

The third is development, as the lack of development leads to extremism and violence.

Finally, he hoped that the conference's outcome will address the problem of violent extremism, taking into account these three factors. President Gemayel stressed on the need to establish a permanent inter-faith dialogue body, in the light of the timid reaction of faith institutions towards religious extremism, especially the Islamic ones. He recalled Al-Azhar's initiative in this regard, noting that it was not seized by other faith institutions, expressly in terms of reforming education. He called for a global cooperation to establish such an inter-faith body, so all faith institutions could agree to unify their stance against the violent extremism on rampage across the world, especially that atrocities are committed in the name of religion.

He also underpinned the responsibility that lies on religious scholars in countering violent extremism, urging to establish the inter-faith body to find a minimum common denominator between different religions, and develop a strategy based on human values to counter this phenomenon. He expressed his hope to see continuous cooperation among the research communities to address the critical global issues of our time.

Nils Wormer of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung welcomed the attendees and acknowledged La Maison du Future's proposal to hold this conference, highlighting the cooperation between the two institutions. He commended President Amine Gemayel remarks on violent extremism, saying that he pinpointed the core of the problem in all its aspects. He added that terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Europe, with the heyday of ideological terrorism in the seventies, and religious terrorism in the nineties and its comeback nowadays. He pointed out that the European media sheds light on terrorism whenever an attack occurs, rather than focusing on how this issue started and trying to pinpoint what triggered it to find solutions to annihilate it. Hence, he commended the participation of foreign experts, wishing the conference would come out with positive results.

The Executive Director of la Maison du Future **Sam Menassa** gave a background call on the conference theme, highlighting the meeting's incentives, particularly in terms of clarifying the wavering and foggy stance of the Arab and Muslim worlds towards violent extremism. He added that la Maison du Future seeks to foster a serene platform to discuss the subject away from the media and political hype, in order to explore its facets and put forward innovative ideas beyond the mainstream that elucidate its quiddity, drivers and worthwhile counter measures.

FIRST SESSION :
"PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM : INNOVATIVE APPROACH"

The first session started with its moderator **John Bell**, Director of the Middle East and Mediterranean Program at the Toledo Center in Madrid, introducing the speakers, **Hassan Mneimneh**, Principal at Middle East Alternatives, **Kristina Eichhorst**, Coordinator for Crisis and Conflict Management in the headquarters of Konrad Adenauer in Berlin, and **Thomas Volk**, Coordinator for Islam and the Dialogue between Religions in the headquarters of Konrad Adenauer in Berlin.

Bell thanked the two institutions for coordinating this meeting, pointing out that the West has witnessed waves of terrorism, but since the Paris incident, the media showed more interest in this issue and is currently unduly debating the violent extremism phenomenon to explore its essence and drives, especially since some of these were harbored within western communities. He added that the fact that some Westerners have embraced extremist ideologies and behavior, shocked Western societies and challenged the political authorities. He noted that on the other hand, whatever the causes and drives of violent extremism were, what stands crystal clear nowadays is the inefficiency of all adopted counter-violent extremism strategies. He added that this conference will allow raising different standpoints in the field of countering violent extremism that need to be discussed in order to determine which scheme is viable.

Mneimneh began his intervention by highlighting the wide divergence over the definition of terrorism, pointing out the double standards in defining terrorism and determining who is a terrorist. While some brand a terrorist attack as an act of bravery, others consider it as a criminal act. The same goes for terrorists, seen by some as freedom fighters and by

others as criminals. He explained that there are two definitional approaches to terrorism, the first is structural and the second is cultural. He said that the most commonly given structural interpretation attributes the emergence of violent extremism to a set of economic, socio-economic or gene-rational socio-economic factors, emphasizing the importance of the economic factor in the emergence of violent extremism and terrorism, as evidenced by the slogan raised during Egypt uprising in 2011, "Bread, Freedom, Social Justice", which gave priority to a prosperous life. He explained that frustration and nibbling resulting from challenging economic conditions, could lead to unlawful and anti-establishment behavior; it is thus a must to address economic problems as a fundamental tenet to prevent terrorism. The other structural interpretation has a political dimension, which connects the origins of terrorism with totalitarian regimes and lack of political participation, along with the existence of an international system based on self-interests. He said that implementing a culture of democracy, strengthening political participation and embracing alternation of power, will contribute at preventing extremism. The same goes with resolving some international disputes, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict. The third structural interpretation championed by researchers, attributes the emergence of violent extremism to socio-psychological factors, particularly with regard to the Middle East, where repressive societies lead to frustration especially among young people. He stressed that addressing this aspect could be crucial in preventing extremism and terrorism.

Alternatively, the simplest theory within the perspective that relies on cultural interpretations to explain violent extremism, seeks to establish causal relationships between the rise of terrorism in the Middle East and the social structure based on power and force along with the cultural structure it has engendered. The second theory prevalent in Europe and the United States links the origins of extremism and terrorism to the essence of Islam, arguing that the war on terror is a war between the West and Islam. Although this theory is narrow, Mneimneh said it has gained prominence in the West especially after 9/11 events, when the clash of civilizations narrative sprouted in the Western countries in general and the United States in particular. In this context, some have connected terrorism to Salafi Wahhabism, a branch of Sunni-Islam, rather than to Islam in general, saying that the real foe in the war on terrorism is the Wahhabi teachings.

Following this presentation, Mneimneh noted that all these attempts to explain violent extremism highlight aspects of the

topic, but do not bring to light this multi-pronged phenomenon. He stressed that the cultural interpretations do not underscore the existence of a clash of civilizations, but rather they highlight the fact that the Western Civilization had succeeded in achieving modernity while Eastern Civilization had not. He explained that throughout its history, the Western society had produced a culture of institutional powers based on respect for human rights, tolerance and acceptance of others, starting with the Renaissance and the enlightenment thought strengthened by the French Revolution.

Alternatively, the East adapted this culture with the advent of Napoleon's army, which paved the road to the rise of the so-called Ammiyat. Albeit the East sought to assimilate this culture, it failed because it was not part of its nurtured cultural structure.

He concluded by saying that when we reflect on the new system that had emerged in the region after World War I, we can objectively say that the twentieth century was in the Middle East, the era of state restructuring and assimilating the state-building concept conforming to the European model. Unfortunately, we did not succeed, and what had been created instead was a series of failed patriarchal nations; he stressed that what we are witnessing today is the consequence of a 200 years of civilization failure to accommodate the forces of modernity inhibiting us from assimilating the social values correlated to the political concepts that we had adapted from the West. He said that the extremist mentality runs as such: "their bombs and our martyrs, their violence (the West) is hidden, ours is wide-open, as we resort to violence in order to install a balance of terror".

Volk began his presentation by stating that ISIL now controls territory in Syria and Iraq the size of the UK, and has power in these areas over eight million people, daily exposed to its Salafist doctrine. He added that more than 30.000 foreign fighters are thought to have joined ISIL's ranks, and they mostly came from Tunisia and some European countries such as France and Germany. He said that many European countries are facing the threat of Islamic extremism growth among their citizens, despite the fact that most of them are natives. He mentioned that a large number of those who have joined Islamic extremist groups are newly converts into Islam. In addition to those a large number of third-generation Muslim immigrants to Europe, including a significant number of women. He highlighted the role of the

online digital platforms as the biggest breeding ground to the so-called "electronic jihad", by way of the use of the electronic network by Islamist extremist groups to recruit, disseminate their ideology, promote their operations, as well as plan attacks targeting intelligence and security sensitive facilities. He emphasized the need for Europe to adopt a new comprehensive and expanded strategy to root out extremism and prevent its growth, to be developed by joint action between security services, educational and media institutions as well as Islamic institutions.

Focusing on the proliferation of religious extremism in Germany, he unveiled that 4 million Muslim live in Germany, among them 43.890 could be viewed as potential Islamists. He stated that 31.000 of those are considered to be legalists, who observe law and order, but they do promote Islamic thinking. However, the most worrying trend in Germany nowadays is the rise in the number of people with Salafist affiliation, as their number has increased from 3800 in 2011 to 8000 in 2015. He also revealed that the number of people departing Germany for ISIL controlled territories in Syria and Iraq had risen as high as 750, over 100 of them had already lost their lives and around 200 had returned to Germany.

He distinguished between three types of extremists:
– The Salafist puristic non-political branch; followers adhere to a strict explanation of the Islamic sharia, and can be identified through their dress code and way of life
– The Salafist political branch associated with Salafist political organizations
– The Salafist extremist jihadist branch; followers are pro-Jihad and the most vulnerable to violent extremism

Volk added that the reasons for embracing violent extremism are varied and can be of psychological, political, sociological or ideological nature. He considered the internet to be one of the most dangerous recruitment tools, as a large number of women were recruited through internet and left their families to join ISIL, while other young people converted to Islam to join extremist groups also through online recruitment.

Finally, he presented Germany's approach to counter the alarming trend of increasing Islamist radicalization, starting by promoting knowledge about Islam as a way to reduce prejudice and counter Islamophobic attitudes in Europe, that lead young Muslims to join radical movements; to promote an historical-critical exegesis of the Quran that places the passed-down verses into the context of their formation, both

in place and time, and present a non-violent reading of Islam; expending Islamic religious education in schools and through social media. Young people obtain most of their information from the Internet, and as Islamist and Salafist organizations are continuously increasing their online presence, it is more important than ever to be proactive and offer alternatives to Islamist websites using promotional videos and websites about an Islam that is tolerant and peaceful. He added that Germany also relies in its attempt to prevent extremism on soft and positive measures, engaging with young people at risk of radicalization or who have already chosen the extremist path in order to induce them to change their beliefs.

He concluded by noting that Islamist and Salafist radicalization has been increasing steadily in Germany for years, especially among the third-generation migrants who grow up in Germany and are German citizens. Thus, it is crucial to draw up a national strategy for preventing Islamic radicalization involving a partnership of responsibility between security, education and social welfare authorities, calling on Islamic institutions to join this effort to stop the misuse of religion.

Before giving the floor to **Kristina Eichhorst**, Bell commented on Volk presentation saying that the emergence of extremism in the West could be seen as a direct offshoot of governance failure as it is the case in the East, wondering if moderate Islam can deter the would-be violent extremists.

Eichhorst began her presentation by asking what motivates Europeans in general and Germans in particular to give up their comfortable life to join ISIL.

She said that this phenomenon caused a public outcry since it arised in Germany four years ago, pushing everyone to wonder about the identity of those who head off to foreign countries to join armed fighters in their battle. Even political authorities were baffled by this new trend.

She stressed that today and after 4 years, we can say that we still have little insight about this phenomenon, as reality shows that the legion of foreign fighters includes persons with varied and often overlapping motives, coming from a range of economic and socio-cultural backgrounds and do not fit one stereotype.

Hence, we stopped asking about their identity, she added, trying instead to elucidate their motives and considerations.

– One theory says that they suffer from mental illness and their personalities are weak. However, the field studies have

shown the invalidity of this theory, since the majority of those who join the ranks of extremist movements are not mentally unstable.

– Another theory says that they do not suffer from mental illness but rather from neurosis, especially depression. Once again, reality has shown the invalidity of this interpretation.

– A third theory says that the reason behind this phenomenon lies in the manhood psyche, mentality and way of thinking, in terms of his strive for wars, power, adventure, bragging and fame etc… Here too, there is no conclusive evidence proving the validity of this theory.

– A fourth reasonable theory, Situation of Radical Change Theory, talks about young people joining extremist movements during a turning point in their lives (trauma). She explained that when a significant negative turning point occurs in someone's life, he becomes weak and vulnerable to recruitment attempts. However she stressed that despite the logic behind this theory, it is not inclusive and totally effective in explaining foreign fighters' motivations.

She concluded by saying that we still have poor insight into the phenomenon of violent extremism in the West, and it is likely impossible to fully understand this ambiguous occurrence in light of the complexity of human psychology. She added that in Germany, we are still at square one and need to share experiences with other European countries in order to tackle this issue.

Public debate followed Eichhorst presentation, with some participants claiming that confining youngster westerns' motivations to join extremist groups to solely personal and psychological factors is pure chimera. They said that any attempt to understanding violent religious extremism should consider its historical context, pointing out that the region has been suffering from terrorism for over 30 years. So what happened during these years to lead violent extremism into a religious path?

As answer to this question they gave three reasons:

– The oil revolution in the Arab Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the emergence of what they called the Islam Nomad Warrior

– The Iranian Revolution

– The Cold War and the consequent support of Salafist jihadist movements

They stressed that all states are responsible for the

emergence of this terrorism, either by support or tolerance or complicity for furthering personal gains.

In the same vein, some saw that confining the phenomenon of violent religious extremism to psychological drivers is a simplistic view.

They considered that what paved the way for the emergence of these radical movements is the failure of all attempts to reform Islamic thought, the Western support for authoritarian regimes in the region and the lack of a serious quest to solve the Palestinian cause.

They also said, while subjective motives should be taken into consideration when attempting to explain terrorism, we should not howbeit overlook the existence of objective drives, stressing that deterring terrorism is a common Arab, Islamic and Western responsibility.

SECOND SESSION :
"UNDERSTANDING EXTREMISM : PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE"

The second session started with its director Hassan Mneimneh presenting the speakers, **John Bell** and **Ivan Tyrrell**, Director of the Human Givens College in the United Kingdom, and founder of the Human Givens approach of psychotherapy and clear thinking about emotional health, education and social issues, and **Jean-Pierre Katrib**, Director of Strategic Relations at Quantum.

Tyrrell began his presentation via Skype by emphasizing the importance of understanding human behavior through a Human Givens approach that links human behavior to a given set of innate needs and the extent of their fulfillment. He explained that humans have several basic emotional needs :

– Security : A sense of safety and an environment in which people can live without experiencing excessive fear so that they can develop healthily.

– Autonomy and control : A sense of autonomy and control over his life economically, emotionally and professionally.

– Status : A sense of status – being accepted and valued in the various social groups we belong to.

– Connection to the wider community : We have evolved as a group animal and need to feel part of something larger than ourselves.

– Intimacy: Emotional connection to other people – friendship, love, intimacy, fun.

– Competence and achievement: A sense of our own competence and achievements, that we have what it takes to meet life's demands, which boosts our self-esteem

– Meaning and purpose and spiritual sustenance: A sense of meaning and purpose which comes from being stretched in what we do and how we think. It is through 'stretching' ourselves mentally or physically by service to others, learning new skills or being connected to ideas or philosophies bigger than ourselves that our lives become purposeful and full of meaning.

Tyrrell added that the human givens model also consists of a set of 'resources' (abilities and capabilities) that all human beings are born with, which are used to get the innate needs met. These constitute what is termed an 'inner guidance system'. Learning how to use these resources well is seen as being crucial to achieve and sustain robust bio-psycho-social health as individuals and as groups.

These resources are: Memory, ability to communicate with others, imagination, rational thinking, the ability to know and understand the world, the ability to step back and be objective and the ability to dream.

Tyrrell than wondered, what happens when our needs are not being met? Humans in this case will get emotional and often act foolishly. When one loses control over his life he/she will also lose control over himself /herself, and when he/she loses his/her self-esteem he/she will be disoriented and when he/she becomes anxious he/she will get depressed. If these disturbances occur with means to fulfill human innate need for recklessness and adventure, he/she will use his resources such as memory, imagination and ability to acquire new skills in reckless gears such as terrorism.

As for the triggers that turn youngsters to extremism, he spoke about their growth in sick environments, preventing them from fulfilling their needs and obstructing their advance and the nurture of their internal guidance system. He also spoke about mental illness or defect of the brain caused by physical or psychological reasons.

He concluded by stressing the need for human rational mind to organize his thoughts and to possess a clearer view of the world's issues. Human needs more a systematic way of thinking than he needs beliefs and ideologies.

Bell started his lecture by emphasizing the Human Givens theory presented by Tyrrell, saying that when one's needs are

not met, the person will react, and the extent of the reaction will be in line with the level of deprivation. He said if we apply this logic to the political reality, we will find that governments in the Arab world, for example, do not meet the needs of their citizens, and therefore we should not be startled by the occurrence of reactions that could reach terrorist behavior. He added that this theory is not simplistic, yet it straightforwardness reflects the existent reality. He pointed out that extremist movements starve to fulfill some of the human needs, and they are proficient at attracting people and driving them to comply with their demands. He said that mass movements such as the phenomenon of violent extremism, we are witnessing today, only arise in certain conditions, when sturdy social structure is in a state of disintegration. This is a good description of parts of the Arab world, he added, and of isolated pockets of our own Western society.

He denied the existence of a unique background profile for extremists, or specific social, economic, cultural and psychological conditions that lead to the rise of terrorism, saying that the reasons often given to explain the emergence of terrorism and violent extremism, such as poverty, ignorance, social marginalization and political tyranny do not apply to all cases. He sustained this view by saying that 48.5% of jihadi recruited in the Middle East and North Africa had a higher education of some sort, of these 44% had degrees in engineering. Among Western-recruited jihadi, that figure rose to 59%. He added that an unpublished report by the World Bank shows no link between increased employment and decreased violence. He pointed out the difference between foreign recruits' motives and local ones, as well as between Western and Eastern contexts. He added that three-quarters of those who become foreign fighters for ISIL are recruited through friends and 20% through family members, noting that ironically, in the West, it is often when they are expelled from Mosques that they radicalize and they are recruited in fast food hangouts and soccer fields. He unveiled that most foreign fighters who have joined extremist groups did so willingly triggered by a broad array of motives such as: pursue of a heroic path, desire of adventure, activism, romance, power, belonging, along with spiritual fulfillment. As for local recruiters, driving factors fluctuate from bad governance to money enticement, to seeking revenge, ending occupation and defeating the enemy. They perceive terrorism as the sole means to reach their goals.

On countering and preventing extremism, Bell said the first step should be understanding this phenomenon, to be

followed by healing social disintegration considered as the seedbed of extremist movements, and offering to vulnerable to be-recruiters positive inspiring causes to replace the suicidal ones used by extremists as pull-factor. He added that keeping a track policy is impossible especially in Europe, as it requires thousands of unavailable security agents.

He concluded by stressing that counter-terrorist policies which are only based on a narrow range of repressive mechanisms produce serious negative side-effects and push those who already chose the path of violence deeper into their imagination. He noted that between 1968 and 2006, only 7% of terrorist groups were militarily defeated, stressing on the West duty to provide financial, technical and social support to their allies in the Middle East who manage to keep ISIL outside their borders.

Katrib presented a white paper prepared by Quantum. Entitled "Understanding jihadists in their own words", this white paper aims to tackling the question of violent extremism thorough understanding the psychology of ISIL fighting force and their state of mind prior to recruitment, through personal testimonies of a 49 sample ISIL and other extremist organizations' fighters in Syria and Iraq aged between 18 and 43, who are currently either detained, defected or still operating. Among those were 9 foreign fighters, 9 Arab fighters and 31 local fighters. The testimonies were accessed through monitoring more than 200 hours of one-to-one interviews on Saudi and Iraqi TV channels, inter alia, that were later transcribed into an academic categorization matrix and coding tool from which conclusions were derived.

He continued: In this study we have analyzed the discourse of these fighters by identifying keywords they used to express:

– How they perceive themselves

– What are their own limits

– What they consider as positive

– What they consider as negative

Accordingly, three categories were identified based on jihadist's Geographical origins, the local fighters category (as in Iraqis in Iraq and Syrians in Syria), the foreign fighters category and the Arab fighters category. The study key-finding was the classification of extremist fighters into 9 categories, based on the push-factors that led them to join the ranks of ISIL and other extremist groups:

– Status Seekers (77% are local fighters): They want to improve their social standing; their main drives are money, employment and certain recognition by others around them.

– Identity Seekers (63% are foreign fighters): Need the identity that comes from belonging to a group.

– Revenge Seekers (80% are local fighters): Consider themselves to be part of an oppressed group, and thus want to inflict harm on their oppressors and anyone who might support them (oppressors).

– Redemption Seekers: Perceive their engagement in Jihadi enterprise as a vindication from previous sinful ways of living.

– Responsibility Seekers: Value family ties and want to preserve their family's well-being

– Thrill Seekers (67% are Arab fighters): Are filled with energy and drive. They want to prove their potential/power by accomplishing an arduous task or surviving a harrowing adventure.

– Ideology Seekers (7% of the study sample): Are mainly in search of a certain world view that they can identify with and the "Islamic Ummah" provides a pre-packaged transnational ideology. The ideology seekers aim at "imposing" their world view on at least one other group.

– Justice Seekers: Consider what is happening in the conflict areas as a major injustice and feel they have a certain inner calling to reverse this injustice.

– Death Seekers: Have most probably suffered from a significant trauma/loss in their lives and consider death as the only way out with a reputation of martyr instead of someone who has committed suicide.

Other push factors were also detected such as: Defending Sunnis (15), Jihad (11), extremist environment (8), Being Muslim and the Syrian war (8)K money (6), former prisoners (5), and being anti-Western culture.

He concluded by pointing out that ultimately, this White Paper edition demystifies some existing theories on ISIL & co. For one, Islam is not the full side of the story. As the wording of the fighters suggest, Islam is a means to an end and not the end itself. Alternative, earthly pursuits seem to be the underlying end for a majority of sampled fighters.

The debate started with some participants claiming that the approach presented by speakers to understand the push-factors behind violent extremism, is a diagnostic-therapeutic

approach and does not capture the core of the problem or unveil the outer and factual root causes of this phenomenon. They added that a key question was so far ignored which is, why religious criticism that started in the Arab World in the 19th century was hindered? They stressed on the need to revisit the traditional interpretation of Islam's view on all aspects of life as the latter are dynamic and not static.

Other participants believed that the psychological approach to analyze the phenomenon of violent extremism is worthy; nonetheless, what we are witnessing today is not a particular and individual violence but rather a mass phenomenon. They added that what contributed to the rise of violence in our region is the failure of the state and its inability to cross the line between authoritarian and violent states to developmental states that seek to fulfill people's needs. They pointed out that the current debate on political violence is confining this phenomenon only to Islam, despite the fact of the presence of extremist movements in Europe not related to Islam or Jihad but rather to the stagnation of modern state in the movement towards providing social justice. Accordingly, they added, if we genuinely want open and honest debate, we should consider extremism in general rather than singling out only its Islamic-religious facet.

Furthermore, some participants suggested that motives behind the recent outbreak of terrorism in Arab nations and worldwide are of political roots, and all nations bear a heavy responsibility for political grievances, either because of their authoritarian regimes or because of their complicity with the latter for strategic interests. They also stressed on the responsibility of religious authority in the Arab world in exacerbating this phenomenon because it failed to provide a new interpretation of Islam; adding to this the failure of the Arab elite in fulfilling its social and cultural role, merely importing Western values without trying to draft a genuine alternative.

Emphasizing the peculiar role of religion in the rise of terrorism, some participants stressed on the political roots of terrorism which simply uses religion as a facade, wondering why ISIL has flourished in Iraqi Sunni areas? They alleged that the US invasion of Iraq interchanged the power play between Sunnis and Shias, bringing the latter to power. Backed by Iran, the Shia rule marginalized Sunnis in revenge to decades of oppression. This retaliatory politic has spawned Sunni extremist movements, which reached its apogee with ISIL. The same applies to Syria, where the regime violence has fostered extremist movements, stressing that the core problem in the region is of political nature and not religious.

Underscoring the wide range of social, political and psychological factors behind the rise of terrorism and religious extremism, some participants wondered why the Arab and Islamic worlds had constituted a breeding foothold for this groundswell of extremism. They added that Arab and Islamic societies suffer from a lack of democracy, marginalization of citizens and their exclusion from public life, considering thus the state failure as a key driver for the rise of extremism and terrorism.

Other participants highlighted the role of the Iranian Revolution in bolstering Sunni extremist movements, saying that the Shia expansionist policy paved the way to the upsurge of the Sunni extremism phenomenon. They wondered why the international community is focusing on Sunni extremism while dismissing Shia extremism.

THIRD SESSION :
"DEALING WITH EXTREMISTS : APPLICABLE METHODS"

The Third session began with its moderator **Hanin Ghadar**, editor in chief of NowLebanon news website, presenting the speakers, General **Fuad Allam**, former Agent in the State Security Investigations in Egypt and former Director of the Port Said security department, General **Abdel Rahmann Sheihtly**, Director of administration and member of the Lebanese Military Council at the Ministry of Defense, and **Max Taylor**, former head of the department of applied psychology at the University College Cork and former Professor in international relations at the University of St Andrews and director of CSTPV in Ireland.

Ghadar described the session's subject by saying that the international community is currently focusing on fighting ISIL by waging a military war, and that is useless. She explained that ISIL is no stranger to our societies which are inherently violent, noting that violence begins at home where men taunt their daughters and wives. She evoked the recent statement by Al Azhar, refusing to declare ISIL apostate, arguing that it is an Islamic organization. She added that both the West and the East bear the responsibility for the emergence of extremist movements, saying that when the West sides with one party in the conflict, things will worsen. The West cannot cozy up to Iran, and expects a no-reaction stance from Sunnis in the region.

General **Allam** began his intervention by commenting on Ghadar's sayings, stressing that Al-Azhar condemns ISIL but has stopped short of declaring it as an apostate, firstly because it rejects the Takfirism process ISIL plays on, and secondly because only God can judge on the matter of apostasy. He added that terrorism has no religion, and Al Azhar believes that the three monotheistic religions are not fundamentally opposed to each other, yet there are misconceptions among hard-liners in each of these religions, which incite violence and terrorism when a believer considers that his faith was offended.

Talking about factors abetting the rise of terrorism, Allam firstly cited wars. He explained that the inability of conventional warfare to be conclusive in military conflicts bolstered the emergence of terrorist organizations, which attempted to settle these conflicts while achieving political gains. Terrorism is a politically-inspired phenomenon and its root-causes are not of religious order, he furthered, stressing that recent wars, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan and Sudan, presented good opportunities for

sympathizers to extremist ideology to obtain military training and acquire arms and explosive materials.

The second factor in boosting terrorism is the fact that some European and Arab countries have provided a safe haven for these organizations under cover of preserving human rights. He revealed that more than 650 terrorists in Britain were granted political Asylum, and that the UK is currently in process to release the perpetrators of the dirty bomb attack on its territory. He added that if those terrorist elements were not given political asylum, the scene in Europe nowadays would have been different. He mentioned that the Muslim Brotherhood organization who had taken refuge in Europe has flourished by gaining funds and controlling lodes of Islamic research centers abroad politically and financially supported by host countries.

He continued that based on his experience in countering terrorist organizations, none was as dangerous as ISIL is today. Unlike other extremist groups, ISIL has gained a significant swath of territory (25% of Syria and 45% of Iraq), controls oil fields and crude is the group's biggest source of revenue, along with kidnaping ransoms and the jizya tax imposed on Christians. He warned that ISIL possesses dangerous weapons that could destroy countries, and some of it is aggressively pursuing the development of chemical weapons, creating a team dedicated to research and experiment using the internet.

He stated that confronting violent extremism must be done on several levels:

– The religious confrontation: confronting the phony and erroneous interpretations of Islamic beliefs and practices used by extremist organizations to polarize youth. While Allam emphasized the need to update Islamic jurisprudence, he refused views about developing Islam suggested by some colleagues. He added that our societies need to update Islamic concepts, blaming the historic stalemate in this field on the religious authority.

– The legislative confrontation: Enacting terrorism-specific laws has become necessary in order to achieve a balance between society's need for security and stability and the rights and freedom of citizens.

– Confrontation via the media: Establishing an on-going media policy of confronting terrorism. There are various roles media can play to confront the problem of terrorism by disseminating well-founded opinions, raising basic issues related to terrorism and engaging citizens as an essential tool in confronting this phenomenon.

– The security level: Although it is now agreed that

security measures alone are not enough to confront terrorism, it should also be noted that such security measures should be the last stage in the process of confronting terrorism. Security agencies must be supported and empowered appropriately considering the scale of the challenge involved and they also must be availed of all assistance enabling them to perform their role with greater efficiency and competency. He noted that care must be taken to ensure that security measures adopted to confront this phenomenon do not lead to an escalation of the problem.

Allam concluded by stressing the need of establishing an international body that includes experts representing the countries that are most impacted by terrorism, charged with studying the underlying causes of violent extremism in order to implement a comprehensive strategy to counter this phenomenon.

General **Sheihtly** started his contribution by defining extremism as being a deviation from what is usual and trendy, noting that extremism is not constrained to a religion's ideology but could be inspired by a range of political, social and economic beliefs.

Sheihtly refused to associate terrorism with Islam owing to the actions of a few radical Muslim individuals who have taken it upon themselves to do the most heinous crimes in the name of Islam, defaming Islam by their deeds. While distinguishing between radicalization and religious piety and observance of the Islamic statutes, he said that according to Islamic teachings, the extremist is a person who oversteps the boundaries of the Sharia in all aspects of life. He added that the authoritarian trend of radical movements and their intolerance against anyone, individual or government, who refuses to apply their harsh and regressive interpretation of Islam, denies any possibility of political negotiation with them.

He stressed that this ideological extremism has two pillars: An outright anti-western stance that considers the West as responsible of all ill-deeds in the world, and a self-inflating attitude stating that only Muslims can engage the process of human reformation. He laid out grievances that extremists capitalize on to promote their ideology, namely:

– The continued Israeli occupation of Arab lands and the failure to implement a just solution to the Palestinian issue

– Increased threats to the holy sites in Jerusalem

– The Western control over the Arabic countries' natural resources

– Political despotism, unjust ruler, lack of democracy and the suppression of freedoms

– Cable television's massive spread, which play a crucial role in diffusing extremist ideology and deepening sectarian rift

– Poverty caused by political and administrative corruption and the waste of the countries' resources.

– Extremists' infiltration into the educational system, which made pupils vulnerable to recruitment

– The existence of internal and external parties that sponsor these extremist organizations and use them in proxy-wars

Amidst the current violent extremism rampage in many parts of the world and the subsequent acts of terrorism, he stressed the need of implementing a joint and comprehensive global strategy to counter this phenomenon, starting with the adoption of a preventive policy through understanding the political, social, economic and cultural drivers of this trend in order to address them; investing in education and instigating an inclusive development of the education system; strengthening the role of Islamic religious authority in countering extremism through awareness raising regarding the real essence of Islam; engaging non-Islamic religious authority in raising awareness among believers about real Islam; emphasizing the role of media in the waged battle against violent extremism.

As for deterrence measures to counter extremism, he mentioned: The exchange of information between countries; the need to invest in enhancing the security services efficiency and readiness both at the military and ideological level; enact special legislation to deter terrorism. He also underscored the role of the United Nations in countering terrorism by taking crucial action under Chapter VII against any State or institution or group classified as terrorist or providing support for acts of terrorism, and first and foremost, the need to reach a unified definition for terrorism that differentiates between the rightful resistance against occupation and terrorism.

Finally, with terrorism gaining an international dimension, he stressed the need to amend the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols to suit the nature of modern asymmetric warfare between nations and terrorist groups and how to deal with individuals or groups classified as terrorists.

Taylor began his contribution by asserting that a deep scrutiny of terrorism requires overviewing an array of factors and restraining from adopting prior interpretations to

ascertain its nature without monitoring factual baselines that elucidate its essence. He outlined a series of fundamental points that might help to understand violent extremism and could contribute to the development of systematic initiatives to counter it. He said that the starting point in the process of understanding this phenomenon is the adoption of the principle of "do no harm" through resorting to rational rather than emotional analysis to ensure its clarity.

The second point is trying to figure out whether the goals of violent extremism are collective and violence is used as a tactic in an ongoing war or they are individual. The third point is determining what behavior is problematic? Maintaining fundamentalist beliefs or putting deeds by ones words? Who is the enemy: non-violent extremists or violent extremists?

He stressed the need to detect the short-term individual factors playing on the emergence of violent extremism (live events, local conditions) which may be different from the long-term factors affecting the massive violent extremism (ideological, social and environmental). He talked about the importance of revisiting prevailing ideas about leadership and responsibility within mainstream extremist groups, and acknowledging that it is currently a networked structure instead of being a hierarchical command/control structure. He said that the reasons behind the emergence of violent extremism in the West (foreign fighters) are different from those in other communities, and every community should take it upon itself to recognize the local root-causes that have contributed to the emergence of violent extremism in order to be able to confront it.

Taylor also underscored the need to recognizing the role of the internet as element of network based violent extremism and a critical tool for spreading extremist ideology and propaganda. He also underlined the need to understanding the relationship between online and personal contact which can be mutually supportive and very powerful. Additionally, we should comprehend the emotional context of propaganda to implement a similar one in counter narratives.

He talked about the existence of similar characteristics between individuals who have chosen the path of violent extremism, revealing that most Westerners who have gone this route have previous criminal records, which could, according to him, indicate a pre-existing marginal life. He added that we should not overestimate the role of religion as initiator, as opposed to motivator or director once someone is already involved in violent extremism. He also highlighted the

difference between people born into and brought up in a religious environment, where there is a limited sense of choice, and converts who have made a choice. He also noted the significance of personal psychological factors and mental health as push factors, especially in the case of foreign fighters.

Speaking about initiatives that have been adopted so far to confront extremism, he considered that none was a winning strategy, proposing a series of questions that could be used as a road map to draft viable initiatives to contain violent extremism:

> – What are the goals of these initiatives: Altering beliefs and behavior changing? What is the measure of success: to stop violent acts or deterring the extremist ideology that drives this violence?

> – Whom these initiatives are reaching: Are they preventive aiming to reach the would-be extremists or they focus on the rehabilitation of those already involved in violent extremism? Should they reach people who advocate terrorism or persons who are already engaged in violent acts? Do they have to engage with extremists' broader families? What are the foundations to be adopted in developing a strategy to contain violent extremism? Should it use religion or should it focus on the economic factors?

He concluded by emphasizing the need for post-release monitoring to detect recidivism and strengthening the process of reintegration into society.

The debate started with some participants praising the speakers' emphasis on distinguishing between terrorism and radicalization, saying that countering each one of these two trends needs a different philosophical approach. They stressed the necessity to view the spread of an ideology of radical extremism with a degree of urgency comparable to the way we view the spread of violent groups animated by that ideology, highlighting the global threat of extremist organizations. Others said that while security measures are a critical part of a comprehensive counter-terrorism approach, they alone are insufficient; they emphasized the necessity of understanding the general context that has laid the groundfield for the emergence of violent extremism, especially in what pertains to the Sunni victimization and marginalization.

Acknowledging that Britain has become a safe haven for terrorists, they said that some of those have returned to their home country repented and open minded. They refused to denounce Britain asylum policy, asserting that the core problem is related to the prevailing situation in our communities. They added that the absence of religious

authority, particularly among the Sunnis, left the field open for extremist interpretations of religion, saying that strengthening religious institutions has become an urgent task while ensuring their autonomy. Additionally, they refused to brand all Islamic movements as extremist and terrorist, noting that declaring Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group in Egypt is at the core of all problems plaguing this country.

Other participants warned against Arab regimes using security and counter-terrorism measures to crackdown on civil liberties, imperiling the Arab people's gains at this level and bolstering terrorism, stressing that Arab societies have had their fair share of violence.

FOURTH SESSION :
"TERRORISM THROUGH THE EYE OF THE ARAB WORLD"

The fourth session started by its director **Sam Menassa** introducing the speakers, **Oraib Al Rantawi**, Founder and Director of Al Quds Center for Political Studies, **Safa Hussein**, Deputy National Security Adviser in Iraq and **Ubeidly Ubeidly**, journalist and researcher.

Menassa opened the session by quoting journalist Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed, who said that "not all Muslims and Arabs are terrorists, but today most of the acts of terrorism are carried out by Muslims." He explained that it was necessary to end the meeting by reviewing Arabs' standpoint pertaining to violent extremism, in light of their current confused and blurred stance towards extremist Islamic movements in particular and terrorism in general.

Maj. Gen. **Hussein** began his intervention by distinguishing between religious extremism, extremism, and terrorist organizations, defining the latter as religious, military and political groups which brand themselves as Salafist and jihadist, and seek to establish an Islamic state using terrorism as a means to achieve this end. He said that terrorist organizations such as ISIL, and Al-Nusra Front and al-Qaida, share the goal of establishing an Islamic state, but are using different tactics to reach this goal.

He pointed out that all attempts to combat terrorism have failed, wondering about the where and why of this shortfall. Talking about the Iraqi experience with terrorism, he outlined three decisive periods :

– Pre-emergence of terrorist organizations phase : It started in the nineties when Iraq was under a UN Security Council system of comprehensive embargo. The

consequences of the embargo have been catastrophic for the people and the economy of Iraq, and the country struggled with an increase in poverty rates. The Saudi humanitarian aids began then to flow to the country going directly to some mosques which become later on a hotbed for Salafists. He stated that the former regime militarized the society and escalated its crackdown against political dissidents using harsh and cruel measures including beheading and mutilation. He added that the perilous security vacuum in some areas produced an environment conducive to the growth and success of armed extremist organizations such as Ansar al-Islam and Jamaat al-Tawhid and Jihad, which mutated into al-Qaida in Iraq. As for the lessons learned from this phase, Hussein highlighted the danger of linking humanitarian aid to broader political goals; when a foreign party capitalizes on a country's dire economic conditions and uses aid as a political tool, this could contribute to the emergence of terrorism. Additionally, he underscored the danger of indiscriminate arrests on terrorist related charges, which could make of innocents an easy prey for recruitment by extremist groups especially in prisons.

– The aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq phase: The second phase began with the US invasion of Iraq and continued until 2006. This phase saw the emergence of groups who took up the banner of resistance against the occupation, which emboldened terrorist organizations to follow into their steps using nationalist sentiment as a trap for recruitment and sectarian rift as a selling point. Alternatively, the US military withdrawal from vital areas led to a vacuum that terrorist organizations were eager and ready to fill. As to lessons learned from this phase, Hussein stressed that foreign interference often breeds terrorism, allowing terrorist organizations to wielding control over populated areas.

– The third phase, between 2006-2015, witnessed the beginning of the defeat of terrorist organizations for many reasons, the first being the Sunnis rejecting al-Qaeda regressive rule and their backlash against the groups' handgrip on their regions; secondly, the divergence between Indigenous, and Arab and foreign insurgents mainly caused by cultural and social differences, and thirdly the continued military and security pressure on al-Qaida and its offspring.

He concluded by explaining the internal and external reasons behind the recent rise of ISIL. Regarding internal

reasons and in addition to corruption and ill-management, Hussein cited the inability and incompetence of local police to deal with terrorist organizations, coupled with the federal police reticence to intervene fearing to incite animosity with Sunni citizens as most of its manpower are Shia. As to external reasons, he said that the civil war in Syria, which turned to become a proxy war, has left the region open to terrorist organizations. They gained control of heavy and hi-tech weapons along with financial capacity through controlling oil fields in Syria and Iraq. With that caveat in mind, ISIL is no longer a mere terrorist organization, but one that operates like an army.

In his presentation, **Rantawi** outlined the most important points that must be taken into account when developing a counterterrorism strategy:

– A counter-terrorism initiative requires the adoption of a comprehensive and multidimensional approach addressing the various political, social, economic, cultural, religious and educational factors, which have contributed to the spread of terrorism; otherwise it will be meant to fail.

– A concerted and unified response to deter terrorism in Arab states is impossible due to domestic divergences. Rantawi rejected the proposal of enacting special anti-terrorism laws, positing that they could be used by regimes to crackdown on civil liberties under the guise of counter-terrorism for self-serving political ends.

– The need to reach a bare minimum national consensus on counter-terrorism and deradicalization.

– The need to set key benchmarks for political reform and engage in the democratization process, as it was proven that the lack of political participation has fostered increased radicalization among disaffected. He called for establishing a secular rule in Arab countries, urging the Arab elite to be bold in clinging to this crucial plea.

– The need to rethink the stance towards political Islam and abstaining from portraying all mainstream Islamist political movements as terrorists. He slammed the massive campaign waged in Egypt against the Muslim Brotherhood because of their old ideology. He emphasized that during the last decade the Muslim Brotherhood has embraced a more open rhetoric espousing democracy and reform; thereafter they should not be equated with other terrorist organizations.

– The need of stepping in the role of societal actors and engaging stakeholders in civil society in counter-ideology

efforts to alter Islamists' narrative with persuasive counter-arguments and contribute to remodel their rigid worldview.

– To promote dialogue with these organizations and capitalize on internal fringe in the persuasion process.

– The need to address the chronic economic and marginalization problems, along with bridging the gap between the poor and the rich, fighting corruption and finding new horizons for young people enabling them to live in dignity.

– The need to undertake a comprehensive reform of the education system including curricula, as nowadays, the diverse streams of education in the Arab world are considered as a factor for facilitating the process of radicalization, graduating pro-ISIL students as they fail short in building resilience against the groups' impact.

– The need to strengthening religious institutions and reforming curricula in religious school and faculties which according to him, graduate pro-ISIL militants. Speaking about Jordan, Rantawi said no one can prevent the building of mosques in the kingdom, and their number have reached 7000, knowing that Jordan has only 2400 credited preachers. He casted doubt about the affiliation of preachers filling the gap to cover the 7000 mosques.

– He concluded by pointing out the responsibility of the West in spurring violent extremism in the region, saying that one of the things that really does play into the hands of terrorists is the western double standards foreign policy in dealing with Middle Eastern problems.

In his intervention, Ubeidly said that terrorism is not a new phenomenon in human experience, adding that throughout history it has been used by dissidents and had threatened the stability of societies and their peaceful coexistence. He refused tying terrorism to Islam, stressing that the wave of terrorism we are witnessing today is not a unique or exceptional case, as political violence has been a significant part of social and political relations since the oldest civilizations.

Amid continued terror attacks, an unprecedented terrorists' military prowess and a widespread radical indoctrination which ignore age and societal boundaries, he underscored the failure of all counter-terrorism initiatives. He added that crafting an effective counter-terrorism Strategy requires following three main steps:

– Reaching consensus over a unified definition of terrorism.

– Undertaking a throughout diagnosis of the underlying root causes and factors behind this phenomenon and its persistence.

– Developing and implementing a viable and sustainable counter-terrorism strategy.

Noting the existing divergence in defining terrorism and perceiving terrorists, he said that the causes behind terrorism are varied, and can be of psychological, cultural, political, and economic nature. Nonetheless, we can detect local and external causes. Outlining the local causes, he mentioned tough economic conditions, poverty and social injustice, marginalization, misconception of religious and political ideologies seeing in violence the only means to reach goals, despotism and lack of political participation particularly among young people, lack of political pluralism and alternation of power, in addition to widespread corruption, lack of civil liberties and the systematic violation of human rights.

As for the external causes, Ubeidly talked about the foreign occupation, the shock of modernity and cultural alienation as a result of globalization, the ruling zeitgeist and the unequal distribution of global power that dominates the unipolar world-system, in addition to regional conflicts that were catalyst for the emergence of terrorist organizations.

Speaking about counter-terrorism efforts, he pointed out that the absence of a general consensus on the definition of terrorism makes of deterring this phenomenon almost an impossible task. Nonetheless, he presented a counter-terrorism strategy founded on the following principles:

– Fully understanding the root causes of terrorism

– Counter-terrorist policies which are only based on security military measures are unproductive and will breed new generations of more violent radicals.

– Implementing political agendas able to address the upstream causes of terrorism

– Strengthening the role of de-politicized civil society organizations

– Promoting substantive political reform that emphasizes pluralistic governance, as an exclusive rule will very likely foster increased radicalization among disaffected

– Promote dialogue with terrorist organizations through the so-called "persuasive ways."

He concluded by reiterating his stance stating that terrorism is not a radical religious phenomenon fueled by anti-western culture sentiment, stressing that all initiatives forged by

western powers to mitigate this growing threat were doomed to fail because rather than addressing terrorism root causes they contributed to trigger them. He finally called on Arab countries to seriously participate in the fight against terrorism by implementing a broader and independent Arab strategy which gives the upper hand to Arab interests.

In the discussion, some participants considered that Salafist movements should have been represented at this conference to speak out about the topic, emphasizing the role of religious leaders in countering violent extremism. Others praised mentioning the western double standards policy towards terrorism, arguing that the West does not consider the daily killing of thousands of people in Syria as an act of terrorism, while the death of hundreds in a lonely operation, triggered global condemnation and prompted the intervention of air and ground forces.

Finally, Mneimneh presented a conclusive overview of the meeting's outcomes, after briefly talking about the history of religious reform in Islam. He said that the ambiguity that surrounded the discussion pertaining to violent extremism is due to the complexity of this trend, stressing however that further similar meetings will try to shed light on the problematic issues identified while discussing the psychological, social and cultural aspects of this phenomenon.

Menassa announced the closure of the conference, appreciating the input of all the attendees and participants and promising further alike fruitful meetings.

La Maison du Futur intends to organize future events to ensure a follow-up and continuation on problematic issues identified in this meeting:

> – There is a gap between the West and the East when it comes to explaining violent extremism and combatting it that needs to be tackled.
> – The need to reform religious institutions in the Arab and Islamic world and to engage religious leaders in the fight of violent extremism.
> – The need to achieve political reform and good governance in the Arab World.
> – Reforming educational programs in general and sharia faculties programs in particular.
> – Reviewing immigration laws.

overview

Violent extremism is part of a process through which radical militancy gradually "initiates" individuals into accepting the abandonment of established norms and values in favor of violence in particular cases, then as a legitimate means to address perceived grievances of a more lasting character, before acquiring these individuals into its world view of perpetual conflict.

Violent extremism is accordingly a symptom of radical militancy. It represents the crossing of the "red line" with which militancy no longer falls within the rights of individuals for free thought and free speech, triggering instead the corrective actions of legal and law-enforcement authorities.

Extremism is on the rise, especially in the Middle East, as manifested by ISIS and other terrorist movements. Europe is also affected by these trends, and therefore this difficult problem may spread further. Chaos, failed states and the rise of violent non-state actors result in migration pressures on other countries as well as the endless threat of terrorism. The major response currently available to these threats is increased security and intelligence activity, and in some cases, military intervention.

Although this may be necessary in certain circumstances, it needs to be complemented by a greater understanding of the root causes of extremism. Why is it that some people, including those with apparently normal lives in the West, join these groups? If we understand better the basic causes, what can be done to address them?

It is incumbent on society to address the reasons of the success of radical militancy in its recruitment efforts, in order to devise means and methods of resistance to its appeal. An understanding of generic factors, from economic, social, and generational alienation, to the emerging factors of globalization, new social media, information saturation, and privacy challenges, will be sought in the context of this meeting, as well as an exploration of the specific elements of ideology, religion, and the appropriation of modernity in the Middle East.

This meeting brings together some Western and Arab experts, including psychologists and academics with innovative ideas and experience on these matters along with Lebanese and Arab counterparts to begin a process of gaining the upper hand on one of the most important of files challenging policymakers today.

KRISTINA EICHHORST

Coordinator for Crisis and Conflict Management
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THE NEW FOREIGN FIGHTERS TREND

What motivates Europeans in general and Germans in particular to give up their comfortable life to join ISIL?

This new phenomenon caused a public outcry since it arouse in Germany four years ago, pushing everyone to wonder about the identity of those who head off to foreign countries to join armed fighters in their battle. Even political authorities were baffled by this new trend.

Today and after 4 years, we can say that we still have little insight about this phenomenon, as reality shows that the legion of foreign fighters includes persons with varied and often overlapping motives, coming from a range of economic and socio-cultural backgrounds and do not fit one stereotype.

Hence, we stopped asking about their identity, trying instead to elucidate their motives and considerations.

– One theory says that they suffer from mental illness and their personalities are weak. However, the field studies have showed the invalidity of this theory, since the majority of those who join the ranks of extremist movements are not mentally unstable.

– Another theory says that they do not suffer from mental illness but rather from neurosis, especially depression. Once again, reality has shown the invalidity of this interpretation.

– A third theory says that the reason behind this phenomenon lies in the manhood psyche, mentality and way of thinking, in terms of his strive for wars, power, adventure, bragging and fame etc… Here too, there is no conclusive evidence proving the validity of this theory.

– A fourth reasonable theory, Sit-

ظاهرة المقاتلين الأجانب

كريستينا إيخهورست

ما هي الأسباب التي تدفع الأوروبيين بعامة والالمان بخاصة الذين يعيشون حياة كريمة إلى مغادرة بلادهم للإلتحاق بتنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام (داعش)؟

شكَّلت هذه الظاهرة عندما بدأت في ألمانيا قبل أربع سنوات، صدمة دفعت بالجميع إلى التساؤل عن هوية هؤلاء ولماذا يقدمون على مثل هذه العمل كما تسببت بإرباك السلطات. اليوم وبعد أربع سنوات، لا نستطيع القول إننا بتنا نعرف أكثر عن هذه الظاهرة إذ أن الواقع يظهر عدم وجود صورة نمطية واحدة لشخصية ما اصطلح على تسميته بالمقاتلين الأجانب، لاسيما وأن هؤلاء يأتون من بيئات اجتماعية واقتصادية وثقافية مختلفة.

دفعنا هذا الأمر إلى التوقف عن طرح سؤال «من هم هؤلاء»، والانتقال إلى محاولة معرفة الدوافع وراء انضمام شخص ما إلى الحركات الإسلامية المتطرفة. وفي هذا الإطار ظهرت نظريات عدة:

نظرية تقول إن هؤلا يعانون من أمراض نفسية وشخصياتهم ضعيفة. إلا أن الدراسات الميدانية أظهرت عدم صحة هذه النظرية إذ أن غالبية المنضمين إلى صفوف الحركات المتطرفة لا يعانون من أمراض نفسية.

نظرية أخرى تقول إن هؤلاء لا يعانون من أمراض نفسية ولكن من أمراض عصبية يأتي في مقدمتها الإنهيار العصبي. ومرة أخرى أظهر الواقع عدم صحة هذا التفسير.

نظرية ثالثة تقول إن السبب وراء هذه الظاهرة يكمن في طبيعة نفسية الرجل وعقليته وطريقة تفكيره، لجهة حبه للحروب والسلطة والمغامرة والمفاخرة والشهرة إلخ... وهنا أيضا، لا وجود لدليل قاطع يبرهن صحة هذه النظرية.

وهناك نظرية رابعة معقولة، تتحدث عن انضمام الشباب إلى الحركات المتطرفة خلال نقطة تحول في حياتهم (Situation of radical change theory). ووفقا لهذه النظرية، عندما يطرأ تغيير سلبي كبير في حياة شخص ما، يصبح ضعيفا وأكثر عرضة لمحاولات التجنيد. على الرغم من منطقية هذه النظرية، تبقى غير شاملة وعاجزة عن تفسير جميع الحالات.

ما زلنا لا نعرف الكثير عن ظاهرة التطرف العنفي في الغرب، وأرجح استحالة فهمها في ظل تعقيدات النفس البشرية. ما زلنا في ألمانيا في نقطة الصفر وعلينا التواصل مع دول أخرى في أوروبا والمنطقة لمحاولة الإحاطة بها.

uation of Radical Change Theory, talks about young people joining extremist movements during a turning point in their lives (trauma). When a significant turning point event occurs in someone's life, he becomes weak and vulnerable to recruitment attempts. However, despite the logic behind this theory, it is not inclusive and totally effective in explaining foreign fighters' motivations.

We still have poor insight into the phenomenon of violent extremism in the West, and it is likely impossible to fully understand this ambiguous occurrence in light of the complexity of human psychology. In Germany, we are still at square one and need to share experiences with other European countries in order to tackle this issue.

THOMAS VOLK

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HOW "ISLAMIC STATE" RECRUITS FIGHTERS IN GERMANY APPROACHES TO EFFECTIVELY PREVENTING ISLAMIST RADICALIZATION

KEY POINTS

There are over 7,000 Salafists living in Germany. Over 700 people have travelled to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant "ISIL"-controlled territory in Syria and Iraq from Germany, and over 100 have died there. The number of "ISIL" returnees is on the rise.

The reasons for joining "ISIL" are varied. They can be of a psychological, political, sociological or ideological nature. Many women and converts are joining "ISIL" from Germany.

In Germany, "ISIL" is recruiting via the Internet, in the environment of some mosques as well as in youth, leisure, sports and penal organizations and institutions. Salafism is a dynamic youth and protest movement. It is important to have a coordinated program for preventing Islamist radicalization. A historical-critical exegesis of the Quran, an expansion of Islamic religious education in schools, increased use of German as the medium in which sermons are delivered in mosques, employment of more Muslim chaplains, as well as websites aimed at young people that promote tolerant Islam can counter the alarming trend of increasing Islamist radicalization.

"A crucial factor to take into consideration before starting to prepare yourself is to know yourself. More important than knowing who you are, is knowing what you can do and what you cannot do". This exhortation does not represent words of wisdom from a philosophical textbook or an excerpt from one of the numerous books giving advice on how to live a good life in an increasingly complex world.

It is a section from an e-book that has been circulating on the Internet for months: "Hijrah to the Islamic State – What to Pack up, Who to Contact, Where to Go: Stories & more". The Hijrah is familiar to all Muslims and the expert public as it refers to the migration of the Islamic prophet Muhammad and his early companions from Mecca to Medina in 622 AD. In Islam, the Hijrah also marks the beginning of the Islamic era and is of great significance to the 1.4 to 1.6 billion Muslims (*umma*) around the world. It is therefore not surprising that the self-styled caliph of the terror organization "Islamic State" (IS), Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, makes reference to the Hijrah as a religious element and that "IS" purposefully evokes religious feelings in its propaganda strategy to recruit new followers. In May 2015, Al-Baghdadi addressed the public in a video message, calling upon all Muslims to emigrate to "ISIL" territory in Syria and Iraq – in other words to follow the example of the Hijrah by leaving behind their current lives and joining "ISIL" – or alternatively "to fight in their country, wherever that may be".

An online "Travel Guide" gives advice on how to travel to "ISIL"-controlled territory

The "Travel Guide to the Islamic State", which is available online as an e-book in English, is intended to provide useful tips for travelling to "ISIL" territory and does so in perfidiously concrete fashion. An "ISIL" follower who had made the trip to Syria describes his "emigration" to "ISIL" territory and provides practical tips that people should bear in mind before setting off. The distance from the airport in the Turkish city of anlurfa to Ar-Raqqa, the secret capital of the so-called Islamic State in Syria, is stated precisely as 127.9 kilometers. There are detailed advice ranging from what to pack before setting off to rules of behavior when entering "ISIL" territory. A perusal of this travel brochure gives a frightening insight into the skills used by "ISIL" to attract new followers and the effects these recruitment strategies have in Germany as well.

This paper analyses current developments of the Islamist potential in Germany and provides concrete suggestions on potential preventative strategies to avoid a further escalation of Islamist tendencies in Germany.

Islamism is a political ideology with numerous strains

First of all, one needs to differentiate clearly between Islam and Islamism. While Islam generally advocates a holistic approach and can therefore be seen not only as a monotheistic religion but also as an ideology and a concept of law and is generally understood by Muslims to be predestined to become the all-encompassing and ultimate religion of all people, the following definition represents a fundamental description of the phenomenon of Islamism: "Islamism begins where religious Islamic precepts and norms are interpreted as binding rules for political action. Islamism is a political ideology, which claims to be universally valid and legitimizes the use of violence under certain circumstances in order to realize goals defined as 'Islamic'." In the same way as there is no *one* Islam, there is no *single* phenomenon of Islamism. While a

differentiated and objective examination of the various Islamic and Islamist movements may be laborious, it is nonetheless necessary. This is because the majority of Muslims condemn acts motivated by Islamism, and in most of the countries of the predominantly Muslim regions, the majority of the victims of Islamists are, in fact, Muslims.

While there are numerous different Islamist movements and manifestations, one common feature is the rejection of national sovereignty and strict adherence to the Islamic holy texts as representing God's commands that must not be questioned. Islam expert Christine Schirrmacher states: "But when the way of life of 7th century Arab society, the model provided by Muhammad and the interpretation by sharia scholars living up to the 10th century are declared to be the generally applicable ideal for the present day, which has to be reinstated by political means, that is an ideological and totalitarian demand. Such political Islam is not compatible with democracy."

Salafist movements show the most dynamic development of the different forms of Islamism

One manifestation of Islamism, and the one that is currently showing the fastest rate of growth, is Salafism. Its name refers back to the "pious predecessors" (*as-salaf as-salih*) – the first three generations of Muslims – and it aspires to a particularly strict way of life modeled on that of the early period of Islam. As in Islamism in general, there are essentially three groupings in Salafism as well. *Purist Islamists/Salafists* themselves live according to the funda-

mental rules of sharia (a collation of the Quran and the Sunnah, i.e. the corpus of the reports on the sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad, which have not been combined in a consistent overall body of text), but are largely apolitical and opposed to militancy. *Political Islamists/Salafists* seek to bring about a turning away from democracy and the establishment of a theocratic form of government. *Jihadist Islamists/Salafists* form the smallest grouping, but a particularly dangerous one because of their militant intentions. The distinctions between these three forms of Islamism/Salafism are somewhat fluid. While Islamism does not necessarily entail violence, a purist or quietist or even political Islamic attitude by itself embodies antidemocratic thinking. Its proponents reject the free and democratic constitutional system and despise authorities representing the rule of law.

The "ISIL Travel Guide" provides practical tips and advice on making the trip – the messaging service Twitter plays an important role

The 50-page "ISIL Travel Guide" mentioned above, which journalists have already dubbed "Lonely Planet: Islamic State", describes in detail what would-be emigrants should bear in mind and relates the experiences made by others, including some women, who have already travelled from the UK, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. The mere fact that the document has been published in English illustrates that it is intended for an international audience – the travel guide is meant to be accessible anywhere in the world and under-

stood by all. The content provides some important background information about the "ISIL" rationale and the methods used to try and attract new recruits.

One specific piece of advice, for instance, is that they should not discuss the planned trip to "ISIL" territory with family members before setting off so as not to attract attention and that it is better to book a return ticket to a nearby holiday destination such as Greece or Spain. Only then should they book another ticket to Turkey, from where they can then travel on to Syria via the Turkish-Syrian border town of Akçakale. And they would need to expect to have to pay a bribe to Turkish border guards. The traveller should also wear unremarkable clothes – preferably "casual" clothes – and avoid looking religious so as not to attract attention unnecessarily in Turkey. The advice takes on a particularly cynical tone when describing what to pack for the journey to "ISIL" territory. The "brother", who has made the trip already and wishes to recruit new "ISIL" followers by describing his experiences and is even mentioned by name with his Twitter account for potential queries, advises people to take care to pack the most important pieces of equipment. Besides clothing and toiletries, people should also take along a solar charger for the journey, for instance, as electricity regularly is a big problem in "ISIL" territory. 7 More crucial than the practical advice on entering Turkey, on suitable places to stay (particularly for single women travellers) and on ways of making contact with potential people smugglers – this could be done most

safely by using Twitter – the actual message of this dubious travel guide is this: each and everyone is welcome in the territory of the "Islamic State" as long as they follow the Salafist ideology of "ISIL" unconditionally and are prepared to serve the Islamist cause.

The "ISIL" message is simple: everybody is needed, come and join us!

By being aware of their strengths and weaknesses, all those willing to emigrate would make a direct contribution to help the "ISIL" succeed through their skills. At one point, the author stresses explicitly that while "ISIL" does need fighters and soldiers, the Islamic state of the time of the Prophet Mohammad was not built solely by fighters and warriors, but complemented and thereby made to prosper by merchants, women and children, as well as by people with different skills. That is a model that one should try and emulate. Engineers, doctors and other professionals are needed to consolidate and advance the building of the Islamic state. The latest sociological findings about the makeup of the departing "ISIL" followers do, in fact, indicate that those setting off to Syria and Iraq are by no means restricted to sympathizers from poorly educated sections of society.

There is no mention in the pamphlet of the extent of the abductions, intimidation, raping and killing endemic in the lived reality in the areas controlled by the terror organization "ISIL" in Syria and Iraq and of the ruthlessness with which opponents are treated. In July 2015, 26-year-old Ebrahim B., who had re-

turned to Germany from "ISIL"-controlled territory in Syria and has since been arrested, attracted attention in an interview with the ARD program Panorama. He summarized his three-month stint in "ISIL" war territory as follows: "If you go there, you're either dead or dead." According to him, you only have the choice of becoming a fighter or a suicide bomber in "ISIL" territory and that as a European jihadist in particular you are merely cannon fodder. New arrivals in "ISIL"-controlled territory would have their passports as well as all their personal possessions taken away. And if there was any suspicion that the person may be a Western spy, they would be executed as a warning to others.

In Germany, over 43,000 people are thought to be Islamists – the majority of them legalistic Islamists

The proliferation of the booklet "Hijrah to the Islamic State" and the picture painted by the "ISIL" returnee correspond depressingly to the figures of the latest Report on the Protection of the Constitution (*Verfassungsschutzbericht)* published in the summer of 2015. According to the BfV, the domestic intelligence service of the Federal Republic of Germany, there were 43,890 persons living in Germany at the end of 2014 who could be considered potential Islamists – an increase of 1.6 per cent on the previous year and of 3.14 per cent on 2012. While the number already stood at 42,550 in 2012 and rose to 43,190 in 2013, it increased by a further 700 in 2014. This worrying trend appears to be continuing as a result of the ongoing atrocities perpetrated by the terror

organization "ISIL". As the high level of brutality, intransigence and radicalness of "ISIL" is attractive particularly to young would-be emigrants, the pulling power is likely to increase with every further act of destruction of historic sites by "IS" in countries of the Middle East and with every further inhumane atrocity perpetrated by the terror organisation. To prevent this, it will require a concerted, country-wide prevention strategy in order to be able to sustainably counter an increase in Islamist machinations in Germany.

The figures from the BfV provide a clear picture. Most of the over 43,000 Islamists in Germany are considered to be legalists. Legalistic Islamists officially observe law and order, but they do promote Islamic thinking. *Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görü e.V.* (IGMG) including its affiliated associations is considered to represent the largest group of legalistic Islamists in Germany; its membership has remained constant at approximately 31,000 for several years. However, the authors of the Report on the Protection of the Constitution stress that IGMG is currently undergoing a process of change and that not all its members have Islamist views. That said, the actual number of followers of the Milli Görü movement in Germany is probably far higher than the official membership of 31,000 as not all visitors of the over 300 IGMG mosques in Germany officially register as members and the BfV does not appear to have included sympathizers in its figures either. Associations with links to the Muslim Brotherhood are also amongst the legalistic Islamists in Germany. The

organization *Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland* (ZMD) acts as the umbrella organization for many such associations, including *Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland* (IGD), for instance. While legalistic Islamists do not call for violent acts and purport to be against militancy, their engagement remains driven by an Islamist and therefore anti-constitutional world view.

There are over 7000 Salafists living in Germany – and the number is still rising.

One particularly worrying trend is the steady rise in the number of people with a Salafist affiliation in Germany. Since 2012 until the beginning of 2015, the number has increased from 4,500 to over 7,000, and it is still rising. The Salafist ideology, which is becoming increasingly popular among German Islamists, harks back to the supposed "golden age" of Islam. Accordingly, Salafist movements strive to establish a Muslim society modeled on the first community of Medina from 622 AD on a global scale. Their ultimate goal is to merge religion and state (*din wa daula*) on the basis of God's unchanging law, the sharia. The ideas underlying the mind-set dramatically. While the national security authorities were aware of 270 people departing Germany in January 2014, the number had risen as high as 600 by January 2015 – an increase of 122 per cent. These are official figures from the BfV. When one considers the detailed description of possible travel scenarios in the "ISIL" travel guide and the routes described or recommended in it, which involve crossing third states masked as holiday destinations to get to Turkey to then travel on to Syria, one can assume that the number of undetected cases of people travelling from Germany to "ISIL"–controlled areas is considerably higher than the officially recorded number. In July 2015, the German Minister of the Interior assumed that the number of people departing Germany for "ISIL" – controlled territory had already exceeded 700. In August, reports emerged that over 100 persons from Germany had already lost their lives for the "ISIL" cause. These figures, which are still on the rise, prompted the president of the BKA, the Federal Criminal Police Office, to give the following prognosis in the spring of 2015: "If the current trend continues, we may see 1000 jihadists departing the country within a year".

Salafism is considered a dynamic youth and protest movement

Even though there has been no empirical study conducted about the typology of the emigrants, there are indications of varying motivation. Besides people acting out of ideological conviction, who justify their decision to travel on the basis of religious principles, there are also adventurers and criminals who want to live out their phantasies about killing and violent acts in "ISIL"-controlled territory with impunity. There are further a small number of people who appear to wish to travel to Syria and Iraq for humanitarian or solidarity reasons in order to assist their "siblings in faith" in the civil war there. Yet others can be classed as hangers-on, who are hoping that their emigration will help them satisfy their wish for a feeling

of comradeship and belonging and a sense of security as well as giving meaning to their lives; some of these people also consider themselves part of an Islamic avant-garde or of a superior generation. The sociologist Aladin El-Mafaalani recognizes the characteristics of a youth and protest movement in Salafism, which he believes to be attractive to many young people because of the way it combines asceticism with nostalgia. He has the following to say on this subject: "A strict dress code, regulation of sexuality and anti-consumerism – to our eyes that should be pure poison to a youth movement, but today, asceticism and nostalgia combined with a self-confident collective demeanor denote rebellion." In addition, the impression of increasing Islamophobia in Western societies appears to be driving young people in particular into the arms of Islamist extremists.

The national security authorities work on the assumption that at least a third of the persons departing Germany for "ISIL" territory have returned to Germany by now. These returnees could constitute a further threat to Germany's security situation. As it is, there is legitimate concern about certain circles who consider Germany a safe haven and fertile ground for recruiting new members.

Over 700 people have left Germany to travel to "ISIL"-controlled territory in Syria and Iraq – including a large number of converts and women

It is also interesting to see that those departing from Germany are not exclusively "German-born Muslim males with a migration back-ground", but that some 10 per cent are converts and further 10 per cent women. The rise in the number of women making the trip is particularly significant. There are various reasons motivating women to take the decision to leave. Many – and young women in particular – make a very conscious and voluntary decision to go and live in "ISIL"-controlled territory at the side of a mujahidin, a fighter for God, and submit themselves unconditionally to the supposed rules of nascent Islamic society of the early 7th century. This phenomenon, frequently referred to with the term "jihadi brides", is resulting in ever greater numbers of young girls from Germany and other European countries taking the decision to abandon their existing environment and travel to Syria. Most initially make contact via social media and other online digital platforms. Without alerting those in their immediate surroundings, young girls abandon their existing lives and travel to Turkey overnight, from where they then proceed secretly to Syria. The widely publicized picture of a seemingly strong "ISIL" follower fighting fearlessly for the good cause, the feeling of "being-accepted-as-you-are" (including the hijab and living your life according to Muslim principles) as well as clear rules for living your life according to the principles of sharia, all this appears to have added to the attraction for many girls who have made the journey. Women living at the side of "ISIL" fighters who get killed also gain fame and respect within the Islamist scene as widows of supposed martyrs. Within the "ISIL" structure, women probably also have special responsibility for

recruiting further women, for "education" work and for professionalizing the propaganda activities. Holger Münch, president of the BKA, the Federal Criminal Police Office, stated in July 2015 that one had to assume that at least 100 women had left Germany to join "ISIL".

Without wishing to overdramatize the situation, one can speak of a new dimension of Islamist activities in Germany. Never before has the number of people forming part of the Islamist potential in Germany been so high; the number of Salafist Islamists in Germany has experienced a significant increase of 55 per cent over three years, and the number of people travelling to Syria and Iraq from Germany has risen dramatically with an increase of 122 per cent within one year. The BfV is right when it points out that ""ISIL" is pursuing a global agenda" and is by no means limiting itself to the Islamic world in its activities and recruitment efforts. "ISIL" is clearly focusing its propaganda and recruitment activities on Europe and Germany. According to the BfV, the terror organization has "developed into the most important port of call for would-be jihadis from Germany". Yet another reason why there is an urgent need for devising a comprehensive concept for preventing Islamist radicalization. The great majority of approaches to date have been too vague, and hardly any empirical investigations have been carried out to examine their chances of success.

A national agenda for countering Islamism is crucial: five potential courses of action.

The following ideas for a successful strategy are intended to further a debate that needs to take place in society on how to prevent the number of Islamist followers in Germany from rising further.

1. Promote a historical-critical exegesis of the Quran

One central challenge for Islamic theology is the development of a historical-critical exegesis of the Quran so that misguided extremists will no longer be able to justify their atrocities with the Muslims' holy texts. At the center of such historical-critical work there should be efforts to place the passed-down written records of Islamic tradition into the context of their formation, both in place and in time. It should be possible to interpret passed-down statements from the early seventh century for application to societies of the 21st century. Of course, the initiative for such textual criticism of the Quran within Islam will have to come from Muslims. Some isolated examples of such interpretation of the Quran already exist in the Muslim world.

That said, one should be permitted to state the hope that departments of Islamic theology at German universities in particular will focus on this task and devote greater resources to it. Concerted efforts must be made to support voices within Islamic theology circles who are engaged in such historical-critical exegesis of the Quran and to defend them against the partly dogmatic arguments of the critics from the Islamic associations. The head of the Centre for Islamic Theology at Münster University, Professor Mouhanad Khorchide, and the Islam scholar Abdel-Hakim Ourghi from Freiburg have been promoting an open-

minded interpretation of Islamic texts for years.

After the attacks on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and on a Jewish supermarket chain in early January, which were motivated by Islamist ideology, Khorchide stated that he did not rate "the statement that Islam and Islamism have nothing to do with each other" and demanded that Islamic theology should take a more critical look at parts of Islamic tradition that were totally outdated. For his part, Ourghi, who is a recognized Quran expert, explained: "Ever since the eighth century, attempts have been made to reform Islam, but the reformers frequently paid for their efforts with their lives. A reform in the European context requires a historical-critical reading of these sources, for instance to question Islam's claim for dominance and to revitalize its ethical and humanistic force."

As long as it is impossible to discuss problematic sections of Islamic texts and these have not been subjected to a historical-critical analysis, there will always be religious illiterates who misinterpret the texts (intentionally) in order to misuse them for their extremist purposes. One can only concur with Ourghi's demand that the "freedom of the individual must be firmly established as *summum bonum*" (highest good) in Islam as well" and that consequently "constructive criticism of the religion (…) (should) no longer be considered an insult so that Muslims will no longer be pushed unwittingly into the role of victim". The fact that constructive criticism of religions is permitted is considered a matter of course in a secular constitutional state and is consequently also in the interest of Muslims themselves. There is basically a need for raising awareness about Islam's diversity. As long as the heterogeneity of Islamic schools of thought and the different manifestations of Islamic interpretations of past centuries are not being openly discussed, there will be room for a perverted interpretation of Islam.

2. Expand Islamic religious education and interreligious projects at schools

The majority of the Islamists/Salafists taking the trip from Germany to "ISIL"-controlled territory can be described as religious illiterates. Only very few of them appear to be capable of understanding the complexity of the Islamic texts in their entirety – let alone in Arabic, the holy language of Islam. As the Salafist movements tend to operate using the local language (French in France and German in Germany), such movements are finding it easy to convert young people to their cause using simple – supposedly religious – messages.

The introduction of religious education geared towards Muslim pupils by teaching staff educated in Germany and in the German language is therefore a necessary step in taking preventative action against a strengthening of Islamist movements. Young Muslims in particular must be encouraged to engage in a considered, historical-critical interpretation of their faith and become familiar with the diversity of branches of Islam and different possible interpretations. Approaching their religion confidently and being able to articulate opinions about Is-

lamic principles of faith as well as being familiar with the theological content of Islam will make young people more self-assured when faced with potential recruitment attempts by Islamists.

It will also strengthen the important feeling that Muslims too are entitled to religious education in German schools and are therefore granted opportunities to discuss religious issues at school like their Christian and Jewish fellow pupils. Islamic religious education at German schools can also prevent contents that are not in accordance with the free and democratic constitutional system being taught in dubious backstreet mosques. Greater efforts can also be made to enhance competences in interreligious dialogue in order to stress the numerous common elements of the monotheistic religions. However, as education policy is a matter dealt with at the federal state level in Germany, there are large differences in the 16 federal states where Islamic teaching is concerned. States such as Hesse and North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) have been offering Islamic religious education at schools for a number of years. In NRW, parents submit an application, with the minimum class size being 12. In the new federal states, there has so far not been any demand for Islamic religious education on account of the low numbers of Muslim residents.

One remaining question is which body can act as contact for the state with respect to drawing up the curriculum for Islamic religious education. As Islam does not have structures comparable to those in Christian Churches and the great

heterogeneity of Islam is also evident in Germany (74% Sunni, 13% Alevites, 7% Shia), it is difficult to identify partners with legitimisation to take part in the collaboration. With the exception of Ahmaddiya-Gemeinde, which is recognized as a statutory corporation (KdöR) in Hesse and Hamburg, no Islamic communities recognized in Germany have attained that status. The obvious route is therefore to cooperate even more strongly than before with scholars from the departments of Islamic theology at the universities when drawing up the curriculum. One ideal partner to involve in the work on the curriculum for Islamic religious education in schools would be "Deutsche Gesellschaft für Islamisch-Theologische Studien" (DE-GITS), which was founded in June 2015 and comprises Muslim scholars from all universities in Germany where Islamic theology is taught.

In any case, in a society that is becoming increasingly more heterogeneous in terms of people's religion and ethnicity, it makes sense to think about how basic knowledge about Islam could be conveyed in existing subjects, such as Social Studies (German: *Gemeinschaftskunde*). That would be a way to reduce prejudice and counter Islamophobic attitudes in Germany.

3. **Work towards establishing use of German to deliver sermons in mosques as a matter of course**

Arabic is the holy language of Islam. According to Islamic tradition, the uncreated Quran came down to the Prophet Muhammad from Allah directly in Arabic. To Islamic thinking, the beauty and complexity of the Arabic Quran by

themselves are proof of Allah's existence. Throughout the predominantly Muslim regions of the world, recitation of the Quran in Arabic and the muezzin's call for prayer in Arabic are considered links joining all Muslims. Arabic is therefore to be acknowledged unquestioningly as the language of Islamic practice.

The majority of the 2000 Islamic prayer rooms in Germany are organized along ethnic-cultural lines under various umbrella associations. The sermons in the DITIB mosques with links to Turkey, for instance, are mostly delivered in Turkish and those in mosques linked to the ZMD mostly in Bosnian or Arabic. The contents of the sermons dictated by the traditional and mostly conservative associations overwhelmingly fail to take sufficient account of the changed social reality in Germany.

Particularly third-generation Muslims living in Germany see themselves as German citizens of Muslim faith and therefore rightly as a natural part of Germany. Young German Muslims of this generation do not necessarily understand the language of their immigrant forebears and have difficulty following theological sermons delivered in Turkish, Arabic or another language.

Salafist movements turn this to their advantage. Salafist activists make a point of using the language of the country in which they operate. Campaigns such as the distribution of copies of the Quran in German cities, under the motto "LIES!" (Read) or members of the self-styled "sharia police" patrolling the streets are conducted consistently in German, for good reason. It

اعتمدت ألمانيا مبادرات عدة للوقاية من التطرف، أولها تعريف الشباب بالإسلام تعريفا صحيحا، إذ أن عدم معرفة الإسلام هي من أحد أسباب الإسلاموفوبيا التي بدأت تتزايد في أوروبا والتي تدفع الشباب المسلم في القارة للانضمام إلى الحركات الجهادية. وهناك أيضا محاولة الترويج لتفسير تاريخي نقدي للقرآن يوضح معنى الآيات وأسباب نزولها ويعطي تفسيرا غير عنفي للدين الإسلامي، إضافة إلى تعزيز التربية الإسلامية على مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي، إذ أن شباب اليوم يلجأون إلى الانترنت للحصول على إجابة حول استفساراتهم. فإلى جانب الأجوبة التي أغرق المتطرفون بها الشبكة العنكبوتية، لا بد من وجود مادة أخرى مضادة ترسم صورة أخرى للإسلام.

وتعتمد ألمانيا أيضا في محاولتها للوقاية من التطرف مقاربة غير عنفية مع الشباب المعرّضين للتطرف أو الذين سلكوا طريق التطرف وتحاول التقرّب منهم لدفعهم الى تغيير معتقداتهم.

تشهد ألمانيا حاليا نموا للتطرف بين أفراد جيل المهاجرين الثالث الذين كبروا وترعرعوا فيها ويتكلمون لغتها وهم من مواطنيها، إضافة إلى الشباب الذين يعتنقون الإسلام. ودفع هذا المشهد المسؤولين إلى محاولة استكشاف أسباب هذه الظاهرة بشكل جدي، وهذا جهد مشترك بين الأجهزة الأمنية والمؤسسات التربوية والإعلامية، تساهم فيه المؤسسات الإسلامية لكبح سوء استغلال الدِّين.

الوقاية من التطرّف: مقاربة مبتكرة

توماس فولك

يسيطر تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام (داعش) على مساحة من الأراضي في سوريا والعراق توازي مساحة بريطانيا، يقيم عليها ثمانية ملايين شخص يتعرضون يوميا لتأثير عقيدته السلفية. والتحق بتنظيم داعش أكثر من 30 ألف مقاتل أجنبي، جاء معظمهم من تونس ومن دول أوروبية كفرنسا وألمانيا. ويواجه العديد من الدول الأوروبية خطر نمو التطرف الإسلامي بين مواطنيها على الرغم من أن معظمهم كبر وترعرع في أرجائها. وعدد كبير من الذين انضموا إلى الجماعات الإسلامية المتطرفة هم من الذين اعتنقوا الإسلام حديثا، إضافة إلى عدد كبير من الجيل الثالث للمهاجرين المسلمين إلى أوروبا، بينهم عدد لا يستهان به من النساء. ويلعب الانترنت دورا مهما في تعزيز «الجهاد الإلكتروني»، حيث تستخدم الجماعات الإسلامية المتطرفة الشبكة الإلكترونية في عمليات التجنيد ونشر عقيدتها والدعاية لها والتخطيط لعمليات ضد المرافق الاستخباراتية والأمنية الحساسة. ولا بدّ أن تعتمد أوروبا استراتيجية جديدة تكون شاملة وموسعة لاجتثاث التطرف والوقاية منه، على أن يكون وضعها عملا مشتركا بين الأجهزة الأمنية والمؤسسات التربوية والإعلامية إضافة إلى المؤسسات الإسلامية.

تعاني ألمانيا من مشكلة التطرف الديني إذ هناك أربعة ملايين مسلم يعيشون فيها،

بينهم 43.890 إسلامي، 31 ألف منهم يعيشون تحت مظلة القانون ولا يشكلون خطرا. وأكثر ما يقلق ألمانيا هو ازدياد عدد السلفيين إذ ارتفع عددهم من 3800 عام 2011 إلى 8000 عام 2015، غادر 750 منهم البلاد للإلتحاق بداعش والمنظمات الإسلامية المتطرفة الأخرى في العراق وسوريا، حيث قتل 100 منهم وعاد إلى ألمانيا ربعهم أي نحو 200 شخص.

وعن مظاهر هذا التطرف الديني السلفي هناك ثلاث فئات:

السلفيون المتزمتون (Puristic) الذين يعيشون وفق رؤيتهم المتزمتة للإسلام ويمكن التعرف عليهم من ملبسهم وطريقة عيشهم.

السلفيون السياسيون أو ما يسمى بالحركات السلفية السياسية

السلفيون الجهاديون وهم الموالون للجهاد والأكثر عرضة للتطرف العنفي

وعن أسباب التطرف، فهي متعددة ومتشابكة ترتبط بجوانب اجتماعية ونفسية وعقائدية. وتستخدم الحركات الإسلامية المتطرفة وسائل متعددة للتجنيد أخطرها هو الانترنت، حيث تم عبره استقطاب عدد من النساء اللواتي تركن أسرهن للانضمام إلى داعش سعيا وراء البطولة، ودفع بعدد آخر من الشباب إلى اعتناق الإسلام للانضمام إلى الجماعات المتطرفة.

has become known that many of the Germans travelling to "ISIL" territory first came into contact with the Salafist milieu at the stands of the "LIES!" campaign.

To young people in difficult domestic situations, to those looking for guidance and meaning, German-speaking, charismatic imams, such as Pierre Vogel alias Abu Hamza or Ibrahim Abou Nagie, who make clever use of youth jargon, represent an attractive and most importantly comprehensible alternative to the partly dogmatic imams of the established mosque associations, whose sermons have little to do with their daily lives. According to El-Mafaalani, young Muslims regard the large Islamic associations in particular as "institutions of the adults – conventional, defensive and boring". As far back as 2012, taz journalist Wolf Schmidt stated in his analysis: "The success of the Salafist movement is due not only to a failure of the social majority, but also of the large Muslim associations, from the DITIB to the VIKZ, the Association of Islamic Cultural centers, to the ZMD, the Central Council of Muslims in Germany. They have not succeeded in engaging sufficiently with the second and third generation of immigrants, nor with the young converts from a German ethnic background, who are frequently seeking guidance. Instead of hearing imams imported from Turkey drone on, they prefer to listen to what the Salafist instant imams tell them in German, at public events, on the Internet or at Islam seminars that frequently last several days".

The phenomenon of the "imported imams" coming mainly from Turkey, most of whom still have a poor grasp of the German language, is another reason why ever larger numbers of young Muslims may be attracted to Salafist movements with their simple answers to complex circumstances, with their division of the world into good and evil, into the permitted and the forbidden.

It may therefore well be worthwhile to consider offering German in addition to the obligatory liturgical language of Arabic for delivering sermons in mosques. If anybody who is interested can visit a mosque and follow the sermon in German, this will make it easier to reduce existing prejudice against "the religion of Islam", and young Muslims, who generally have better German language skills than their parents and grandparents, will ideally not seek out Salafist activists to find simplistic answers if they can follow theological sermons.

If the associations overseeing mosques in Germany were to commit themselves voluntarily to hold their sermons predominantly in German, this would not only have a preventative impact but also a huge signaling effect in encouraging integration. Visitors to mosques who do not speak German might find a model realized by the DITIB communities attractive. For several years, sermons have been delivered in both German and Turkish and can therefore be understood by a broad public. Thanks to opportunities for students to study Islamic theology at German universities, a new generation of imams will make their mark on the local mosque landscape anyway in the future.

4. Employ more Muslim chaplains in prisons

Muslim chaplains play a central role for prevention in an Islamist context. Prisons represent an ideal breeding ground for Islamist radicalization. During a phase when people are looking for stability and orientation, for meaning and re-socialization, increasing numbers of prison inhabitants are coming into contact with other inmates who have already been radicalized and are hoping to find an alternative to their previous way of life in Islamist circles. Sociologist El-Mafaalani described how serious the situation is by stating that "some prisons are recruitment offices"33. Denis Cuspert alias Deso Dogg, a former rapper who grew up in Berlin-Neukölln, converted to Islam – or more precisely to Islamism – during his time in prison and ended up travelling to "ISIL" - controlled territory in Syria via Egypt in the spring of 2014. Today, Cuspert is one of the most influential jihadist Salafists from Germany, who is attracting attention particularly through his propaganda videos posted online and attempting to recruit new jihadists.

Besides radicalization in prisons, there have been increasing reports of Salafist activities in the vicinity of prison buildings throughout Germany. Small groups of Salafists are frequently waiting outside prisons with the specific intention of offering newly released prisoners help and assistance with reintegration into daily life. The Salafists provide support with finding a place to stay and find work, introduce the ex-prisoners to a "new" circle of friends and give them practical advice and help.

The Münster sociologist Aladin El-Mafaalani coined the following phrase for this: "Salafists are better social workers." They look after other people's interests; they are there when they are needed, and they provide the feeling of a replacement family, a community and sense of belonging.

It is therefore a matter of urgency for the number of positions for Muslim chaplains in prisons to be increased substantially. More Muslim chaplains should also be employed in the military and the police. There is a need for greater sensitisation to Muslim concerns in all public authorities and for greater attention to be paid to the needs of specific religious groups. Once again, as in the case of Islamic religious education, choosing the right contacts for collaboration is of great importance. The obvious solution here as well is to cooperate with university departments of Islamic theology to provide training for specialist personnel to ensure that Muslim chaplains working in the sensitive penal environment are law-abiding and feel committed to the free and democratic constitutional state and a historical-critical interpretation of the Quran. An evaluation of the first few projects in this area – e.g. a campaign entitled "Verantwortung übernehmen – Abschied von Hass und Gewalt" (English: Accepting responsibility – abdicating hate and violence), conducted by the Violence Prevention Network (VPN), which has been doing good work for a number of years – clearly demonstrates that the number of recidivists has gone down.

5. Strengthen education about Islam on the Internet – provide more alternatives to Islamic websites

Anybody who wishes to seek information about Islam on the Internet these days will quickly find themselves on one of the numerous Islamist websites. In a world characterized by rapid digital change and at a time when young people in particular obtain most of their information from the Internet and only rarely from books, information about Islam that is accessible online is becoming increasingly important. Islamist and Salafist organizations are continuously increasing their online presence and most of them have their own Facebook and Twitter profiles, professional-looking websites and some even their own YouTube channels. "Online jihad" has been a reality for some time now and represents one of the central challenges of our times because of its dynamic nature.

Today, it is more important than ever to be proactive and offer alternatives to Islamist websites using promotional videos and websites about an Islam that is considered and lived peacefully. One should, for instance, consider producing informative video clips about Islamic religious content and issues of daily Muslim life in collaboration with the university departments of Islamic theology and Islamic studies in a manner to be easily understood and appealing to the young and marketing these effectively through the media with the assistance of prominent models of Muslim faith. Initiatives such as that by the bpb, the German Federal Agency for Civic Education, which has recently

launched a project involving YouTube star LeFloid, should therefore be welcomed and supported at the political level. Successfully reclaiming the Internet for the purposes of promoting a peaceful interpretation of Islam will require more forceful online action and measures to provide practical answers to issues of daily life in comprehensible (youth-friendly) language, thus denying Islamist/Salafist movements one of its most important recruitment and propaganda platforms.

Summary and Outlook

Islamist and Salafist radicalization has been increasing steadily in Germany for years. There are a number of reasons for people to succumb to this radicalization, including political, ideological, sociological and psychological ones. Several factors frequently reinforce each other and lead to radicalization irrespective of gender and social and religious origins. Concepts to counter Islamism aim at nipping radicalization tendencies in the bud or at stopping or even reversing them. Young people demonstrating a commitment to the free and democratic constitutional system and the rules of the secular state in Germany should remain of crucial importance to society as a whole. It is essential to show greater self-confidence in promoting a "value-defending culture" in Germany, aimed at safeguarding our fundamental liberties and basic rights. Anybody who has consciously decided to embrace an Islamist world view, thereby placing God's sovereignty over national sover-

eignty, rejecting gender equality and wanting to introduce sharia instead of Basic Constitutional Law, will be very hard to resocialise. Prevention is therefore crucial.

To date, there is no comprehensive, well thought-out preventative concept in place in Germany. Drawing up a national concept for preventing Islamic radicalization involving a partnership of responsibility between security, education and social welfare authorities would set an important signal. Efforts should also be made to bring on board the mosque associations, the university departments of Islamic theology as well as web-savvy Muslim youth groups as additional partners. While such models have already been initiated in some federal states, there is still no country-wide campaign for the prevention of Islamist radicalization. More efforts will have to be made to educate imams as ambassadors of democracy and to expand projects of encounter and exchange between Muslims and Jews. In any case, projects to pre-empt anti-Semitic tendencies should be furthered particularly strongly.

Country-wide measures such as "Demokratie leben!" (Live Democracy!), which has been allocated 40.5 million euros for projects for the prevention of extremism at community level for 2015 alone, are pointing the way. Within the European Union, approximately one billion euros will be available for de-radicalization programs between now and 2020.

The prevention of Islamist radicalization is a challenge for society as a whole. A historical-critical exegesis of the Quran, the expansion of Islamic religious education in schools, more widespread use of German to deliver sermons in Mosques, employment of more Muslim chaplains, and the setting up of websites promoting considered Islam that will appeal to young people will be able to curb the alarming tendency of increasing Islamist radicalization.

Muslims are part of Germany. Islamists should realize that they are up against an alliance of free-thinking democrats self-confidently defending the free and democratic constitutional system – not dictated by any religion.

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HUMAN GIVENS APPROACH IN DEALING WITH COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

The Human Givens Approach is a set of organizing ideas that provides a holistic, scientific framework for understanding the way that individuals and society work. At its core is a highly empowering idea: that human beings, like all organic beings, come into this world with a set of needs. It is a simple approach to understanding human behavior but it is far from being simplistic. We now have a much fuller understanding of human needs. We now know that having meaning and purpose, a sense of volition and control, being needed by others, having intimate connections and wider social connections, status, appropriate giving and receiving of attention etc, are crucial for health and well-being.

And we also know that when one's needs are not met, the person will react, and the extent of his reaction will be in line with the level of deprivation. If we apply this logic to the political reality, we will find that governments in the Arab world, for example, do not meet the needs of their citizens, and therefore we should not be startled by the occurrence of reactions that could reach terrorist behavior. This theory is not simplistic, yet it straight-forwardly reflects the existent reality: Terrorist groups recruit by preying on human needs that are unmet. In that vein, extremist movements starve to fulfill some of the human needs, and they are proficient at attracting people and driving them to comply with their demands. Mass movements such as the phenomenon of violent extremism we are witnessing today, only arise in certain conditions, when sturdy social structure is in a

فهم التطرّف من منظور نفسي

جون بل

اثبت اعتماد نظرية المعطيات البشرية (أي ارتباط سلوك الإنسان بمدى تلبية حاجاته الأساسية) في محاولة فهم ظاهرة التطرف العنفي وتاليا وضع مبادرات ناجحة لمواجهته جدواه، إذ أنه في حال عدم تلبية حاجات الإنسان سيقوم بردة فعل، وإذا كانت عملية القمع هذه كبيرة، سيكون رد الفعل كبيرا أيضا. وإذا ما طبقنا هذا المنطق على الواقع السياسي، نجد أن الحكومات في العالم العربي مثلا لا تلبي حاجات مواطنيها، وبالتالي علينا أن لا نتعجب من وجود رد فعل قد يصل إلى حد السلوك الإرهابي. وهذه النظرة للأمور ليست تبسيطية إذ أنها على بساطتها، تعبر عن الحقيقة: فالحركات المتطرفة تلبي بعضا من حاجات الإنسان وهي بارعة جدا في جذب الناس إليها ودفعهم للقيام بما تريد. إن التيارات الجماعية، كظاهرة التطرف العنفي التي نشهدها اليوم، تولد في ظروف محددة حين تكون البنية الاجتماعية مفككة، الأمر الذي ينطبق على العديد من الدول العربية وعلى فئة المهمشين في المجتمعات الغربية.

لا يوجد صورة نمطية واحدة تحدد شخصية المتطرف وظروف اجتماعية وسياسية واقتصادية وثقافية واحدة تساهم في نشأة الإرهاب. الأسباب التي غالبا ما تعطى لتفسير نشأة الإرهاب والتطرف العنفي كالفقر والجهل والتهميش الاجتماعي والاستبداد السياسي لا تنطبق على جميع الحالات. وأظهرت بعض الدراسات أن 48.5% من الجهاديين المجندين في الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا حاصلون على شهادات جامعية و44% منهم مهندسون. وترتفع نسبة الحاصلين على شهادات عليا بين المقاتلين الأجانب إلى 59%. وكشف تقرير للبنك الدولي لم ينشر عدم وجود علاقة بين ارتفاع نسبة فرص العمل وانخفاض وتيرة العنف. وهناك اختلاف في الدوافع بين المجندين المحليين والأجانب وبين البيئات الشرقية والغربية. وثلاثة أرباع الذين جندهم تنظيم داعش في الغرب كمقاتلين أجانب، تم تجنيدهم عبر أصدقاء أو أفراد من عائلاتهم، وهم يقعون في براثن التطرف بعد أن يطردوا من المساجد ويجندون في مطاعم الوجبات السريعة وملاعب الرياضة. ومعظم الأجانب الذين انضموا إلى داعش فعلوا ذلك إراديا، وتراوحت دوافعهم بين أوهام البطولة والسعي وراء المغامرة والرومنسية وحب السلطة والبحث عن الشعور بالانتماء، إلى جانب السعي للاكتفاء الروحي. أما دوافع المجندين المحليين فتتراوح بين الحوكمة غير الرشيدة والسعي للانتقام والمال وإنهاء احتلال أجنبي ودحر العدو، وهم يعتبرون أن الإرهاب وسيلتهم الوحيدة لتحقيق ما يسعون إليه.

وعن سبل مكافحة التطرف العنفي والوقاية منه، تبدأ الخطوة الأولى بإدراك ماهية هذه الظاهرة، تليها محاولة معالجة التفكك الاجتماعي الذي يعتبر بيئة خصبة لنشأة التيارات المتشددة، إضافة إلى أهمية تقديم قضايا بديلة ملهمة للشباب تحل مكان القضايا الانتحارية التي تستخدمها الحركات المتطرفة لجذبهم.

ولا بدّ من التوضيح إلى أن اعتماد سياسة رصد الإرهابيين، وبخاصة في المجتمعات الأوروبية، غير قابلة للتطبيق لجهة تطلبها الآلاف من رجال الأجهزة الأمنية، كما أن اللجوء إلى معاقبة الإرهابيين يجعلهم يغرقون أكثر في أوهامهم.

من المهم الإشارة إلى أنه بين عامي 1968 و2006، هزم فقط 7% من الجماعات الإرهابية، وعلى الغرب تقديم الدعم المالي والتقني والاجتماعي لحلفائه في الشرق الأوسط الذين تمكنوا من إبقاء داعش خارج حدودهم.

state of disintegration. This is a good description of parts of the Arab world, and of isolated pockets of our own Western society.

We all know there is no one background profile of a violent extremist or terrorist, nor specific social, economic, cultural and psychological conditions that lead to the rise of terrorism; the reasons often given to explain the emergence of terrorism and violent extremism, such as poverty, ignorance, social marginalization and political tyranny do not apply to all cases. Studies have shown that 48.5% of jihadi recruited in the Middle East and North Africa had a higher education of some sort, of these 44% had degrees in engineering. Among Western-recruited jihadi, that figure rose to 59%. An unpublished report by the World Bank shows no link between increased employment and decreased violence.

Moreover, there is a difference between foreign recruits' motives and local ones, as well as between Western and Eastern contexts. Three-quarters of those who become foreign fighters for the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) are recruited through friends and 20% through family members, and ironically, in the West, it is often when they are expelled from Mosques that they radicalize and they are recruited in fast food hangouts and soccer fields. Most foreign fighters who have joined

extremist groups did so willingly, triggered by a broad array of motives such as: pursue of a heroic path, desire of adventure, activism, romance, power, belonging, along with spiritual fulfillment. As for local recruiters, driving factors fluctuate from bad governance to money enticement, to seeking revenge, ending occupation and defeating the enemy. They perceive terrorism as the sole means to reach their goals.

The first step in any countering initiative should be understanding this phenomenon, to be followed by healing social disintegration considered as the seedbed of extremist movements, and offering to vulnerable to be-recruiters positive inspiring causes to replace the suicidal ones used by extremists as pull-factor. Keeping a track policy is impossible especially in Europe, as it requires thousands of unavailable security agents.

Finally, Counter-terrorist policies which are only based on a narrow range of repressive mechanisms and military measures tend to become overly heavy-handed, producing serious negative side-effects which serve to enhance the problem rather than reducing it and push those who already chose the path of violence deeper into their imagination. Between 1968 and 2006, only 7% of terrorist groups were militarily defeated, and it is the West duty to provide financial, technical and social support to their allies in the Middle East who manage to keep ISIL outside their borders.

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UNDERSTANDING EXTREMISM :
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
HUMAN GIVENS APPROACH

The Human Givens approach is a set of organizing ideas that provides a holistic, scientific framework for understanding the way that individuals and society work. At its core is a highly empowering ide : Human beings come into this world with a set of needs. If those needs are met appropriately, it is not possible to be mentally ill.

To get our physical and emotional needs met, nature has gifted us with our very own internal 'guidance system', which together with our needs, make up what we call the human givens. We come into the world with an instinctive knowledge of what we need and with a set of inner resources that can help us get our needs met, provided we use them properly and are living in a healthy environment.

Humans have several basic emotional needs :

– Security : A sense of safety and an environment in which people can live without experiencing excessive fear so that they can develop healthily.

– Autonomy and control : A sense of autonomy and control over a person's life economically, emotionally and professionally.

– Status : A sense of status - being accepted and valued in the various social groups we belong to.

– Connection to the wider community : We have evolved as a group of animals and need to feel part of something larger than ourselves.

– Intimacy : Emotional connection to other people-friendship, love, intimacy, fun.

– Competence and achievement : A sense of our own competence and

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achievements, that we have what it takes to meet life's demands , which boost our self-esteem

– Meaning and purpose and spiritual sustenance : A sense of meaning and purpose which comes from being stretched in what we do and how we think. It is through 'stretching' ourselves mentally or physically by service to others, learning new skills or being connected to ideas or philosophies bigger than ourselves that our lives become purposeful and full of meaning.

The Human Givens model also consists of a set of 'resources' (abilities and capabilities) that all human beings are born with, which are used to get the innate needs met. These constitute what is termed an 'inner guidance system'. Learning how to use these resources well is seen as being crucial to achieving and sustaining robust bio-psycho-social health as individuals and as groups.

These resources are : Memory, ability to communicate with others, imagination, rational thinking, the ability to know and understand the world, the ability to step back and be objective and the ability to dream.

What happens when our needs are not being met ? Humans in this case will get emotional and often act foolishly. When one loses control over his life he/she will also lose control over himself/herself, and when he/she loses his self-esteem he/she will be disoriented and when he/she becomes anxious he/she will get depressed. If these disturbances occur with means to fulfill human innate need for recklessness and

adventure, he/she will use his/her resources such as memory, imagination and ability to acquire new skills in reckless gears such as terrorism.

As for the triggers that turn youngsters to extremism, he spoke about their growth in sick environments, preventing them from fulfilling their needs and obstructing their advance and the nurture of their internal guidance system. He also spoke about mental illness or defect of the brain caused by physical or psychological reasons.

Human beings need a rational mind to organize their thoughts and to possess a clearer view of the world's issues. They need a systematic way of thinking more than beliefs and ideologies.

فهم التطرّف من منظور نفسي
نظريّة المعطيات الإنسانيّة
إيفان تيرال

من المهم فهم السلوك البشري من خلال منهج المعطيات الإنسانية، أي ربط السلوك بحاجات الإنسان الفطرية ومدى تلبيتها. لدى الإنسان عدة حاجات عاطفية أساسية هي:

ــ الأمن: الإنسان بحاجة إلى الشعور بالأمان وإلى العيش في بيئة لا خوف فيها لكي ينمو.

ــ الإستقلالية والسيطرة: الإنسان بحاجة لأن يكون مستقلا ومسيطرا على حياته بجوانبها الاقتصادية والعاطفية والمهنية.

ــ المكانة: الإنسان بحاجة لكي يكون لديه مكانة في المجتمع الذي يعيش فيه ليشعر بأنه عضو فاعل فيه.

ــ الارتباط بالمجتمع: الإنسان حيوان اجتماعي بحاجة للانفتاح على مجتمعه ليكون جزءا منه.

ــ الحميمية: الإنسان بحاجة إلى التواصل العاطفي مع الآخرين (الصداقة والحب والعلاقة الحميمة والمتعة).

ــ الكفاءة والإنجاز: الإنسان بحاجة ليشعر بأنه كفء، يتمتع بما يلزم لمواجهة متطلبات الحياة وحقق انجازات تعزز من احترامه لنفسه.

ــ المعنى والهدف والقوت الروحي: الإنسان بحاجة لإعطاء معنى لحياته وتحديد هدف يصبو إليه ويجعله يتخطى نفسه بسلوكه وفكره. وتكون حياة الإنسان هادفة وذات معنى عندما يتخطى نفسه فكريا وجسديا عبر خدمة الآخرين واكتساب مهارات جديدة والإيمان بأفكار أوفلسفات أكبر منه.

يتكوّن نموذج المعطيات الإنسانية أيضا من مجموعة من «الموارد» (قدرات وإمكانيات) يولد جميع البشر وهم يتمتعون بها ويستخدمونها لتلبية حاجاتهم الفطرية. وتشكل هذه الموارد ما يسمى بـ «نظام التوجيه الداخلي». أن تعلم كيفية استخدام هذه الموارد بشكل جيد، يعد أمرا حيويا في تمتع الأفراد والمجموعات بصحة جسدية ونفسية واجتماعية صلبة والمحافظة عليها.

أما عن ماهية هذه الموارد فهي: الذاكرة، القدرة على التواصل مع الآخرين، المتخيلة، التفكير العقلاني، القدرة على معرفة وفهم العالم، القدرة على الموضوعية والقدرة على الحلم.

ماذا يحصل عندما لا تتم تلبية حاجاتنا؟ غالبا ما يصاب الإنسان بانفعالات عندما يحصل ذلك ويتصرف بحماقة. فعندما تختل سيطرة الإنسان على حياته يختل هو أيضا وعندما يفقد احترامه لنفسه يصاب بالضياع وعندما يكون قلقا يصاب بانهيار عصبي. وإذا ما تزامن ذلك مع توفر وسيلة تحقق له حاجته الفطرية للتهور والمغامرة، يستغل موارده كالذاكرة الطويلة والقدرة على التعلم واكتساب مهارات جديدة والقدرة على التخيل في أمور متهورة، كالإرهاب مثلا.

أما الأسباب التي تدفع الشباب إلى التطرف فأولها وجودهم في بيئات لا تسمح لهم بالنمو ولا تلبي حاجاتهم بل على العكس تحد من هذا النمو. والسبب الثاني هو وجودهم في بيئة لا تساعدهم على تنمية قدرة التوجيه الذاتية. السبب الثالث هو الإصابة بأمراض نفسية أو بخلل في عمل الدماغ ناتج عن سبب جسدي أو نفسي.

إن الإنسان بحاجة إلى تنظيم أفكاره لمساعدته على التفكير ورؤية الأمور بشكل اوضح، وهو أيضًا بحاجة إلى التفكير بشكل سليم ومنطقي أكثر من حاجته إلى معتقدات.

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UNDERSTANDING JIHADISTS IN THEIR OWN WORDS

Tackling the question of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) necessitates a thorough understanding of the psychology of its fighting force and their state of mind prior to recruitment. Literature on the organization has focused on the "who, when, and how," leaving much to be desired with regard to the "why," which, when it is addressed, tends to fall short in terms of personal testimonies of a sizable sample of ISIL fighters. Instead, most published accounts rely on a few isolated and/or unrepresentative encounters with ISIL detainees and defectors at best, or else on generic analyses of terrorism and counter-radicalization experts.

This White Paper edition aims at filling these gaps while also revisiting some of the more dubious narratives on ISIS' raison d'être and état d'âme. It does not claim to be absolute or exhaustive of the full realities. Nonetheless, its relevance rests on the breadth and originality of its content. All of the findings are based on one-on-one interviews with ISIL' and other extremist organizations' fighters in Syria and Iraq, who are currently either detained, defected or still operating. The interviews themselves were accessed mainly through television programs on Saudi and Iraqi channels, inter alia, that were later transcribed into an academic categorization matrix and coding tool from which conclusions were derived. The forty-nine sampled fighters were profiled into nine categories of seekers and categorized by geographical origin : External fighters, both Western and Arab ;

and internal fighters, operating in their countries of origin, i.e., Iraqis in Iraq.

The study key-finding was the classification of extremist fighters into 9 categories, based on the push-factors that led them to join the ranks of ISIL and other extremist groups:

– Status Seekers (77% are local fighters): They want to improve their social standing; their main drives are money, employment and certain recognition by others around them.

– Identity Seekers (63% are foreign fighters): Need the identity that comes from belonging to a group.

– Revenge Seekers (80% are local fighters): Consider themselves to be part of an oppressed group, and thus want to inflict harm on their oppressors and anyone who might support them (oppressors).

– Redemption Seekers: Perceive their engagement in Jihadi enterprise as a vindication from previous sinful ways of living.

– Responsibility Seekers: Value family ties and want to preserve their family's well-being

– Thrill Seekers (67% are Arab fighters): Are filled with energy and drive. They want to prove their potential/power by accomplishing an arduous task or surviving a harrowing adventure.

– Ideology Seekers (7% of the study sample): Are mainly in search of a certain world view that they can identify with and the "Islamic Ummah" provides a pre-packaged transnational ideology. The ideology seekers aim at "imposing" their world view on at least one other group.

– Justice Seekers: Consider what is happening in the conflict areas as a major injustice and feel they have a certain inner calling to reverse this injustice.

– Death Seekers: Have most probably suffered from a significant trauma/loss in their lives and consider death as the only way out with a reputation of martyr instead of someone who has committed suicide.

Other push factors were also detected such as: Defending Sunnis (15), Jihad (11), extremist environment (8), Being Muslim and the Syrian war (8), money (6), former prisoners (5), and being anti-Western culture.

Ultimately, this White Paper edition demystifies some existing theories on ISIL & co. For one, Islam is not the full side of the story. As the wording of the fighters suggest, Islam is a means to an end and not the end itself. Alternative, earthly pursuits seem to be the underlying end for a majority of

sampled fighters. Second, ISIL is not a monolithic entity driven by ideology alone. It seems the allure of individual power and richness instigated by a context of marginalization and deprivation overrides the collective rallying behind a self-styled Ummah chronicle.

One hopes that upcoming literature on ISIL (and its cohorts) focuses more on a deeper understanding of the idea behind it, so one can understand, and hence, address it better.

الفئة السادسة هي فئة الذين يسعون وراء الإثارة، وتشمل دوافع انضمامهم إلى المنظمات المتطرفة رغبتهم بإثبات قوتهم من خلال تنفيذ مهام شاقة أو المرور بمغامرة مروعة. يشكل المقاتلون العرب 67% منهم (Thrill Seekers).

الفئة السابعة هي فئة الذين يسعون وراء عقيدة تعبر عن رؤيتهم للعالم ويجدون في مفهوم الأمة الإسلامية عقيدة متكاملة وعابرة للانتماءات الوطنية. يسعى هؤلاء إلى فرض عقيدتهم على الجميع، وشكلوا 7% من عينة الدراسة (Ideology seekers).

الفئة الثامنة هي فئة الذين يسعون إلى إحقاق العدالة ويرون في الصراعات التي تشهدها المنطقة ظلما يسعون إلى رفعه (Justice seekers).

الفئة التاسعة هي فئة الذين يسعون وراء الموت بسبب مواجهتهم لصدمة كبيرة في حياتهم فيعتقدون أن الموت هو سبيلهم الوحيد للخلاص. هؤلاء ينضمون إلى المنظمات المتطرفة لأنهم اختاروا أن يموتوا كأبطال بدلا من الانتحار (Death seekers).

ومن بعض الحوافز الأخرى للإنضمام إلى الحركات المتطرفة: الدفاع عن أهل السنة (15)، الجهاد (11)، البيئات المتطرفة (8)، الإنتماء إلى الإسلام والحرب في سوريا (8)، المال (6)، مساجين سابقين (5) ورفض الثقافة الغربية (4).

في نهاية المطاف، كشفت هذه الورقة البيضاء ضحالة بعض النظريات حول داعش ومثيلاتها. فالإسلام ليس لبّ الموضوع. وكما دلّ خطاب أغلبية المقاتلين، الإسلام ليس هدفا بحد ذاته وما هو إلا وسيلة لتحقيق أهداف دنيوية أخرى.

فهم التطرّف من منظور نفسي:
فهم الجهاديّين من خلال خطابهم
جان بيار قطريب

نستعرض اليوم ورقة بيضاء أعدتها كوانتوم بعنوان «فهم الجهاديّين من خلال خطابهم» (Understanding Jihadists in Their Own Words)، تهدف إلى الإحاطة بالأسباب التي دفعت بعض الأشخاص للانضمام إلى داعش وتنظيمات متطرفة أخرى في سوريا والعراق، مستندة إلى شهادات 49 منهم تتراوح أعمارهم بين 18 و43 عاما، إما اعتقلوا أو انشقوا عن هذه التنظيمات أو ما زالوا يقاتلون في صفوفها. بين هؤلاء، تسعة مقاتلين أجانب وتسعة مقاتلين عرب و31 مقاتلا محليا. رصدت الدراسة هذه الشهادات عبر الاستماع إلى 200 ساعة من البث التلفزيوني على أقنية سعودية وعراقية وغيرها لمقابلات شخصية مع هؤلاء الجهاديين، تم لاحقا تشفيرها ونقلها إلى مصفوفة تصنيف أكاديمية استخلصت النتائج عبرها.

اعتمدت هذه الدراسة على تحليل خطاب هؤلاء المقاتلين عبر تحديد الكلمات الدالة التي يستخدمونها للتعبير عن:

ـ نظرتهم إلى أنفسهم

ـ كيف يرون حدود قدراتهم

ـ القيم التي يعتبرونها إيجابية

ـ القيم التي يعتبرونها سلبية

وعليه، صنفت الدراسة الجهاديين إلى ثلاث فئات استنادا إلى أصولهم الجغرافية وهم فئة المقاتلين المحليين (العراقيون في العراق والسوريون في سوريا) وفئة المقاتلين الأجانب

وفئة المقاتلين العرب. وتوصلت الدراسة إلى تصنيف هؤلاء المقاتلين إلى تسع فئات، استنادا إلى الدوافع التي حدت بهم للالتحاق بداعش وباقي المنظمات المتطرفة وهي:

ـ الفئة الأولى هي فئة الذين يسعون ليكون لديهم مكانة، وتشمل الذين انضموا إلى المنظمات المتطرفة سعيا لتحسين وضعهم الاجتماعي. دوافعهم الأساسية هي جني المال، العمل والحصول على التقدير. يشكل المقاتلون المحليون 77% منهم (Status seekers).

الفئة الثانية هي فئة الذين يسعون إلى هوية، وتشمل الذين انضموا إلى المنظمات المتطرفة سعيا وراء هوية تمنحهم شعورا بالانتماء الى هيكلية اجتماعية معينة. يشكل المقاتلون الأجانب 63% منهم (Identity seekers).

الفئة الثالثة هي فئة الذين يسعون للانتقام، وتشمل الذين يعتبرون أنفسهم جزءا من فئة مقموعة وانضموا إلى المنظمات المتطرفة سعيا للانتقام ممن ظلمهم وكل من يواليهم. يشكل المقاتلون المحليون 80% منهم (Revenge seekers).

الفئة الرابعة هي فئة الذين انضموا إلى المنظمات المتطرفة للتكفير عن خطايا سابقة ارتكبوها (Redemption seekers).

الفئة الخامسة هي فئة الذين يسعون لتحمل مسؤولية عائلاتهم وانضموا إلى المنظمات المتطرفة سعيا لحماية أسرهم ومجتمعهم (Responsibility seekers).

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DEALING WITH EXTREMISTS :
APPLICABLE METHODS

A deep scrutiny of terrorism requires overviewing an array of factors and restraining from adopting prior interpretations to ascertain its nature without monitoring factual baselines that elucidate its essence. A series of fundamental points might help to understand violent extremism and could contribute to the development of systematic initiatives to counter it. The starting point in the process of understanding this phenomenon is the adoption of the principle of "do no harm" through resorting to rational rather than emotional analysis to ensure its clarity.

The second point is trying to figure out whether the goals of violent extremism are collective and violence is used as a tactic in an ongoing war or they are individual. The third point is determining what

behavior is problematic? Maintaining fundamentalist beliefs or putting deeds by ones words? Who is the enemy : non-violent extremists or violent extremists?

We also need to detect the short-term individual factors playing on the emergence of violent extremism (live events, local conditions) which may be different from the long-term factors affecting the massive violent extremism (ideological, social and environmental). Likewise, we should revisit prevailing ideas about leadership and responsibility within mainstream extremist groups, and acknowledge that it is currently a networked structure instead of being a hierarchical command/control structure. Equally, we should understand that the reasons behind the emergence of violent extremism in the West (foreign fighters) are

different from those in other communities, and every community should take it upon itself to recognize the local root-causes that have contributed to the emergence of violent extremism in order to be able to confront it.

We also need to recognize the role of the internet as element of network based violent extremism and a critical element for spreading extremist ideology and propaganda; to understand the relationship between online and personal contact which can be mutually supportive and very powerful. Additionally, we should comprehend the emotional context of propaganda to implement a similar one in counter narratives.

There are similar characteristics between individuals who have

chosen the path of violent extremism, and most Westerners who have gone this route have previous criminal records, which could indicate a pre-existing marginal life. We should not overestimate the role of religion as initiator, as opposed to motivator or director once someone is already involved in violent extremism. We should also highlight the difference between people born into and brought up in a religious environment, where there is a limited sense of choice, and converts who have made a choice, as well as the significance of personal psychological factors and mental health as push factors, especially in the case of foreign fighters.

As for initiatives that have been adopted so far to confront

extremism, none was a winning strategy. We will propose a series of questions that could be used as a road map to draft viable initiatives to contain violent extremism:

– What are the goals of these initiatives: Altering beliefs and behavior changing? What is the measure of success: to stop violent acts or deterring the extremist ideology that drives this violence?

– Whom these initiatives are reaching: Are they preventive aiming to reach the would-be extremists or they focus on the rehabilitation of those already involved in violent

العوامل النفسية الشخصية والصحة العقلية عند الأشخاص الذين يعتنقون التطرف العنفي فكرا وممارسة دورا مهما، وبخاصة لدى فئة المقاتلين الأجانب.

أما عن المبادرات التي اعتمدت حتى الآن لمواجهة التطرف، فأي منها لم ينجح حتى الآن. إلا أنه هناك عدد من التساؤلات قد تسمح الإجابة عليها برسم خارطة طريق حول الأمور الرئيسة التي يجب تسليط الضوء عليها في عملية احتواء التطرف العنفي:

ــ ما هي أهداف هذه المبادرات، تغيير المعتقدات أو تغيير السلوك؟ ما هو مقياس نجاحها، وقف العنف أم تغيير العقيدة المتطرفة؟

ــ من تستهدف هذه المبادرات: هل عليها أن تكون مبادرات وقائية تستهدف الأشخاص الذين لم يعتنقوا بعد التطرف العنفي، أم أنها مبادرات تركّز على إعادة تأهيل المتورطين؟ وهل يجب التركيز على الأشخاص الذين يدعمون هذا التوجه أو على الأشخاص الذين انخرطوا فيه ويقومون بأعمال عنيفة؟ هل عليها التعامل مع أسر المتطرفين؟ ما هي الأسس الواجب اعتمادها في وضع استراتيجية لمكافحة التطرف العنفي؟ هل تستخدم الدين أم تركز على الأوضاع الاقتصادية؟

أخيرا، لا بدّ من اعتماد سياسة مراقبة المفرج عنهم لرصد أي توجه للعودة إلى السلوك المتطرف إضافة إلى ضرورة تعزيز عملية إعادة دمجهم بالمجتمع.

extremism? Should they reach people who advocate terrorism or persons who are already engaged in violent acts? Do they have to engage with extremists' broader families? What are the foundations to be adopted in developing a strategy to contain violent extremism? Should

it use religion or should it focus on the economic factors?

Finally, a post-release monitoring policy to detect recidivism and strengthening the process of reintegration into society is crucial.

التعامل مع الإرهابيين: أساليب قابلة للتطبيق
ماكس تايلور

إن دراسة الإرهاب تتطلب دراسة مجموعة كثيرة من العوامل ومن الخطأ اعتماد التفسيرات المسبقة لتحديد ماهيته دون البحث أولا عن دلائل توضح جوهره. هناك سلسلة من النقاط الأساسية التي من شأنها المساعدة على فهم ظاهرة التطرف العنفي والمساهمة في تطويرمبادرات منهجية لمواجهته، أولها اعتماد مبدأ «عدم إلحاق الأذى» من خلال اللجوء إلى التحليل العقلي وليس العاطفي، ليأتي هذا التحليل واضحا. أما النقطة الثانية فهي محاولة معرفة أهداف التطرف العنفي وما إذا كانت جماعية تستخدم العنف كوسيلة تكتيكية في حرب دائرة أو هي أهداف فردية. والنقطة الثالثة هي تحديد نوع الممارسات التي يجب مواجهتها وهل هي العمل العنفي أو التفكير المتطرف أو كلاهما.

لا بدّ من معرفة العوامل المؤثرة على المدى القصير في نشأة التطرف العنفي الفردي (الأحداث المباشرة، والظروف المحلية) والتي قد تكون مختلفة عن العوامل طويلة المدى التي تلعب دورا في نشأته (أيديولوجية، والبيئة الاجتماعية). ومن الأهمية بمكان إعادة تقييم الأفكار السائدة حول القيادة والمسؤولية ضمن الجماعات المتطرفة الراهنة، وإدراك أنها باتت اليوم تقوم على أهمية الشبكات بدلا من اعتماد الهياكل الهرمية. كما لا بدّ من التمييز بين الأسباب الكامنة وراء ظهور التطرّف العنفي في الغرب (المقاتلين الأجانب) وتلك

الموجودة في مجتمعات أخرى، وعلى كل مجتمع المبادرة إلى معرفة الأسباب المحلية التي ساهمت في نشأة التطرف العنفي للتمكّن من مواجهته.

إلى هذا، من الضروري الاعتراف بدورالإنترنت في تعزيز هذه الظاهرة، من خلال الدور الذي تلعبه المواقع الإلكترونية المتطرفة في نشر العقيدة المتطرفة والدعاية لها والمساحة التي يتيحها للتواصل مباشرة مع الأشخاص بشكل يساهم في خلق روابط متينة بينهم. إضافة إلى ذلك، من المهم الإحاطة بالأساليب النفسية والعاطفية التي تعتمدها الحركات الأصولية لنشر عقيدتها لمواجهتها بأساليب مماثلة.

هناك سمات متشابهة بين الأفراد الذين يعتمدون السلوك المتطرف العنيف، إذ أن معظم الغربيين الذين سلكوا هذا الطريق لديهم سجلات جنائية سابقة، ومن هنا تأتي أهمية تسليط الضوء على فئة المهمشين في المجتمع.

لا بدّ من الإقرار بعدم جدوى المبالغة في الدور الذي يلعبه الدين كمحفز للتطرف العنفي، علما أن الدين قد يشكل دافعا بعد انخراط شخص ما في هذا النمط من السلوك. ويوجد اختلاف بين الأشخاص الذين يولدون وهم ينتمون إلى ديانة معينة وبين الذين قرروا بخيار شخصي اعتناق هذه الديانة، وتلعب